

Marta Studenna-Skrukwa
University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań

Two Poles of the Ukrainian Political Structure: Donbas and Galicia. Problem creating international Myths: ‘Supporters of the Ukrainian Extreme Nationalist Founded by Stepan Bandera’ versus ‘Thugs from Don’¹

Should rivers really be borders, then among the Ukrainian ones Dnepr is such a border, the biggest and the most centrally situated one. It is mainly the border between landscapes—wood covered hills, so called ‘mountains’ in the west, that is on the right bank, and a plane, steppe or wood covered steppe in the east (left bank). At the same time, the Right—Bank Region is ‘culturally immemorial’ traditionally agriculturally settled, whereas the Left-Bank Region, especially in its southern part—is colonised, nomadic, and proletarian, these are the former Wild Fields. The symptoms of that duality, as well as, related with it conflicts, determine the sense of Ukrainian perplexity. So generally speaking, the Left Bank Region does not allow Ukraine to turn towards Europe, and the Right Bank—towards Russia. Moreover, both antipodes have merged so strongly in everyday dimension, that separation, turning Dnepr into another border-national—cannot be taken into consideration. The only thing to be done is to endure each other’s presence and gradually unite in all the deeper dimensions. I have no doubt, however, that such integration is actually taking place. But the course of this process frequently stimulates despair.²

¹ Title inspired by the statement of a historian from Charkov D. Czorny, notes from the conversation from 22.10.2010

² J. Andruchowycz, *Diabeł tkwi w serze*, przeł. K. Kotyńska, O. Hnatiuk, R. Rusnak, Wołowiec 2007, p. 32.

In case of Ukraine, internally diversified, multi-ethnic, multi-denominational political construction, the formation of a nation is a secondary process in relation to the establishment of the state. Although, dating back to the 19th century Ukrainian nationalism, characteristic of contemporary political movements of middle-east Europe, aspired to creation of independent Ukraine, it eventually appeared on the map of the world, as a result of favourable international situation, not as articulated and achieved demand of Ukrainian nationalists. It is, therefore, the situation when the institution of the State becomes the main regulator of the process of the formation of the nation (or continuation of that process), and on the ideal assumption, natural element of which, remains harmonization of relations among various parts of the country.

In the intricate regional structure of Ukraine, two centres formed historically, presenting different concepts of Ukrainian national identity, and as a consequence mutually incompatible models of development of Ukraine. Both concepts are devised in regions situated on the opposite ends of the country, which present the greatest power for potential extrapolation. What is meant here, are Galicia and Donbas, within the frame of which, starting from 1991, two contradictory formulas of being Ukrainian are undergoing the reproduction. To make it simple, I assume that nowadays there are two models of expressing opinion about the Ukrainian³ past, none of which supports the consolidation of Ukrainian nation. They function as scientifically sanctioned sets of statements about the past reality, on the basis of which that reproduction takes place. After 1991 Ukrainian scientists had at their disposal contradictory paradigms of historical interpretation: works of the pre-Soviet school of Ukrainian historiography in its two trends: *narodnicki* and *derżawnicki*⁴ as well as

³ Extensive and insightful analysis of the national discourse in Ukrainian historiography and political debate (run on the indigenous ground as well as on the emigration) was presented by Tomasz Stryjek in the work: *Jakiej przeszłości potrzebuje przyszłość? Interpretacje dziejów narodowych w historiografii i debacie publicznej na Ukrainie 1991–2004*, Warszawa 2007.

⁴ Among the Ukrainian historians, especially emigration ones, for a long time there was a division of pre-soviet Ukrainian historiography into two trends: *narodnicki* and *derżawnicki*. In the first one, the whole 19th historiography and achievements of Michajł Hruszewski, who is the unquestionable leader of this school, are included. Wiaczesław Łypynski was the mentor of *derżawnicki* trend—which gathered all the researchers who considered as the fundamental category of the national discourse not—as *narodnicy* did—ethnic aspect, but indigenous elites and state organisations. This division was caused mainly by ambiguous attitude of Hruszewski—the father of Ukrainian historiography

created in the Marxist spirit, Soviet variant of Ukrainian history being an inherent part of the wider pattern of the history of all the USSR nations. They constituted sort of skeletons for new constructions, as they determined the turning points in history, offered the judgement of the events and participating in them heroes and also supplied methodological instructions. On the basis of these patterns of interpretation of history, there are two types of regional awareness in Ukraine. As a result two projects of Ukraine are formed, each of which aspires to being the whole nation one.

There are diametrically different projects, however, at the level of everyday life they do not play the leading role and do not exclude the possibility of communication among the members of the communities within which are created.

