This article will argue that a set of concepts developed by Arnold Toynbee, namely “internal proletariat,” “universal state” and “religions as chrysalides” may constitute useful analytics tools for contemporary social philosophy and prognostics, especially in relation to current religious dynamics in Europe and the study of social alienation. It will first critically describe the general evolutionary model of a civilization as seen by Toynbee; then it will elaborate the key notions and concepts\(^1\). Finally, it will superimpose these notions on the European Union and its social dynamics in accordance with Toynbee’s own intuitions.

Civilization strikes back

“There are signs today that ‘civilization’ is making something of a comeback both as a concept and mode of analysis” — claims Krishan Kumar in a recent

\(^1\)A general idea of treating the EU as Toynbee’s “universal state” was presented in my book *Here comes new Proletariat! Internal proletariat of Hellenic and Western civilizations according to Arnold Toynbee* (Lewicki 2012), published in Polish language. However, internal proletariat was not identified as decidedly related to Islamic groups in the said publication.
article (2014A: 815) about Arnold Toynbee. According to Kumar, although civilizational concept was present in the literature throughout the whole twentieth century, a pattern of shifting scholarly interest in the issue is visible (ibid.: 816-17). Works with “civilization” as their main topic of inquiry are “clustering around the period from the 1930s to the early 1960s, with not much coming later” (ibid.: 816, footnote). It is the influential work by Samuel Huntington *The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of the World Order* (1997) that seemed to have sparked interest in “civilization” anew (Kumar 2014A: 817). In principle, Huntington went against a scholarly trend of speaking about one, single “global civilization.” Instead, he spoke of dividing lines between different “civilizations” that may differ in terms of values, religion and approach to resolving problems.

According to Kumar, five main factors contributed to the renewal of interest in “civilization” in the last two or three decades. One of them seems to be a rise of militant Islamism, which attracted international attention after the terrorist attacks 9/11. The public opinion along with politicians and intellectuals started to ask the question “why this happened?,” which ultimately led to further questions about the identity of “the West” and those entities that surround it (ibid.: 817). Public intellectuals and scholars such as Niall Ferguson (2011) tried to address these issues as well. Another factor was a political and economic rise of Asian powers, such as China, India and Japan (Kumar 2014A: 817-18). Their increasing influence constituted a stimulus for the scholars to look at international relations from a comparative civilizational perspective. A third factor is related to the rise of ecological research, with contributions of ecology-oriented scholars such as Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (2002) as most representative for the field. “Civilization,” in an ecological view opposed to “nature,” is presented as a collective endeavour aimed at responding to a challenge generated by the rising human demands (Kumar 2014A: 819). Concluding his argument, Kumar claims that a return of “civilization” owes much to the advancement of research on issues such as globalization and world history. Research in both of these fields deals with macroscopic phenomena on international level, which in turn necessitates a transgression of the analytical perspective that had nation states as their main point of reference (ibid.).

The necessity of transgression may be also related to a sixth factor: a psychological need of collective self-understanding brought about by globalization itself: as increased interconnectedness associated with globalization alters humanity’s experiences of space and time (Scheuerman 2014), a deeper understanding of cultural, economic and cultural processes requires at least tentative reach for a broader, civilizational scale of reference.
Toynbee as a whipping boy

In describing the current “return of civilization,” Kumar points out that many scholars dealing with comparative civilizations, such as Huntington or Fernandez-Armesto rely — more or less explicitly — on the grand work by Arnold Toynbee, who authored monumental *A Study of History* published in twelve volumes (1934–1961). These days remembered mainly as an out-of-fashion Oxford historian, Toynbee created a typology of existing civilizations as well as an allegedly universal evolutionary model of a civilizational life-cycle.

However, not many scholars read Toynbee today. Why? Once acclaimed by Lewis Mumford as a “father of universal history” (Mumford 1956: 140) Toynbee lost his popularity in the 1960s due to harsh criticism fired by prominent historians such as Pieter Geyl and Hugh Trevor-Roper (Kumar 2014A: 816). Toynbee was effectively ridiculed as a would-be Messiah, who believes to have achieved a complete, almost mystical understanding of history and civilizational mechanics. As a result, his popularity waned and the next generation of students was discouraged from dealing with his work. Kumar openly recalls: “As a history undergraduate at Cambridge, I quickly learned from the amused and condescending smiles on the face of my teachers to avoid all references to Toynbee” (Kumar 2014B: 17).

Sadly, Toynbee is not without guilt in encouraging such criticism and such condescending smiles. His writing style was tedious: in many places too essayistic and not complying with the rigid requirements of the academia. The key term he is dealing with, namely “civilization” is far from being well defined. Moreover, many passages in *A Study of History* are repetitive, chaotic or ungrounded in evidence. If it wasn’t for D.C. Somervell, who prepared a valuable abridgement of the book, it is quite possible that there would be only a few persons acquainted with Toynbee’s work today. If this was not enough, Toynbee uttered some contradictory statements that generated

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2Toynbee uses terms “civilization” and “society” synonymously. Unfortunately, the key term “civilization” is not defined properly. He claims that nation states do not constitute “intelligible fields of historical study” (Toynbee 1974A: 15) and that an intelligible field must be world-wide (ibid.: 20). Such intelligible unit is “civilization” (ibid.:53). He differentiates a civilization from a primitive society by claiming e.g. primitive societies were more numerous in history (ibid.). He also claims civilizations are societies which “alone are in a process of civilization” (ibid.). However, he does not define what “being in a process of civilization” means. Such quasi-definition is problematic: if a civilization is “a society in a process of civilization,” one can reasonably claim Toynbee makes a double fallacy when introducing the term by committing *idem per idem* and *ignotum per ignotum* fallacies. In the first case the defining description (*definiens*) is semantically dependent on the notion to be defined (*definiendum*), in the second both *definiendum* and *definiens* remain unknown.
confusion for those wanting to tackle his work analytically. What is even worse, he was also fond of poetic and mystical remarks (e.g. Toynbee 1954: 139) which — in spite of having some literary charm — could have made an impression he is more of an essayist and writer, than a scholar. All this was ruthlessly pointed out by his critics, which is evident if one reads through a collection of commentaries on Toynbee edited by Ashley Montagu (1956).