The discrepancy between Galic and Donbas formulas of being Ukrainian, of no importance to people in their everyday activity, can clearly be seen in the moments of political crisis, when the manipulation of populist slogans and carrying strong emotional impact historic arguments reaches the climax. Such formulas merely matching, wide and far from precise, mental categories of East and West Ukraine—absolutely contradictory and frequently aggressive towards each other—are simultaneously indispensable components of the idea of independent Ukraine. Irredenta of any other region of Ukraine would definitely mean undermining sovereignty of the country on international arena and triggering discussion on Kosowo casus in Eastern Europe, as well as, participation of external factors influencing the condition of the countries, which came into being after the demise of the USSR. As a result, the colourful Ukrainian cultural mosaic would suffer, being reduced by one of its components. However, Donbas or Galicia separatism would lead immediately to the

to the institution of the state. Ukrainian historians could not decide what rank was assigned to it by the first overall synthesis of the history of Ukraine. Till the outbreak of the revolution 1917-1920 he remained the supporter of the idea of solidarity of nations in the struggle against czarizm and to have Ukraine in the federal relationship with post-revolution Russia, and at the same time he became the first President of the Ukrainian People's Republic. According to the contemporary researcher, Ihor Hyrycz, such radicalization did not result from different paradigms of the Ukrainian history accepted by *narodnicy* and *derżawnicy*, but from dividing them differences in political views. From the sixties of the 20th century among the Ukrainian emigration historians formed fairly homogeneous national-state paradigm of Ukrainian history, so the previous division into *narodnicy* and *derżawnicy* has lost its significance. See.: I. Hyrycz, „*Narodnyctwo*” ta „*derżawnictwo*” w *ukrajinskiej istoriohrafiji*, „*Mołoda nacija*,” 2000, no. 4, www.smoloskyp.kiev.ua, after: *ibid.*, pp. 253-257, 263).

total collapse of Ukraine as independent country. It results from the fact that both these regions have become the centres of modernisation processes, their proto-Ukrainian identity was formed as the result and due to those processes, with reservation, that in both cases the modernisation took a different form.

Jarosław Hrycak drew attention to the differences and complications, resulting from the disregard for them, on the pages of the special edition of 'Ukraina Moderna,' a magazine devoted to the analysis of the three-stage sociological research, concerning differentiation in regional identity of Lwow and Donieck—informal capitals of both poles of the Ukrainian political construction.⁵

The identity of Lvov, being as it were, the focus serving the perception of the entire Ukrainian Galicia, is the offspring of the modernization project realized by Habsburgs, which Hrycak suggests to call 'modernization by bureaucracy.' it is connected with the situation when the initiators of the changes were not businessmen or bankers but officials. While Hrycak's statement that Lvov was the capital of the biggest and the most economically stable Austrian province, seems of little credibility, resulting from his argumentation conclusion, that the city developed as the administrative and cultural centre, not as the industrial one, is indisputable. There were urbanisation processes taking place there, forming the city tissue independently of the process of industrialisation.⁶

The role of analogical focus for the perception of the Donbas regional awareness is played by the identity generated in Donieck, being, however, the outcome of the industrial type of modernization. Juzówka—the centre of a great excavation region developing in the

⁵ Україна Модерна. Львів—Донецьк: соціальні ідентичності в сучасні Україні, ред. Я. Грицак, А. Портнов, В. Сусак, Київ—Львів, 2007 Special edition consisting texts laid down on the basis of the results of a common social project of the Institute of the Historical Studies at the I. Frank University in Lvov and the Michigan University carried out under the scientific supervision of Jarosław Hrycak. The sociological research within the projects was conducted at the election campaigns which should have activated the political identity of the respondents. Meanwhile, what is interesting, it was noted that if in respect of political identity the differences between the two cities are the biggest it is of little importance for both of them. In 2004 only 2,5% of the inhabitants of Donieck referred to themselves as communists, and only 14,5% of the interviewed from Lvov as nationalists. The results of the survey abolish therefore the stereotype about equating of Donieck inhabitants with the communists and Lvov inhabitants with nationalists Н. Черниш, о. Маланчук, *Динаміка ідентичностей мешканців Львова і Донецька: компаративний аналіз (1994–2004)*, [w:] *Україна Модерна...*, pp. 81, 302-303.

⁶ Я. Грицак, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

south-east outskirts of Russia from the 18th century, forming the most spectacular example of the success of the Russian industrialisation,⁷ has developed in a different way from other czar Russia cities. In the Russian Empire cities developed (like Galicia Lvov) as the centres of administrative, not industrial character.⁸ In Juzówka, meanwhile, the opposite tendency occurred: the industrial boom from the beginning of the 19th century was hardly connected with urbanization and was not followed by development of urban infrastructure. Hrycak observes that contemporary Juzówka did not remind the centre of urban type, it was rather ‘a conglomeration of villages scattered around a great metallurgical factory.’⁹ Ignoring the difference between the processes which initiated the formation of modern identity in both regions leads to a mistake of methodological nature.

⁷ Term “Russian” is used here in the meaning of “pertaining to the eastern territories included in the Russian Empire”. For the beginning of the industrialization of the southern outskirts of Russia responsible became mostly the foreign capitals mainly French—Belgian, British and German. Long after the discovery of the coal in Donbas and iron ores in Kryvyy Rih czarism was not interested in investing in those regions, focusing mainly on the exploitation of the ores in Ural region. Most probably it was an outcome of an apprehension of too much independence of those regions from the central. The proof of this is lack of the train communication between Donieck Basin and Kryvyy Rih, although the economical considerations dictated the soonest inauguration of the communication between those regions. What’s more the development of the metallurgical industry of Dniepr side Ukraine was long dependent on the supply of raw iron from distant Russia terrains (Ural). At first the czarism administration treated both regions as sources of raw materials, of which processing was to be carried out much closer to the Centre. Only the increase of the foreign investments endangering the Russian economical interests pulled in the presence of the Russian capital to those territories. “Skeptical relation to the richness of the iron ores in Kryvyy Rih was characteristic for czarism as well as for the scientific associations almost up till 1880. Historical conflict of Kryvyy Rih and Ural was resolved by the interjection of the foreign capital endangering the Russian national interests” (М.Б. Вальф, *Географическое размещение русской промышленности*, Москва 1927, р. 42 [quoted after: I.B. Довжук, *Індустріальний Донбас в історії Наддніпрянської України (друга половина XIX—початок XX ст.*, Луганськ 2009, pp. 305-306]).

⁸ V.: P. Herlihy, *Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, [in:] *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. by I.L. Rudnytsky, Edmonton 1981 or later edition: ed. by I. L. Rudnytsky with the assistance of J.-P. Himka, Edmonton 1991.

⁹ Я. Грицак, *op. cit.*, pp. 34. Important also is the fact that the production activity in Juzówka still in the end of XIX century had a very little influence on surrounding territories. In nearby villages people still plowed with the wooden plow in which no. trace of metal was found. Besides the heavy industry no. other sections were really developing. (Ch. Wynn, *Workers, Strikes and Pogroms. The Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870–1905*, Princeton, 1992, pp. 15-25 [quoted after: *ibid.*])

[...] Ernest Gellner theory treats ‘modernization through nationalisation’ as a certain norm. Donieck is industrialised and not nationalized and therefore looks like an exception some ‘under-modernised, anomaly. Lwow, meanwhile, with its high level of of national mobilization is accepted as a norm and a model for Donbas.

However, Hrycak concludes:

[...] this way of thinking is inappropriate. There is no serious reason to consider nationalised Galicia as a model for (under)nationalised Donbas. Actually, the examples of lack of correlation between industrialisation and nationalism can be seen in both . It is worth comparing late imperial Juzówka, not with late Austrian Lvov, but contemporary Bortslaw (together with the lack of general identity among the workers and high level of anti-Semitism).¹⁰

Awareness of the difference of the nature of stimuli, which started the process of formation of the modern Ukrainian society, allows for putting the equality sign between the two Ukrainian social projects being shaped parallel in Galicia and Donbas. Under the notion of social project, after Iliia Kononow and Swietłana Chobta, I understand certain attitude of conviction and behaviour patterns conditioning the community reactions to reality challenges, therefore, taking part in determining the direction of its development. The core of the social project is its axiological dimension which appears in prescriptive system and is externally articulated in the form of ideology.¹¹ Even a cursory analysis of both Galicia and Donbas projects to observe how much opposing they are and how much the correspond with two disparate models of interpretation of Ukrainian history. The main premise of Donbas project is the postulate of formation of the modern Ukrainian nation on the basis of citizenship principle. In this context, the political and economic bonds are of much greater significance than ethnic and cultural ones, which belong more to the private sphere. An irreducible element of arising on the basis of the project formula of being Ukrainian is the Ukraine-Russia bi-culturalism (in some regions even multi-culturalism) and also Ukrainian- Russian bilingualism. As for economic matters the project assumes the development of heavy industry, mainly metallurgical and chemical, based on large

¹⁰ Я. Грицак, *op. cit.*, p. 57-58.

¹¹ І.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: від регіональних проєктів до загальнонаціональної перспективи розвитку*, (mpis w posiadaniu autorki), p. 4; С.В. Хобта, *Ціннісні орієнтації населення Галичини та Донбасу*, [in:] *Стосунки Сходу та Заходу України: суб’єкти, інтереси, цінності*, Зб. Наук. Пр.-Луганськ 2007, С. 111-116 (quoted after: *ibid.*).

enterprises linked up with the production cycle and on preferences for national capital. Donbas project does not suggest any specific political programme, if we assume that the idea of federalism from 2004, was merely a reaction to Wiktor Janukowycz presidential election defeat.¹² Galicia Ukrainian project is, in principle, a literal opposite of Donbas version. The foundation here is based on the assumption that formation of the modern Ukrainian nation on the basis of ethnic principle, with distinct and having legal consequences division into dominating titular ethnos and national minorities. In such a model the ethnic-cultural bonds correlate with political ones. The project openly expresses the necessity of severance with the Russian and Soviet past in the need for derusification. A very important element of formed in Galicia Ukrainian formula is to influence the collective memory through glorification of the history of Ukraine Nationalist Organization and Ukraine Insurrectionist Army¹³ As for economic matters the supporters of the Galicia project postulate development of little and middle-sized business and the political programme opts for the close cooperation (membership included) with European Union structures and NATO as well as strategic partnership with the USA.¹⁴

Conceptualisation of Ukraine on the basis of presented social projects of Donbas and Galicia correspond with Stephen Shulman's assumption, who comes to the conclusion that modern Ukraine is the field of rivalry of two versions of ethnic identity. The first version called by the author, Ukrainian ethnic national identity is based on the conviction that both the Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian language should be domineering factors integrating the citizens of Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainians as the titular nation should experience a special status in their country, which is justified by classical triad of arguments: autochthon provenance (of Ukrainian people on the territory of present Ukraine), colonization (to which the Ukrainian

¹² І.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: причини напруженості в стосунках та пошук історичного компромісу*, [in:] *Стосунки Сходу та Заходу України: минуле, сьогодення та майбутнє: Матеріали Всеукраїнської конференції, Луганськ, 25-26 травня 2006 з.*, наук. ред. І.Ф. Кононов, Луганськ 2006, pp. 7-8.