Presenting a detailed account of Toynbee’s errors is beyond the scope of this article. He committed many. However, it is possible that after long decades of either silence or ironical chuckles whenever his work is mentioned, Toynbee have completed his penance as a whipping boy in historians’ purgatory. Considering the current renewal of academic interest in “civilization,” it is possible that he deserves an academic resurrection. However, in order to prevent him from returning as a zombie, the resurrection must be partial (cf. Kumar 2014A: 833). In fact, there are many parts of Toynbee’s work that remain inspiring for the modern scholars. Kumar lists some of them: an insight into Scottish culture, an impact of Shiite Revolution in Iran on the Ottoman Empire (ibid.: 834), the history of Islamic civilization and the conquests of Muslim Arabs as well as an insight into different functions “marches” and “interiors” play in the body of a civilization (ibid.: 835-36). “There are many other aspects of Toynbee’s work that would repay renewed attention” — writes Kumar (ibid.: 837).

A Study of history in 25 sentences

A detailed elaboration of Toynbee’s work certainly exceeds the scope of a short article. However, before proceeding to the analysis of “internal proletariat” and “universal state,” some introductory background information must be presented. Such introduction is necessary for the readers who are not acquainted with Toynbee’s work to properly understand the latter part of the article. For the sake of brevity the summary is limited to 25 sentences.

In order to understand history, one must frame it not as a process involving national cultures, but in a macroscopic way — as a history of greater social entities. In the hitherto history one is capable of identifying twenty one

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4 It is useful to summarize Toynbee’s model, especially considering his peculiar way of writing, which manifests itself inter alia in scattering portions of a single argument in different places. As a result, understanding A Study may take time. Aware of this fact, D.C. Somervell, the author of an abridgement, decided to reorder parts of Toynbee’s work while editing. He even decided to prepare a summary of the abridgement in order to make it even more accessible to the reader (see: Toynbee 1974A: 648-672, 1974B: 424-430).
Return of Toynbee. European Union as universal state, Muslims...

civilizations, among which there currently exist only five (Western\textsuperscript{5}, Islamic, Orthodox, Hindu, Far Eastern), which might have already experienced a breakdown. In addition, Toynbee described three “abortive” civilizations that experienced too difficult a challenge and collapsed (Scandinavian, Christian Far Eastern and Christian Far Western), as well as five “arrested” ones (Polinesians, Eskimos, Nomads, Spartans and Osmanlis), which had to concentrate all of their energy to overcome a challenge, thus depriving themselves of a surplus of resources necessary for further development.

Every civilization, from birth to death, goes through four phases of development, with the first one being (1) genesis: civilizations are formed from primitive societies as a result of a mechanism called “challenge and response,” according to which the societies capable of transforming into civilizations first solve a problem that in the long run threatens their existence (if a challenge is too great a burden, a civilization may collapse or become arrested; if it is too easy, a civilization drifts toward stagnation). In case of “primary civilizations” — those that do not have traceable ancestors in history — a challenge is always physical, i.e. it is some harsh environment that generates conditions which exercise the creativity of primitive peoples. In turn in case of “secondary” or “tertiary” civilizations — those with traceable civilizational ancestry — a main challenge is almost always social, i.e. related to an ongoing degeneration of a given civilization’s predecessor.

Toynbee’s universal evolutionary model is based on the generalization of the history of Hellenic civilization. In turn social dynamics within a civilization is framed as an imitation of “creative minority” (elites) by the “inert majority” (masses). As long as successful imitation takes place, a civilization may experience (2) growth, but when the masses reject guidance of their elites or start to imitate foreign elements, a civilization starts to run the risk “a breakdown,” which is preceded by some failure of self-determination, i.e. an unsuccessful response to a challenge or inability to spot one.

In the long run, if a civilization fails to maintain both political and spiritual unity, a process of (3) disintegration begins that has three phases: (i) time of troubles, (ii) universal state, and (iii) interregnum. The first phase takes the form of a period of strong internal conflicts and struggles between “parochial states” (e.g. Greek city-states or nation states). The conflicts are caused by the elite’s inability to harness and appreciate new social forces that emerge in a civilization. As a result of this inability “a schism in a soul” takes place: the creative minority is incapable of leading and it ultimately

\textsuperscript{5} Sometimes referred to as “Western Christian,” especially when mentioned in relation to other civilizations with Christianity as a root: “Orthodox Christian” (Russian), “Far Eastern Christian” and “Far Western Christian” (collapsed civilizations).
becomes a “dominant minority” that wastes time and resources mainly to keep the social and political status quo. In the meantime, more and more inhabitants of a civilization feel underrepresented in the structure of power and alienated. This psychological mechanism leads to the formation of “internal proletariat” — a group of people that in spite of living within a civilization’s boundaries does not have a sense of belonging to it in terms of identity. As internal proletariat becomes more and more numerous, two processes become visible: the emergence of a new creative minority willing to take over a civilization and the expansion of a new proletarian religion that will outlast the upcoming collapse. Meanwhile, the dominant minority is struggling to harness the political and social turmoil but it either fails to identify a challenge or generate an appropriate response to it. As a result, it directs energy inwardly to manage conflicts and appease internal proletariat, which weakens the civilization’s defensive and political potential. Finally, when a victor in the struggle of parochial states emerges, a “universal state” is created — in the form of an international political entity formed by a member of domestic or foreign civilization, aimed at bringing safety and political stability to the exhausted population. The established order is an effective medication against the symptoms of the civilization’s illness, but it does not do away with the causes. With time, the turmoil sparked by internal proletariat and raiders from abroad contributes to the collapse of a universal state: a civilization becomes deprived of a leading direction (an interregnum), which in turn leads to final (4) decay.

As mentioned above, an important role in Toynbee’s model is played by internal proletariat, which forms a religious movement that spreads geographically thanks to effective transportation routes and unrestrained flow of people in the universal state. This movement slowly becomes a “universal church,” an organization that channelizes and orders human energy. A key to its success is — in the majority of cases — a “peaceful” response to disintegration, which takes the form of spreading ethical ideals based on the principles of brotherly love and overcoming individual egoism.

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6A notable exception from this rule is Islam, which initially spread exclusively due to violent action. Toynbee notes that a public career of Muhammad “falls into two sharply distinct and seemingly contradictory chapters. In the first he is occupied in preaching a religious revelation by methods of pacific evangelization; in the second chapter he is occupied in building up a political and military power and in using this power in the very way which, in other cases, has turned out disastrous for a religion” (Toynbee 1974A: 555-56). In this second, Medinese chapter of his life, Muhammad, faced with the lack of popular interest in his revelation simply gathered army and forced people into conversion. Normally, an enforced religion does not survive the test of time. But according to Toynbee, the non-Arab converts who adapted Muhammad’s “crude and casual assertions” to Hellenic philosophy and Christian theology managed to make it more attractive for the population (ibid: 557).
Return of Toynbee. European Union as universal state, Muslims...

(in the meantime other social movements choose “violent” response instead, which involves military struggle and coercion in order to bring back political stability). As disintegration advances, the universal church is ultimately used to form a next civilization — Toynbee believes a church is in fact “a chrysalis” that preserves and carries on the core values from one civilization to another, giving them a new form⁷.

European Union as a universal state

Certainly, the above 25 sentences are simplistic and do not account for all of the complexities of Toynbee’s model. What is more, the model can be criticized from many angles. However, as mentioned earlier, this has already been done many decades ago. What I would like to do, however, is to point at practical usefulness of some notions Toynbee utilizes for the modern social thought. This will be done by comparative superimposition of Toynbee’s model on Europe and checking what insight might be produced by doing so. Toynbee's model will be treated as “rigid,” which means it will not receive any corrections for the purpose of the superimposition. For those who are not convinced by the accuracy of Toynbee’s general model, this superimposition may be viewed differently: as a historical analogy between Hellenic and Western civilizations. After all, Toynbee’s model is a generalized version of the history of Hellenic (Graeco-Roman) civilization and whatever refers to the model, refers to the Hellenic civilization as well. In due course I will be relying on both the abridgement of A Study and a few original volumes, as Toynbee believes they are complementary (Toynbee 1974B: 5).

As English historian Lawrence Stone put it, Toynbee has left a valuable speculative framework “for those who like such toys” (Stone 1956: 114). It is possible that such toying with history can contribute to better understanding of at least a few phenomena that currently take place in the European Union.

⁷ When a civilization disintegrates, a church keeps her values alive “by preserving a precious germ of life through a perilous interregnum, between the dissolution of one mortal representative of the species and the genesis of another. A church would thus be a reproductive system of civilizations, serving as egg, grub, and chrysalis between butterfly and butterfly” (Toynbee 1974B: 97). It must be noted, however, that Toynbee’s approach to this role of churches changed after the Second World War, which he admits openly (ibid.: 98). In the later approach, a religion does not serve civilization anymore; instead, a civilization is viewed as a transmission belt for religions (so it is only a means for spreading a higher religion). Although this change has no practical consequences for Toynbee’s civilizational model, I suggest elsewhere (Lewicki 2012: 65-67) that it may be sufficient to distinguish “early Toynbee” and “late Toynbee” periods in his life. The change of attitude may be attributable to Toynbee’s reflection on the trauma of war, or to what can be called a “mystical turn.”
Toynbee himself was trying — many times — to superimpose his model on the Western civilization, so if one is to perform this task again, one is left with at least a few Toynbee’s intuitions on how to do this.

What is needed for looking at modern Europe through the comparative lens of Toynbee’s model? One would first need to determine which phase (genesis, growth, disintegration, decay) is now taking place and then to identify the key phenomena corresponding to this phase. It is evident that Toynbee treated Europe as a part of Western Civilization. For example, a map in volume XI of *A Study* presents USA as well as Western and Central Europe as “the West,” with Poland and some other countries A.D. 1952 dominated by Stalinist Russia marked as “debatable.” (Toynbee 1959: 93)

![Fig. 1. Civilizations in existence A.D. 1952 according to Arnold Toynbee (Toynbee 1959: 93)](image)

As to universal state, Toynbee assumes the West unsuccessfully tried to create it a few times, e.g. in the form of Habsburg Monarchy and Napoleonic Empire (Toynbee 1974B: 636). As to Europe in the post-1945 period, he speculated about the possible disintegration of the West, but he had difficulties in identifying the next universal state, which would be a clear sign that the disintegration has already started (1974A: 287, 1974B: 336).
However, Toynbee still assumed a universal state might be tacitly emerging, as he was convinced its emergence is slow and may at first go unnoticed (see Toynbee 1948A). In this view, the second world war could be labelled as “a time of troubles,” followed by the prospective emergence of an universal state.

What is a universal state? In Oxford historian’s own words:

A universal state is imposed by its founders, and accepted by it subjects, as a panacea for the ills of a Time of Troubles. In psychological terms, it is an institution for establishing and maintaining concord; and this is the true remedy for a rightly diagnosed disease. The disease is that of a house being divided against itself and the schism cuts both ways. There is the horizontal schism between contending social classes and the vertical schism between warring states. (Toynbee 1974B: 25)

A main goal of an universal state is to alleviate human torment and exhaustion caused by the wars. To establish a predictable order, the ruling minority proclaims universal peace and tolerance in both domestic policy and international relations. It is worth to quote a lengthy passage from A study as it summarizes many hall-marks of an universal state:

Nonviolence ... is a state of mind and a principle of behaviour that cannot be confined to one compartment of social life. Therefore the concord which a dominant minority is moved to seek in its own domestic relations has to be extended to the dominant minority’s relation with the internal and external proletariat and with any alien civilizations with which the disintegrating civilization is in contact. This universal concord profits its diverse beneficiaries in different degrees. While it enables the dominant minority to recuperate to some extent, it brings a greater relative access to strength to the proletariat ... The toleration practiced by the founders of a universal state, for the negative purpose of eliminating strife among themselves, gives the internal proletariat a chance to found a universal church, while the atrophy of the martial spirit among the subjects of the universal state gives the ... barbarians or a neighbouring alien civilization a chance of breaking in and seizing for itself the dominion over an internal proletariat ... The relative capacity of the dominant minority to profit from the conditions that this minority itself has called into existence is illustrated by its almost invariable failure to propagate a philosophy or ‘a fancy religion’ of its own from above downwards. On the other hand, it is remarkable to observe how effective a use the internal proletariat are apt to make of the pacific atmosphere of a universal state for propagating, from below upwards a higher religion and eventually establishing a universal church. (Ibid.: 25-26)