¹³ Here Ilija Konow adds that in radical version shaping of the national memory in Galicia also assumes the glorification of SS Galizien Division (*Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS*). It seems however that this a marginal phenomenon, because Galician project of Ukraine has a distinctively pro-European character, very often referring to those values and ideas which make up the fundamentals of the United Europe: liberalism, democracy and free market. Comp. *ibid.*, p. 10

¹⁴ *Ibid.*.

people were subjected in cultural-social sense) and Russification (to which the Ukrainian people were subjected in cultural-social sense)¹⁵. The second version of ethnic identity in Ukraine, from Shulman's point of view is East-Slavonic national identity. In its background lies the concept according to which the Ukrainian nation was founded in two ethnic groups, two languages and two cultures, namely Ukrainian and Russian, which—being rooted in the common history—were subjected to unification. Perception of the Russians from the perspective of that identity requires seeing them as fully autochthonic part of the Ukrainian nation. Therefore, being a part of Ukraine for centuries, Russians are neither a minority nor the diaspora. The Ukrainian nation is perceived as bi-ethnic, bilingual and bi-cultural, which finds its expression in the acceptance of this version of history of Ukrainian land, which is upheld by Russian and Soviet historiography.¹⁶

To emphasise the discrepancy between the two versions of ethnic identity, Shulman highlights at the same time, that in Ukraine national identity of citizenship type is much stronger. The conclusion is based on the results of sociological research conducted in May and June 2001 by Ukrainian Centre of Economics and Politics Studies, in a form of about 1500 direct interviews.¹⁷ Shulman's main conclusion is based on the statements of the respondents, which relate to the factors that could integrate the inhabitants of Ukraine into one unified community. Only 15% of the respondents provided the answer that such role could be played by the Ukrainian culture and language. Also, only 15% of those addressing the issue, pointed to the common Slavonic heritage. Meanwhile, as many as 57% of all the respondents, considered the

¹⁵ G. Smith et al., *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, Cambridge 1998, p. 122 (quoted after: S. Shulman, *The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine*, "Europe-Asia Studies," vol. 56, No. 1, January 2004, s. 38). Elaborating the argumentation G. Smith Schulman writes, that in the argument about the indigenes, the accent is put on belief that the Ukrainians are the first native population of Ukraine. Russians and other nations (except for Tatars and Karaims on Krym) do not have such deep roots in Ukraine. The colonization argument results from the evaluation of the relations between Ukraine and Russia and classified them as relations between the colonized and the colonizer, what results in conclusion that the presence of Russians in Ukraine de-legalized starting in 1991. Russification on the other hand created the unnatural division of Ukrainians to (especially ethnical) Ukrainian and Russian speaking.

¹⁶ S. Shulman, *op. cit.*, p. 39

¹⁷ The study was done in ten Ukrainian districts: Donieck, Dniepr -Pietrow, Charkow, Kijow, Lvov, Odessa, Poltava, Rowne, Post-Karpatia and Winnica and Authonomical Republic of Crimea and the city Kiev.

co-existence and equal rights as the factor determining integration¹⁸. Such a picture of Ukraine emerges also from Hrycak's narration:

Both Galicia, which opts for the ethnic Ukraine, as well as Donbas choosing the civil Ukraine, consider themselves as the heart of Ukrainian identity. But these are noisy extremes, aspiring to impose their particular prospects upon the whole nation.¹⁹

The results of the quoted research and Shulman's conclusion, allow for formulation of the hypothesis, that at the everyday life level, disparate projects of the two opposites of the Ukrainian country did not play any important role, what is more, they tended to undergo radicalization in the situation of political tension and at the media level.

The media radicalization of interregional differences in Ukraine is proved by the research conducted by an Ukrainian sociologist, Wiktoria Sereda, who carried out the analysis of two local newspapers: Lwow one 'Wysokyi Zamek' and Donieck one 'Doneckyye Nowosty' with regard to attitude towards holidays and celebrations of the Soviet and Ukrainian provenance between 1994-2004. Traditional Soviet holidays, such as the Red Army Day (23rd February) and Women's Day (8th March) were not even mentioned by 'Wysokyj Zamek.' A note about the Labour Day was supplied with an information about the intention of national—democratic forces to commemorate the Czernobyl explosion (26th April), which could serve to divert the people's attention from the 1st May celebrations.²⁰ The October Revolution and its celebration were in the Lwow paper described as an event provoking conflicts in the society when: 'the right wing chants: Communists to court! Suitcase-station-Russia! The Fifth column out of Ukraine!'²¹ The Independence Day (9th May) is the only post—Soviet holiday half accepted by 'Vysokyj Zamok,' however, the articles devoted to that event, usually relate the acts of vandalism on Soviet cemeteries, which could be an attempt of deconstruction of the myth of the invincible Red Army.²² For 'Donecky Nowostej' in contrast, the

¹⁸ S. Shulman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁹ *Rosja chce zmienić Ukrainę w słabego satelitę*, talk of F. Memchesa with J. Hrycakiem, „Europa. Magazyn Idei Newseeka,” 2010, no. 8 (293), p. 2.

²⁰ „Високий замок,” 1998, 30 квітня—07 травня, С. 1 (quoted after: V. Sereda, *Regional Historical Identities and Memory*, [in:] Україна Модерна..., pp. 171-172.

²¹ „Високий замок,” 1998, 10 листопада, С. 5 (quoted after: *ibid.*, p. 172).