A universal state is thus a post-war political entity that generates a philosophy of tolerance, promotes peace and facilitates the spreading of ideas by those who provide spiritual comfort through religious means (internal proletariat).
In Hellenic civilization, a universal state was Roman Empire in the era of *Pax Romana* (Toynbee 1974A: 28). Can we spot an entity of similar characteristics in modern Europe? Although according to Toynbee, a universal state does not have to be an “empire,” it is worth noting that European Union may be treated as exhibiting the features of an empire as well. Zielonka (2007, 2011) argues that although European Union consists of the member states which voluntarily join in, it in fact declares a kind of imperial order:

The EU is a sort of civilian, rather than military, power and it offers economic help to its peripheries, rather than trying to exploit them. Yet, when we look at the ever further extension of the EU’s borders and at the ‘aggressive’ export of EU rules to its neighbours we cannot but conclude that the EU is (or is becoming) an empire of some sort. In fact, EU’s latest [2004] enlargement looks like an imperial prototype. In its essence, it was about asserting the EU’s political and economic control over the unstable and impoverished eastern part of the continent, through the skillful use of political and economic conditionality. (2011)

Anyway, as an entity that bears resemblance to an empire, European Union may be at least an initial candidate for an universal state. To start with, it has a post-war genesis, which is a necessary feature Toynbee puts forward. It would also fit into his model as a territorially large political entity created after “time of troubles.” What is more, EU remains faithful to the ideals of domestic and international peace. As Cooper (2000) pointed out, the post-1945 treaties like Treaty of Rome or Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe that change an approach to international relations in Europe mark the end of modernity in international relations, understood as reliance on the balance of power and the principle of sovereign states. A postmodern era that follows is qualitatively different:

The post-modern system does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union, for example, is a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages. (Ibid.: 20)

One of the features of this new international order embodied by the EU is “the rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of rules of behaviour” (ibid.: 22).

When one reads through the documents crucial for the establishment of European Communities, such as Schuman Declaration (Schuman

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8 In fact Toynbee was one of the first users of a term “postmodernity” (see: Malpas 2005: 33-4), although he understood it differently from how it is understood today (cf. Aylesworth 2015).
1950), it is evident, that their major goal was to make war “unthinkable” and “materially impossible” (ibid.). This non-violence which results in domestic and international “benevolence” are also necessary features of an universal state as seen by Toynbee. Another necessary feature is existence of an official elite “philosophy of detachment” (Toynbee 1974A: 598-9) or “a fancy religion” (Toynbee 1974B: 26 op. cit.). Such religion or philosophy is coined by the elites of the universal state to overcome alienation as well as to promote and justify the universal benevolence of the state in the eyes of the masses. In the Roman Empire a fancy religion took the form of the cult of universal state and the godly Caesar (Toynbee 1974A: 436, 1974B: 584). In turn a philosophy of detachment took the form of elite philosophies like stoicism, which aimed at extinguishing human passions and keeping people from being too attached to any ideas or objects. Those who followed such philosophy were not imposing their views on the others, thus practicing tolerance. Unfortunately, a philosophy or a religion coined by the elites is not as attractive as a proletarian religion in the eyes of the masses (Toynbee 1974A: 436). What is more, it does not spread efficiently enough to provide social order and spiritual bond.

Is similar elite philosophy present in the European Union? It can be argued that it is represented by some post-war intellectual currents popularly referred to as postmodernism. Although the term “postmodernism” is hardly definable due to its general nature (Aylesworth 2015), it can be described as a set of philosophical currents which undermine the certainty in ultimate statements about the reality. One of the key theorists of postmodernism, François Lyotard, claims it is in fact an “incredulity toward meta-narratives” (Lyotard 1984: xxiv), where “a meta-narrative” can be related to criterions or sources of legitimization and validation of statements about reality. According to postmodernists any statement about an element of reality that once seemed to be fixed and epistemologically certain, is now perceived as only one among innumerable, heterogeneous “language games.” As Aylesworth (2015) puts it,

... where Kant insists that reason must assign domains and limits to the other faculties, its dependence upon the unity of the subject for the identity of concepts as laws or rules de-legitimizes its juridical authority in the postmodern age. Instead, because we are faced with an irreducible plurality of judgments and “phrase regimes,” the faculty of judgment itself is brought to the fore. (Ibid.)

One of many consequences of postmodern thinking in social sphere is tolerance to other narratives and equal valuing of many different standpoints or beliefs: as long as there is no ultimate criterion for ordering language
games played by the people, everyone should have an equal right to practice her own language game.

In summary, it seems that European Union may be treated as fulfilling the characteristics of a “universal state,” for it has (i) a post-war genesis, it is (ii) a territorially large political entity (iii) faithful to the ideals of domestic and international peace that (iv) has a social philosophy related to multidimensional tolerance.

What identification of the EU as the universal state could mean for Europe? According to Toynbee’s model it is a symptom of “a schism in the soul:” the creative minority already became a dominant minority as it is incapable of stimulating the imitation by the masses anymore. It may lead them politically, but it does not lead them spiritually, which in the long run will have certain consequences: the systems of thought and values coined by the minority will be rejected by an increasingly numerous amount of people in the universal state.

**Internal proletariat, alienation and Islamic migrants**

Having found a possible universal state we now have to find an internal proletariat which should be — according to Toynbee — currently strengthening its position and visibility in the European society.

What is internal proletariat? Toynbee’s understanding of “proletariat” is by no means Marxist and as such it is not related to Marxian self-conscious working class. Toynbee derives the meaning of “proletariat” from Latin term *proletarius* (Lat. *proles* — offspring), which means those people, whose input in public affairs is limited to their offspring. He derives this understanding from Roman legal terminology, namely the excerpt of “Compendiosa Doctrina per Litteras” by Nonius Marcellinus: *Proletarii dicti sunt plebeii qui nihil rei publica exhibeant sed tantum prolem sufficient* (Toynbee 1951: 41, footnote 3), which may be translated as: “It is said that proletarians are those plebeians who do not have any input in public affairs, apart from their offspring.”

Elsewhere Toynbee claims: “the word proletariat is here and hereafter used to mean any social element or group that in some way is ‘in’ but not ‘of’ any given society at any period of that society’s history” (1974A: 26, footnote). He adds that “proletarianism is a state of feeling rather than a matter of an outward circumstance” (1974A: 433) and that “the true hall-mark of the proletarian is neither poverty nor humble birth but a consciousness — and the resentment that this consciousness inspires — of being disinherited from his ancestral place in society” (ibid.).
As one can see, “internal proletariat” is an alienated social group living within a civilization. It may be indigenous to a territory or be of a migrant origin. Who was a member of proletariat in Rome? Toynbee answers the question in detail:

The Hellenic internal proletariat was recruited first of all from the fee citizens, and even from the aristocrats of the disintegrating Hellenic bodies politic; and these first recruits were disinherited in the first instance by being robbed of a spiritual birthright; but of course their spiritual impoverishment was often accompanied, and was almost always followed by pauperization on the material plane, and they were soon reinforced by recruits from other classes. ... We now see that the internal proletariat of the disintegrating Hellenic Society was composed of three distinct elements: [1] disinherited and uprooted members of the society’s own body social; [2] partially disinherited members of alien civilizations and primitive societies that had been conquered and exploited without being torn up by the roots; and [3] doubly disinherited conscripts from these subject populations who were not only uprooted, but were also enslaved and deported in order to be worked to death on distant plantations. The sufferings of these three sets of victims were as various as their origins were diverse, but these differences were transcended by their overwhelming common experience of being robbed of their social inheritance and being turned into exploited outcasts. (Ibid.: 433-34, enumeration mine.)

According to Toynbee, proletarians may react to growing frustration either violently, by starting riots or peacefully, by withdrawing into the world of religion that promises satisfaction in a different dimension (ibid.: 434-435). Some proletarians, in their search for peace, may have a potential to generate a new faith. This is what once happened in the Hellenic civilization, where a non-violent response to alienation and civilizational disintegration took the form of Christian faith. This new religion in fact aimed at breaking alienation and overcoming social divide by encouraging inter-ethnic bonding and living by the ethical rules put forward by Jesus of Nazareth.

What is interesting, although low social or material status is one of the possible features of a proletarian, it is not a feature that defines her. Instead, a key feature is psychological and refers to alienation from a society, as well as a feeling of being disadvantaged or discriminated. Anyone who enters a functional relation with the institutions of a civilization, but subjectively feels he does not belong to this civilization can be called a proletarian. A proletarian feels that his surroundings are governed by the forces which do not represent him. This in turn leads to a psychological tension that may cause both violent (riots) and peaceful reactions (withdrawal into the world of religious hope). In accordance with Toynbee’s mechanics whole civilizations
or parts of them may function as internal proletariat of another civilization (e.g. at some point Egyptian and Syriac civilizations were a proletariat of Hellenic civilization, cf. Toynbee 1974A: 442).

If the EU is an universal state, what social groups form an internal proletariat? Toynbee is of only limited help here, as his remarks in this matter generate interpretive problems. The first problem is related to the geographical reach of Western civilization. If one wants to look for internal proletariat, one must search for it within the boundaries of the West. Unfortunately, Toynbee has a problem with deciding how far this reach extends. For example, he claims that Western civilization has already encompassed the whole world (1974A: 538). This statement is as original as imprecise. If the West would really encompass whole the world where would other civilizations be? In this case anyone looking for an internal proletariat of the West could search anywhere in the world, which in turn would ridicule the task. However, by general consent Toynbee treats only Europe and the USA as the West (cf. Toynbee 1959: 93).

It seems that this contradiction may be attributed to Toynbee’s imprecise language, which leads him to conflation of two types of relation, namely causal connection (“x has causal impact on y”) with relation of inclusion (“x contains y, i.e. y is a subset of x”). This is more evident, if one takes into account a passage about Western civilization on Africa (Toynbee 1974A: 450). Toynbee speculates that due to various processes that we would define today as “globalization or “westernization” people from all over the world are eager to become a part of Western workforce (cf. 1974A: 538).

However, implying from the occurrence of globalization that the West would extend globally goes against Toynbee’s very model. Throughout the study Toynbee assumes that a strict political control over a certain territory is needed to speak of civilizational belonging (e.g. Hellenic civilization had Syriac civilization as it part when it conquered it (ibid.: 442). When we look at the West today it is evident it does not exercise direct political control over the whole planet. So it is reasonable to assume that searching for internal proletariat of the West should be limited to the territory the West is located on, i.e. USA and Europe.

In fact Toynbee himself is trying to do so, suggesting (1974A: 450-459) that the Western internal proletariat may once be recruited from among intellectuals or even lower working class “which has received a secondary or even university education without being given any corresponding outlet for its trained abilities” (ibid.: 453). Also, many unemployed are good candidates for internal proletariat, as their psychological alienation is deepened every time they receive their “dole” (ibid.: 455).
It must be highlighted at this point that although alienation seems to be a sufficient feature for a person to belong to an internal proletariat in general, it is not sufficient to belong to a proletariat that is capable of changing the fate of a civilization. For Toynbee, as long as proletarians do not form a religious movement, they are without significance for the model, because they do not have a cohesive, effective means to influence a civilization. Thus, a proper internal proletariat, the one that is a hall-mark of an upcoming civilizational transformation must follow some new, fervent and expansive religion. Toynbee acknowledges that as long as a religious criterion is a must, it is impossible to find a historically significant proletariat in the latter half of the twentieth century: “There is singularly little evidence in our Western history so far for the laying of any foundations of a proletarian universal church or even for the emergence of any strong-winged proletarian-born ‘higher religions’” (ibid.: 458-9).

He links this state of affairs with the adaptability of Christianity as well as its potential to regenerate and take over the ideas that are originally used against it (ibid.: 459). He is also convinced that Christianity may regain vitality and prevent the West from collapsing. As Christianity has the ability to do away with the schism between dominant minority and internal proletariat (ibid.: 460-462), it can transform the dominant minority into creative minority once again.

Having this in mind, where to find an internal proletariat of the West? One needs to find a psychologically alienated group related to an emerging religion on the territory of EU that questions the values exercised by the elites of the universal state.

According to Toynbee a religion is an extremely useful tool in the hand of internal proletariat: religious affiliation ensures a cohesion of a group and allows it to create a strong, international sense of identity as well as interpersonal bond. The followers of a religion share not only religious rituals, but also more or less common values that facilitate perseverant collective actions dictated by conscience (Toynbee 1974A: 610-11).