²² An example of an attempt of deconstruction of the general Great Patriotic War myth may be the article “Nawet Stalin nie obchodził Dnia Zwycięstwa” in which we read “for twenty

Independence Day is one of the most important celebrations, and during the analysed decade, 21% of all the historical articles were devoted to that one. Similarly solemnly is, in Donbas, celebrated the Red Army Day (however, under another name—the Homeland Defender Day) and also the 1st May holiday. From Seredy's analysis we can conclude that the only post-Soviet holiday presented by 'Doneckye Novosty' in a negative light is the anniversary of October Revolution.²³ Traditional Ukrainian national or folk holidays such as UNR Day,²⁴ the Ukrainian Unity Day (22th January),²⁵ the anniversary of Kruty Battle, Szewczenko Days, Mother's Day, the anniversary of Proclamation of Independence in 1941, the Night of Kupala, the anniversary of formation of UPA and the anniversary of proclamation of ZUNR, which in 'Wusoky Zamek' received a lot of attention in an apologetic tone, and which were not even mentioned in Donieck newspaper. The only exception from the mentioned above list are Szewczenko Days, on which occasion 'Doneckye Novosty' featured a critical article under the title "The theatre of patriotism at Szewczenko monument."²⁶ Quoting this research here could prove inessential, if not for the fact, that the media are for the inhabitants of Ukraine, the most popular source of historical knowledge.²⁷

years since 1945 till 1965 during the Stalin and Chruszczew reign 9 May was the normal working day. It was not an accident, simply there was nothing to celebrate. USSR was led to a complete ruin. Victory Day should rather be the day of grief and memory of the victims of this most bloody war in the history. (Високий замок," 1999, 20 квітня, С. 1; por. „Високий замок,” 2004; 23 листопада, С. 16 [quoted after: *ibid.*, p. 172]).

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 175

²⁴ Most probably it is about 20 November that is the anniversary of proclaiming the III Proclamation of the Central Council in 1917 proclaiming the beginning of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic. See: А. Губар, В. Корнелюк, А. Ткачук, Д. Ткачук, В. Туркевич, *Військово-історичний календар—2002*, Київ, 2002, p. 45.

²⁵ As it appears in the findings of Wiktorija Sereda, Day of the Ukraine Unity is in Lvov used as an argument helping with the deconstruction of the myth about the role of USSR in connecting the Western Ukraine to the rest of Ukrainian territories. The author of the article „Święto naszej dojrzałości” writes: “lately the newest historiography tries to convince us, that unification of the Ukrainian territories happened on 17 September 1939, but really it happened...” („Високий замок,” 1998, 21 січня, p. 1 [quoted after: V. Sereda, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177]).

²⁶ „Донецкие новости,” 1999, no. 10, p. 1 (quoted after: V. Sereda, *op. cit.*, p. 177).

²⁷ Source of the historical knowledge: television—74,3% (Lvov), 73,5% (Donieck); newspapers—60,5% (Lvov), 54,8% Donieck, radio—42,0% (Lvov), 37,8% (Donieck), school books—28,5% (Lwow), 31,3% (Donieck) (Quoted after: *ibid.*, p. 168).

The thesis of politicization of regional differences in Ukraine are supported by the results of the three-stage sociological research entitled 'Ukraine, the Pictures of regions and Interregional Relations,' devoted to disparity between eastern and western part of Ukraine and conducted by the Philosophy and Sociology Department of the Szweczenko Ługański National Pedagogical University, the Centre of Studies over the Social Processes and Humanities in Ługańsk and the Jurisprudence and Politology Department of Frank Drohobycz National Pedagogical University.²⁸ The research, which aimed at seizing

²⁸ Initiator of the project was Ukrainian philosopher and sociologist Iliia Kononow. Up till now three stages of the study were performed: first: April—May 2005: survey in the cities: Lugansk (N=593) and Drochobyc (N=365); second: March 2007: survey in the cities: Lvov (N=375), Lugansk (N=365), Drochobyc (N=298), Stachanov (N=300) and four villages of Lugansk and Lvov circuits (N=2x100); third: 2008: 5 focused group interviews in each Lugansk and Lvov circuits, in both regions 2 types of groups were formed: group of "public opinion leaders" (teachers, journalists, political activists) and a group of "average people". The aim of this study was grasping the interregional differences on the line Donbas—Galicia, that subject has gained a special topicality in the time of sharp political crisis of the end of 2004. It turned out also, that studies of regionalism on the Ukraine constitute a specific scientific niche. In the introduction of the book edition of the after—conference materials, crowning the first stage of studies, Kononow wrote: "organising committees both from Lugansk as well as from Drohobyc were searching for specialists dealing with the interregional relations problematic of Galicia and Donbas, or more widely East and West of Ukraine. It is to say with distress that on Ukraine there are no. experts dealing with this subject and scientific analysis is often confused with publicity" (І.Ф. Кононов, *Стосунки Сходу та Заходу України...*, p. 4 Often, notices Kononow, too simplified assumptions are formulated. In December 2006 Kijev Horsenin Institute of Management performed an all Ukrainian study under the title "East—West Ukraine in the eyes of Ukrainians." Gained were valuable results, but their analysis did not to the end fit into the standards of the scientific discourse. Directing the study laconically stated that at least the surveys do not reflect the discrepancy between the East and West Ukraine on the level of customs and mentality, they prove its existence on the political level. Reasons for this is that politicians with success manage to manipulate the societies of specific regions lie in the fact that inhabitants of different parts of Ukraine know too little of each other. Therefore the director of the Institute K. Bondarenko urged: "Let the miners see Hutsul!" (Г. Колесниченко, *Чому «шахтери не видят гуцулов»*, День, 2007, 17 януаря, p. 2 [quoted after: І.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: Регіональні авто- та гетеростереотипи і соборність України*, typescript is owned by the author pp. 3]). Kononow has no. doubt that it is a right concept. Indeed however the most important reason for existence of interregional negative stereotypes in Ukraine is lack of contact between the inhabitants of individual regions. It is also reflected in the results of a study performed under the scientific direction of Iliia Kononow. Respondents of all studied centres in over 50% answered that they never had a chance to visit the opposite pole of Ukraine (І.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: від регіональних проєктів до...*(on the empirical base of the second stage) pp. 12. He draws the attention however that the scientific problem lies rather in the answers to the questions: Does miner and Hutsul see