These days some social critics such as Slavoj Žižek suggest that religious togetherness will be crucial for uniting the advocates of a future social transformation in Europe (Žižek 2009). Indeed, although fifty years ago Toynbee could not find in Europe a proper religious proletariat, times have changed: the post-war migration to Europe changed demographical, cultural and religious landscape of the continent. It seems there is an evident candidate in terms of religion that could be related to an emerging internal proletariat — namely, some members of Islamic community in European Union. According to a recent report Pew Research Center (Hackett 2015), the only new religion that keeps spreading fast in Europe is Islam. The number of
Christians is shrinking (ibid.: 17), while “the Muslim share of the population is expected to increase from 5.9% in 2010 to 10.2% in 2050 when migration is taken into account along with other demographic factors that are driving population change, such as fertility rates and age” (ibid.: 12-13). Certainly, one could also try to treat atheism or a lack of religion as a distinct “religion” as some scholars suggest (Lee 2012), but Toynbee seems to have not left space for such an option as a civilization always has a religion\(^9\) or a mystically oriented philosophical system\(^10\) at it roots. Atheism, from obvious reasons, lacks this.

Why narrowing search for historically causal internal proletariat to Islamic groups in the EU seems plausible? First of all, there are no other suitable candidates. Christianity is neither historically nor geographically new to Europe. Christian religion, a chrysalis of Western values (cf. Toynbee 1974B: 97-103) already embodied and manifested these values. Thus, the aspect of novelty is lacking. What is more, it is not gaining followers in the European Union. Certainly, some Christians in Europe may feel alienated and may fulfil the characteristics of an “internal proletariat,” but Christianity is not spreading, whereas expansive nature of a religious movement is a necessary attribute of a promising internal proletariat in Toynbee’s model. Thus, it seems Christians cannot be deemed as a historically promising internal proletariat.

Muslims in turn fit into the model almost ideally. Although, as a religion, Islam is not new historically, it is new to most of European territory: never in history did Islamic faith enter a geographic heart of Europe and spread within. Although expansion of Islam in Europe is known to history, in the past it took mainly the form of a military or political intrusion from the outside; it was also limited to the boundary areas of the West (to mention

\(^9\)“If we cast our eye over the civilizations that were still alive in A.D. 1952 we shall see that every one of them had in its background some universal church through which it was affiliated to a civilization of an older generation. The Western and Orthodox Christian churches were affiliated through the Christian Church to a Hellenic civilization. The Far Eastern civilization was affiliated through the Mahayana to the Sinic civilization; the Hindu civilization through Hinduism to the Indic; the Iranian and Arabic through Islam to Syriac. All these civilizations had churches for their chrysalides” (Toynbee 1974B: 98). What is interesting, an example of Christianity shows that a religion is capable of forming more than one civilization. As a person sympathetic with the universality of Christianity, Toynbee criticized it for becoming too “Western” and “civilization-specific,” but on the other he appreciated the vitality Christianity has injected into the Western civilization (see: Coker 1998: 163-4).

\(^{10}\)Faced with the enormous cultural diversity of Asia, Toynbee realized his identification of a single Far Eastern civilization is problematic. As a result, he later tended to speak of “branches” of this civilization, which had different mystical philosophies or “religions” as their root (cf. Toynbee 1974A: 638, table III).
Emirate of Granada 1238–1492 in southern Spain, or the westbound expansion of Ottoman Empire which was halted in the 1683 battle of Vienna by the Polish king Jan III Sobieski, cf. Toynbee 1974B: 190).

However, these days Muslims live in the majority of the countries of European Union. Although they are not historically new to Europe, they are geographically new i.e. their population in Europe is distributed in a historically unprecedented manner. Also, their religion is expanding, which fulfils a second criterion Toynbee puts forward. It is also evident that at least some European Muslims are psychologically alienated (e.g. Zięba and Szlachter 2015, Greif 2007, Schmid 2014: 1-2). This alienation may have many roots, not necessarily linked directly to religion (Goodman 2014).

This issue aside, from the perspective of the present article it is crucial to note that the problem of alienation among Muslim migrants may be seen as corresponding with an alienation as a feature of internal proletariat (understood as a subjective feeling of living “in” a given society without a sense of actual belonging to it in terms of self-identification).

It thus seems that looking for a historically meaningful internal proletariat as understood by Toynbee among some Muslim groups in the EU is completely legitimate from the perspective of his own model. Certain Muslim communities in the EU fulfil four of five criteria offered by Arnold Toynbee. Namely, some Muslims constitute (i) an emerging religious group in (ii) an universal state of the West; they are (iii) historically and geographically new to the most of European territory; they also exhibit signs of (iv) alienation, thus fulfilling almost all criteria of “internal proletariat” (with the exception being a lack of historical novelty of the religion itself).

This does not necessarily mean that a whole Muslim community in the EU should be seen as an internal proletariat of the Western civilization. Rather, it can be argued that some groups within this community which fulfil Toynbee’s criteria may be perceived as such.

We have now superimposed Toynbee’s model on the Western civilization.

The West and Islam: competition, coexistence, merging?

What would the author of A Study of history say to this superimposition? What insight this identification could generate? Toynbee would certainly treat the presence of Muslim proletariat in EU as a kind of interaction between Islamic civilization and Western civilization, as he believed any of the four “higher religions” (Christianity, Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam) are the carriers of a set of values specific to a certain civilization (Toynbee 1974B: 161). Islam, for that matter, was a carrier of the values of Islamic civilization.
As Muslim migrants become more and more rooted into European social tissue, they start to both express the values of Islamic civilization and interact with the values of the Western civilization, potentially absorbing them. What can be a result of this interaction? It is beyond the scope of this article to enter the territory of cultural anthropology and address this question in detail. Yet, from the perspective of Toynbee’s model such interaction generates a challenge for both civilizations, a challenge which might be answered in many ways. From obvious reasons, Toynbee did not address the present interaction between Islamic and Western civilizations in the EU. However, he did speculate on many occasions on a possible result of an encounter between the two religions that constitute chrysalides (or the vessels) of values associated with two civilizations.

First of all, Toynbee believed that after the military triumph of the West over Islamic civilization in Vienna, 1683, Muslims had suffered psychologically and were forced to redefine their goals and global standing (Toynbee 1974B: 190-1). He asserts that Islamic civilization is currently prospering thanks to its rich natural resources and that this state of affairs will not change anytime soon. (1974B: 192). However, Islamic civilization has been strongly influenced by the Western civilization and her values. In the meantime, it also radiates culturally, trying to influence other civilizations, but unfortunately this influence takes mostly the form of Pan-Islamic movements that want to violently create a universal state based on political order inspired by Koran. According to Toynbee, due to their violent nature these movements are doomed to failure (1974A: 316).
In summarizing Toynbee’s view of Islam Gotthold Weil (1956: 273-86) points out that the Oxford historian assumes an overall superiority of the West by claiming it has military, economic and spiritual advantage over Islamic civilization. Although Toynbee believes Christianity is in spiritual crisis, he hastens to add that it may still regain vitality as a religion of the West. Islam, however, is deprived of a possibility to become a religion of the West as Toynbee believes Islamic civilization has only two possibilities ahead: either to create an archaic utopia (so called Zealotism) in its own territorial boundaries or to imitate the West (so called Herodianism). In due course, the advantage of the West may constitute an incentive for Islamic civilization to prepare both violent and peaceful responses. If Islamic civilization is to gain followers peacefully, it may spread the message of tolerance and unity of all believers. These ideas will help to combat Western nationalism and decadence. However, if Islam will spread violently (by trying to enforce an Islamic universal state through coercion and bloodshed), it may bring harm to the West.

Weil reasonably contends that Toynbee is not fair in limiting a positive civilizational role of Islam to merely enriching the West, as his model would predict otherwise. After all, according to Toynbee the four higher religions in existence: Christianity, Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam have similar potential: every one of these religions constitute a chrysalis of a certain set of civilizational values. Christianity carries on Western values, while Islam carries on Islamic values. Weil cannot understand why Islam is a priori deprived of its civilizational potential. He legitimately claims there is a contradiction between the principles on which Toynbee’s scheme is based and his personal judgment:

In principle, he vouchsafes to the other higher religions (Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism) the exalted place to which they are entitled in his scheme of the future development of the world; however, when he speaks in detail on the future of humanity and invites us to participate in his visions of the remote future, the other religions do not appear as being equal to, and competing with, Christianity. At best their task might be that of smoothing over of

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11 Unfortunately, Toynbee is not entirely clear about the exact criteria for a religion to qualify as a “higher religion;” however, in volume V of *A Study of history* (1948) he claims — after Henri Bergson — they must refer to some universal, transcendental Godhead, be more philosophically elaborate than the so called “primitive religions” and spread large to exert a civilizational impact: “a primitive religion is merely one expression, among many, of the corporate life of some local human community, whereas a ‘higher religion’ is the worship of a Godhead that is conceived of as transcending the whole of human life as well as the whole of the Material Universe” (p. 79).
otherwise influencing Christianity; but in the last analysis, Christianity ... will emerge as the only higher religion of humanity. (Ibid.: 285)

Weil believes that downplaying civilizational potential of other religions stems from Toynbee’s psychological self-identification with the West and Christianity, which makes him prefer value-judgments over the rigid requirements of his own model.

If Toynbee’s value-judgments are downplaying Islam, what would be a prospective result of the meeting between Islam and Christianity when one leaves these biased judgments aside? In an European universal state, where a dominant minority proclaimed postmodern tolerance and free speech both religions have excellent conditions for attracting believers and competing for converts. The use of a word “competition” here is value neutral and should be understood in game theoretic terms as a competition for a limited commodity, namely human souls in the European Union. Such competition obviously does not mean both religions are incapable of cooperation and dialogue on an institutional level.

As for today, Christianity is still an influential religion, but the number of Muslim believers is rising. If a historically meaningful internal proletariat is to be found among the followers of Islam, what will happen to the Western civilization in the long run? There are at least a few logical possibilities open if one is to treat Toynbee’s model as binding. One of them is an emergence of a new civilization:

(i) **Western Islamic civilization in EU (merging).** Potentially both religions could merge. Internal proletariat of the West that carries on Islam could remain open to Christianity and as a result some new religious entity could emerge. Should such an amalgamate be formed, a new civilization would be crated, e.g. Western Islamic. This is possible in the framework of the model, as Toynbee assumes the merging of civilizations may take place, with an example being the merging of Arabic and Iranic civilizations into Islamic civilization (Toynbee 1974A: 175, 1974B, table V). However, he does not dwell too much upon historical laws that operate in the background of merging or conditions under which it may or may not occur. However, the case of Arabic and Iranic civilizations, suggests that a single religion shared by the two civilizations is needed in order to merge them. There does not seem to be such a religion these days. Still, should a strong movement of religious syncretism emerge in Europe, such scenario could be a possibility.

Other set of scenarios in line with Toynbee’s model could take place if one of the competing religions is able to dominate the
religious market of the whole European Union, thus winning the majority of souls in the region.

Firstly, Islam may become a dominant religion of the West, fully establishing Islamic civilization in Europe. In accordance with Toynbee’s model, Islamic internal proletariat could either reject or embrace portions of the cultural heritage of the receding Western civilization.

(ii) Islamic civilization in EU (Westernized). Should Islam become a religion worshipped by the majority of the Europeans, the values of Islamic civilization will spread with the new faith. In accordance with Toynbee’s model this would mean that thanks to the religion of Islam, the Islamic Civilization will spread to the extent of substituting the Western civilization in Europe. In the meantime, the emerging civilization could embrace the values of its declining predecessor. Just as Western civilization once underwent Hellenization (understood as embracement of Graeco-Roman civilization), the Islamic Civilization could undergo Westernization (understood as absorption of some of the values characteristic for the West).

(iii) Islamic civilization in EU (de-Westernized). It is also possible that during the times of expansion in European Union, the Islamic civilization will reject Westernization. In accordance with Toynbee’s thought this is a probable scenario as in the past Islam was successfully used to reject the influence of a foreign civilization. For example, when Alexander the Great invaded Syriac civilization, Hellenism started to permeate the area. In response, some religions, like Nestorianism and Monophysitism were created to de-Hellenize Syriac civilization (Toynbee 1974A: 174-175). They failed, but the next attempt was successful:

Islam succeeded where its predecessors had failed. It completed the eviction of Hellenism from the Syriac World. It reintegrated, in the Arab Caliphate, the Syriac universal state, which Alexander had ruthlessly cut short ... Islam endowed the Syriac Society, at last, with an indigenous universal church. (Ibid.: 175)

There is some probability that the Islamic civilization may reject Westernization just as it once rejected Hellenization.