the regional differences between Galicia and Donbas is the source of interesting reflections. In one of the questions the respondents, being presented sixteen features and asked to evaluate, on the scale 1–5, which of them are the most characteristic for the Ukrainian nation . The results proved that both regional communities share the negative way of auto-perception, as the most often indicated features were: increase in crime, incomes differentiation, and sexual liberation.²⁹ In the next question the respondents were asked to choose the five features, which they would like to discern in Ukrainian society. Those polled from both regions evaluated the most the following: justice, economic efficiency and equal rights. Such choice allows to notice the great discrepancy between the prescriptive and real model of Ukrainian society.³⁰ The results of the discussed research confirm functioning, at the level of social consciousness, of two regional projects of Ukraine. The respondents were confronted with a few statements connected with the required form of the Ukrainian state and asked to choose the one they agree with. The greatest percentage of the respondents from Lvov (58,6%), Drohobycz (70,7%) and the villages of Lvov district (69,1%) chose the expression ‘Ukraine is above all the country of Ukrainian people, who should have some privileges in their own land . Other ethnic groups should be ready to accept this situation.’ In turn, the respondents from form Lugansk (72,9%) and Stachanow (68,5%) were the closest to stating ‘Ukraine should develop as multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious society.’ The respondents from the villages of Ługański district agreed to the greatest extent with the statement: ‘Ukraine should protest everything that is precious from the heritage of czar Russia and the USSR and combine it with its own spiritual tradition.’³¹

The part of the project devoted to international stereotypes also leads to interesting conclusions. Analysing the results of one can notice

the things the same way? And if they see each other will they be able to understand each other? To find the answers to those questions, Korononow suggests, one has to reconstruct the social worlds of each of them by using the scientific methods (І.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: Регіональні авто- та гетеростереотипи...*, p. 3).

²⁹ Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: від регіональних проєктів до...*, pp. 12-13. Because “criminalisation” as an Ukrainian society feature was mentioned in all studied units, both in Galicia and Donbas, it lets for the popular myth to be impaired that Donbas was mostly criminalised region of contemporary Ukraine.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 13-14

³¹ І.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: Регіональні авто- та гетеростереотипи...* (on the empirical base of the second stage), pp. 8-9.

something like a mirror reflection: both Galicia respondents, making comments on Donbas and Donbas respondents drawing the picture of Galicia, used the formula: an aggressive region trying to impose their order on the whole nation. Meanwhile, constructing the picture of their region, Donbas inhabitants most often defined it by saying: 'Donbas is the region whose development should become a model for the whole Ukraine,' or: 'Donbas is the region forced to protect its uniqueness.' The citizens of Galicia, described their region mainly as the one which 'kept its uniqueness.'³² Despite the clear pattern: positive auto-stereotype of their own region and negative image of the other one, the results of the research allow for the scope for a dialogue.³³ The further reflection on the problems of regional stereotypes prove that at the bottom of most of them lie in the political orientations. Since they are the source of vulgarized generalizations concerning Galicia citizens and naming them fascist or Bandera supporters, however, those were anachronistic notions.³⁴ Stereotypes also develop on the basis of specific features of the given region, presented in an extremely exaggerated form. For example, Donbas is the coal-steel industrial centre symbolised not by ballet, opera, theatre or philharmonic concert halls but by heaps of coal waste. Instead of peace and brightness—it is associated with terror and darkness (the association with coal-mining is not accidental here).³⁵ As the findings of Donbas researcher, Olga Taranenko, show, most stereotypes related to Donbas are aggressive in nature. A lot in this context is explained by the remark of another Donieck historical researcher, Stanisław Fedorczyk, who observes that the stern perception of Donbas is connected with its picture in history, when:

[...] we open the history course books either of Russian or Soviet empire, we find the thorough statistics concerning the quantity of excavated tons of iron, coal or steel, however, little is said about people who lived there!³⁶

³² Ibid., pp. 15-17.

³³ Second most often given answer by the Donbas respondents as to Galicia was the answer: "Galicia is the region, which kept its specifics." On the other hand a large part of Galicia respondents judged Donbas as a "self sustained region." It suggests an existence of some kind of coherence of ideas (ibid.).

³⁴ On the same basis generalizations concerning Donbas inhabitants arise—communists, *sowki*.