But the situation may unfold differently. It may still be Christianity that comes to dominate the market for religious services in European Union. In that case the analogues two scenarios could follow.
(iv) *Western civilization in EU (Islamized).* If the majority of EU members will be Christians, the Western civilization may return to its roots. As to Islamic civilization, Toynbee believed that it constitutes a challenge for the West and that it may enrich the West culturally by both stimulating moral Renaissance and contributing to political tolerance (see Toynbee, 1948B). Considering the growing numbers of Muslims in the European Union, the presence of Islamic civilization will surely have a significant impact on the Western identity. In accordance with Toynbee’s model if people of an universal state of Europe embrace Islamization (i.e. some values that Islam promotes) without converting to Islam, their civilization will regain vitality.

(v) *Western civilization in EU (de-Islamized).* The interaction of dominant Christianity with Islam may also take different route. If Islam shows a predominantly violent face, the West may lose interest in Islamic civilization and her values. Toynbee (1948B) speculates about the threat that comes along with movements like Wahhabism — an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam currently supported *inter alia* by Saudi Arabia. However, he hopes that the cultural, economic and political attractiveness of the West will encourage Muslims in general to follow the tolerant route.

Apart from a scenario of merging and scenarios, where one of the civilizations dominates, there is also another option, where both civilizations keep exhibiting similar attractiveness in the eyes of EU citizens. This in the long run may result in a stable game theoretic equilibrium in terms of the number of their followers. Although such variant was not referred to by Toynbee at all, it logically follows from his assumptions about civilizations and the role of religions as chrysalides and generators of specific civilizations.

(vi) *Western and Islamic civilizations next to each other (coexistence or separation).* Should both Christianity and Islam be similarly attractive in the eyes of the future Europeans, both civilizations will fully express themselves on the European continent. They may choose to coexist and negotiate political conditions of a common existence, while — at the same time — refusing to embrace each other’s heritage. In accordance with Toynbee’s intuition (ibid.) it is also possible that such negotiations could fail, for example if Muslims would want to furnish the universal state of EU in accordance with dogmatic rules found in Islam. In this case both civilizations may separate politically and territorially by dividing the universal state. In real life though, a situation of a genuine game
theoretic equilibrium could probably be only temporary, leaning towards civilizational advance of either the Western or Islamic civilization.

The above scenarios can be presented in the following manner:

Fig. 2. Possible outcomes of interaction between Western and Islamic civilizations in the European Union in accordance with Toynbee’s model of civilizational evolution (Toynbee 1974A, 1974B).

Certainly, these scenarios might not exhaust all logical possibilities allowed by the evolutionary model Toynbee developed in *A Study*. However, they are generally faithful to the mechanisms of the model. Of note is that these mechanisms leave no space for some other scenarios one could think of. For example, in accordance with the model a scenario, in which the majority of the EU citizens become disillusioned with religions and do not follow any religion is rather inconceivable. As mentioned earlier in this article, Toynbee directly links a religion to a specific civilization, so even if one would want to treat atheism or non-religion as a religion or universal church that safeguards some values, there is apparently no civilization one
could link these values to. A question remains whether such civilization can be born.

**Toynbee redivivus**

Toynbee’s model of civilizational evolution has many flaws. However, as mentioned earlier, Kumar argues that the power of *A Study of history* lies in its parts — in Toynbee’s insight into a broad range of historical questions and in examination of particular civilizational phenomena (2014A: 833-34). A general interplay of religions and civilizations elaborated on in this article is one of these phenomena. According to Christopher Coker, Toynbee’s ideas on religion and civilization are on the rise — they are currently being vindicated as social theory starts to accept the “normalization” of religion in both public and social life (Coker 1998: 163).

In light of this, it is possible that not only historians, but also political scientists, social scientists and researchers of civilization may benefit from occasional glances at history through historiosophical (philosophical-historical) lens Toynbee offered. In a globalizing world such lens will be surely searched for. In the European Union comparisons of the modern situation to the past cultural and demographic turmoil are already circulating in the public sphere. Not only among intellectuals, but also politicians. For example, Mark Rutte, Dutch central-right Prime Minister, whose government assumed the EU’s rotating presidency in January 2016 publicly compared EU to Roman Empire. According to Rutte an uncontrolled influx of migrants into EU sparked by Angela Merkel’s politics is dangerous and could be compared to the influx that happened in ancient Rome; moreover, it may bring about similar political and social phenomena (Spiegel 2015).

Certainly the adequacy of such comparisons is a matter of controversy and should be subject to an honest debate. To many, these comparisons are not appealing at all. But Toynbee himself paid a price for advocating such comparisons: he drowned under a wave of criticism by academic historians. However, despite such backslash he kept repeating that his undertaking is worth fighting for. In response to the critics, he said:

> I am trying to use our knowledge of history as a telescope-lens for taking a look at the universe as a whole. I do not see why one should not use historical knowledge in this way ... In choosing a name for the book under review, I deliberately called it not a history but a study of history. If someone wrote a study of Shakespeare, and a critic objected “This isn’t Shakespeare,” the writer could, I think, reasonably reply: 'I never said it was Shakespeare; I said it was a study of him.” (Toynbee 1956: 385)
Such self-defence may not sound convincing to everyone, but it might at least convince some scholars to reconsider those wicked chuckles they put on display when discouraging students from any references to Toynbee.

References:

Lewicki, Greg Grzegorz (2012). *Nadchodzi nowy proletariat! Cywilizacja helleńska a zachodnia według Arnolda Toynbee’ego* [Here comes the new proletariat! Hellenic and Western civilizations according to Arnold Toynbee], Kraków.
This paper argues that some tenets of thought by British historian Arnold Toynbee live on and may be applicable to generate insight into modern social phenomena in Europe. As “civilization” framed as a mode of analysis regains popularity, Toynbee’s insight into some historical processes calls for re-examination. This article claims that a set of Toynbee’s concepts related to “disintegration” of a civilization (“internal proletariat,” “universal state,” “religion as chrysalis”) may be applied to generate an interpretation of religious and demographical processes that take place in Europe. The article first identifies European Union as an “universal state” and some groups...
within European Muslim community as “internal proletariat.” It then goes on to analyse the logical consequences of Toynbee’s assumption that Christianity and Islam are the carriers (chrysalides) of, respectively, Western and Islamic civilizations. In accordance with Toynbee’s model of civilizational evolution (summarized in the article) there are at least six or seven logically possible outcomes of an ongoing interaction between the Western and Islamic civilizations on the territory of the EU. Both civilizations may succeed in the competition for European souls.

*Keywords:* Arnold Toynbee, European Union, historical processes, universal state, internal proletariat, Islamic civilizations.