³⁵ H. Kuromyia, *Donbas ostatnie pogranicze Europy?*, „Nowa Ukraina,” 2006, no. 2, p. 67.

³⁶ M. Шокало, *Донбас-шахтарський край*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine/2009/12/091222_donbass_one_marta_sp.shtml, [06.01.2011]. Analogical phenomenon happens also in the opposite direction.

Only, not for long, one can observe formation of a new, positive myth of Donieck as the sports capital of Ukraine. Before one of the Szachtar matches played within UEFA Cup there were leaflets distributed with the slogan—‘We are from Donieck and God is with us!’³⁷

It is also worth referring to the results of the third stage of the research project conducted by Kononow team. It was connected with the construction of mutual narrations about the other regions and used the method of the focused group interview. Basically, the narrations present the clear dichotomy of successful and unsuccessful contacts.³⁸ An example of a successful one:

As they say in Lvov we are not liked. To, such things, relations, such moods... I can say, that it's absolutely not like that. I was there a number of times, I could see and I know very well how they treat us there. To Donbas, to Donieck and Ługańsk regions. The same way as we treat them. There are fools everywhere, but there are also clever people, pragmatic. And they know we are one country. (K.P.N., a journalist, Ługańsk, 19.04.2008)³⁹

An example of failed contact:

I was in Lvov once. We were sitting at the station for a long time and wanted to have some coffee. We went up to the counter and in Russian asked for coffee. No one even turned towards us. Then someone suggested: say it in Ukrainian and coffee arrived in front of me almost immediately. (Z.N.W. The first group invalid, Lugansk, 25.04.2008)⁴⁰

Some respondents separated the contacts with simple people (as successful) and contacts with Galicia elite (as problematic):

I worked in various business structures. From the mid-nineties and the beginning of two thousand I frequently went on business trips to west Ukraine. From Zytomirski region to Slawuta and to Lvov. A lot of times. At the company level, workers, there were no problems. I mean: they spoke their surżyk we used ours. And we understood one another perfectly well,

³⁷ Ibid. It is one of the aspects of the wider trend signalised by Julia Soroka, that identification with Ukraine can be done not only basing on the historical memory but also on the mass culture. Is it impossible to underestimate the influence that had on the auto identification of Ukrainians event such as Ruslanas success in the international music festival Eurovision in 2004, success of Ukrainian football team in world championship in 2006 or the sport achievements of Kliczko brothers (*Регіональні ідентичності в сучасній Україні та методи їх вивчення. Форум, [in:] Україна Модерна...*, p. 10).

³⁸ И.Ф. Кононов, *Донбасс — Галичина нарративы взаимных посещений* (on the empirical base of the third stage), typescript owned by the author, pp. 5-6.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

we solved the business matters and then we drank to it. But when you start meeting, sorry to say, so called intelligence, then misunderstandings start. Both in Slawut and Lvov itself. It is intelligentsia, which is the carrier of ideas, which .so to say, they shift onto the common people. (M.S.W. a warehouse manager in a private enterprise, Ługańsk, 19.04.2008)⁴¹

The unsuccessful contacts are most often connected with language problems.

In Iwano-Frankowsk I was still a schoolgirl. Child's impressions are so vivid. And I remember two of them. The first one is, that when you would enter a shop and speak Russian to the shop assistant: Please, show me, or I'd like this and that,—no one would react, as if you were not there. I was so surprised! I was twelve or thirteen . The shop assistant would simply sit there staring at one point, as if no one had come into the shop. And it was so till I spoke Ukrainian. And then she would stand up and show and explain everything. I remember it very well. And I remember that we laughed at it for a long time afterwards. And then, with my childish mind I could appreciate the feeling of national pride. When we came, we could feel that people were so proud to live here. Here is them, so wonderful and we came as if to look at them. (W. N. E., a teacher, Ługańsk, 19.04.2008)⁴²

In such situation the medium of contact is limited to switching into Ukrainian language:

I was in Lvov, shortly before the declaration of independence. People like people. In public transport I heard that Moscsals should be executed. And then I asked a woman sitting next to me : isn't it irrelevant which language I use. I can switch to Ukrainian and then no one will bear a grudge against me, but, please, tell me, why ii is so? In reply I heard that, by and large, it did not matter which language I was using. The city itself made a great impression on me. It is a real monument. Simply, a monument of history. (L.N.W., a librarian, Stachanow, 13.05.2008)⁴³

The language problem has also a Janus face:

In the summer I visited the a friend in Charkow. When I spoke Ukrainian, people looked at me and answered: I don't understand, please, speak Russian. And here in Lvov people are more liberal, more tolerant. Whichever language you speak [...] And it's not that we praise ourselves .or what. (I.O.B., a college teacher, Lvov, 20.11.2008)⁴⁴

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴² И.Ф. Кононов, *Донбасс — Галичина нарративы взаимных посещений*, pp. 9-10.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

However, the citizens of Donbas seem to be more ready to switch to Ukrainian when visiting Galicia, then the inhabitants of that region visiting Donbas. The included below quotation characterises perfectly the attitude of Galicians.

I will speak Ukrainian wherever I go. If it is Kijew, Odessa, Dniepropawłowsk or Crimea. I always speak Ukrainian. Such is my principle: I speak Russian in Russia, Ukrainian in Ukraine Polish in Poland. I asked in Ukrainian and people tried to answer in Ukrainian. And it was pleasant to listen how they tried even some sounds, some words to say in Ukrainian (K.N.P., a student, Drohobycz, 21.11.2008)⁴⁵

Besides the language, the other obstacle in contacts between the inhabitants of East and West Ukraine is the mutual prejudice about the relations of one side towards the other. The prejudice was formed historically during traumatic contacts in post war period. That is when in Donbas appeared the term to describe Galicians-Bandera supporters.

About fifteen years ago my job was to visit all Ukrainian power stations. I sent people to work. When I came to the following regions: Donieck, Ługańsk, or Dnipropietrowsk they said; the Bandera supporters are here. But I was followed by women to work in the services sector. Cooks, shop assistants. With time, they got to know the local people, got married. They were sought after instantly. That is how impressions changed. They were not called Bandera supporters any more. Everything was normal. (W.I.G., a manager, Lvov, 20.11.2008)⁴⁶

Kononow's view, who claims that the relations of the present inhabitants of Donbas and Galicia can be described as relationship between brother in discord, might then be accurate. However, though at first sight, they might seem declared in their argumentation, finally they show the will to reach reconciliation. To the question on what the relations of East and West Ukraine should be like, 75% of Ługańsk respondents and 68% of Drohobycz respondents gave the answer, that agreement should be reached through compromise. 17,6% of the inhabitants of Drohobycz were convinced that they should strive for victory of the West over the East, on the other hand, 9% of the respondents from Ługańsk believe that the victory of the East over the West would be right. This proves that in both parts of Ukraine there are groups ready to impose the experience and values of their

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

region on the whole nation, though there are twice as many of those in Galicia.⁴⁷ As far as the power of political mobilization of both extreme projects is considerable, the balance between coming from Donbas and Galicia potentials of influence is undoubtedly the most important factor, determining the unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine as a state. However, the balance itself will guarantee nothing but status quo and will not contribute to consolidation of Ukrainian society, it can only strengthen the dichotomy.

The relations between regions and the centre have a tendency for evolution in the direction of relation between the centre and periphery. On Ukraine this tendency is effectively opposed by various interregional centres; Lvov, Charkow, Donieck, Dniepropietrowsk and Odessa. Moreover, the regional system of Ukraine is not as much the relation between the regions and the centre, as relations between the poles of the system⁴⁸. In addition, the weakness of the centre with its capital in Kijew is the characteristic element of inter-Ukrainian arena of the clash over tow identity projects. If both Donbas and Galicia projects of being Ukrainian aim at the cultural—political seizure of Kijew and submission of the rest of the Ukrainian territory, Kijew itself neither generates its own project nor effectively supports the dialogue between already existing projects.⁴⁹ The political elites, for which interregional distinction constitutes the basis for electorate mobilization, also do not approve of the dialogue. It is the only aspect which allows to look at Ukraine as at the post-colonial country, where the political elites treat the country as the war trophy and where the principle of each election campaign is the slogan: “The winner takes it all.”⁵⁰ It is perfectly presented by Anastazja Riabczuk:

When people’s minds are occupied with the debate about the NATO membership, WWII veterans, Church or relationship with Russia, their

⁴⁷ И.Ф. Кононов, *Отношения Востока и запада Украины между прошлым и будущим* (on the empirical base of the first stage), typescript owned by an author p. 5.

⁴⁸ I.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: від регіональних проєктів до...*, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Iliia Kononow also draws attention to this, though he thinks that in the second part of the first decade of XXI century Center of Ukraine starts to articulate its own project. An example of that may be the fact that in the parliament elections in 2006 Center and Wolyn supported the social project of Julia Tymoszenko Block which in a certain extend joins Donbas and Galicia projects, alas rather their negative characteristics: ethno—nationalism and godord (Galicia) and paternalism and clientelism (Donbas) (I.Ф. Кононов, *Донбас та Галичина: причини напруженності встосунках та пошук історичного компромісу...*, p. 10-11.

⁵⁰ Кононов, *Апрельський кризис*, <http://ostro.org/articles/article-1052/> [06.01.2011].

attention does nor concentrate on problems like unemployment, law salaries, corruption, environment protection or social care [...] Ukrainian politicians refer excessively to the matters of nationalism, and regional identity to whitewash their lack of professionalism, to divert people's attention from essential issues and to be able to conduct their political game. [...] The parliamentary election from September 2007 proved again absence of a party of definite ideology (socialist, liberal, conservative) which would express the interests of exact social groups. [...] Analysing the programmes of both formations [Our Ukraine—Peasants' Self-defence and Party of the Regions] it is easy to observe that they roughly offer the same [...].⁵¹

Ukrainian regionalism is also a smokescreen for another problem. Quoting the view of a Charkow philosopher, Tatiana Żurzenko, the German researcher, Kerstin Zimmer, concludes that Ukrainian regional differences become very often categories of political not analytical discourse. They are abused because it is a convenient argument explaining why Ukraine⁵² has failed to become Europeanised . Perhaps we could move a step further and ask a question if this political debate does not reveal an inconvenient truth, that nobody in principle cares for this Europeanization.

⁵¹ A. Riabczuk, *Dwie Ukrainy*, „Res Publica Nowa,” spring/summer 2008, pp. 115-116.

⁵² *Регіональні ідентичності в сучасній Україні...*, [in:] *Україна Модерна...*, p. 22.