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## Ukrainian Revolution of 1914–1921: The European and Russian Dimension

*Наша українська революція, на жаль, не розвивалась  
самостійно, вона ввесь час мусила маршувати з конвуль-  
сійними рухами і киданнями революції російської,  
хаотичної і страшної. Російська революція потягнула  
нас через кров, через руїну, через огонь.*

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (*In the storm and fire*, 1917)

*The Ukrainian revolution was a national or nationalist  
revolution whose goal was to win independence for a nation  
lacking it.*

Roman Szporluk (*Review*, 1978–1980)

### Historiographical and methodological notes

In 1980, the American historian of Ukrainian origin, Roman Szporluk, published a review on a collection of articles “The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution” (Cambridge, 1977), edited by Taras Hunczak, abruptly calling it “did not study the revolution.”<sup>1</sup> The reviewer presented arguments against the prevailing interpretations of the revolutionary events in Ukraine. The historian showed the presence of the ideological subtext in the Diaspora concept of the “liberation movement in the 1917–1923,” pointing out methodological similarities with the Soviet paradigm of the “October Revolution and the Civil War in Ukraine of 1917–1920.”

As a reference point, Szporluk chose 1914, the beginning of the First World War in Europe.<sup>2</sup> For many historians, this year indicates the

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<sup>1</sup> R. Szporluk, *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*. 1978–1980, “Review”, Vol. XIV, no. 37-38, pp. 267-271.

<sup>2</sup> In modern Ukrainian historiography R. Szporluk views regarding the new history and interpretation of the Ukrainian revolution has considered in his article Yaroslav Hrytsak,

beginning of the “short twentieth century” (Eric Hobsbawm) as the era of extremes. Was it really so? It is clear that the logic of Szporluk’s critics are based on the idea of the nation and the recognition of nation-building in the western dimension. Thus the scholar not only instrumentalized his view of the nation and tries to provide a broader context of events that the Diaspora and even the Soviet historiography (until the mid-30’s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) called the Ukrainian revolution.

The conclusion is clear: for the Russian Empire, the Great War was a prelude of a social revolution, for the Ukrainians and other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe—it was the beginning of the national revolution. Even more profoundly, this approach revealed a Szporluk essay “The making of Modern Ukraine: the western dimension.”<sup>3</sup> The main conclusion by analyzing the essay of the American historian is a desire to form a new conception of the Ukrainian revolution.

In fact, Ukrainian history regards 1914 as the beginning of the realization of ideals of the 19<sup>th</sup> century on autonomy and a union of its ethnic lands. A peasant mass gradually transformed into a Ukrainian national community with its own history, political values and civil aims. Therefore, what is the significance of the role of the Russian Empire and Europe in the development of the Ukrainian nation and state? Szporluk presents the contrary to the dominant interpretation, which was characteristic for the Soviet and Diaspora researchers. On this basis, I believe that a review of the main items of the Ukrainian revolution is possible only in the broader context. The output from the “provincial view of the Ukrainian revolution” reveals the way to comparative analysis, which can help by including in its methodology unknown categories, principles and facts.

At the same time in the Soviet Union, the fifth volume of the “History of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” (1977), edited by Professor Nikolai Suprunenko was published. This book was written in the Ukrainian language and called “The Great October Socialist Revolution and the civil war in Ukraine (1917–1920).” In this book the concept of “the Great October Revolution in Ukraine” expanded to include the revolutionary events in Western Ukraine into the Russian revolutionary process. This Slavophile discourse in the Marxist sense fully fit within the paradigm of the “Three Ones Russian nation,” which at that time was the “Soviet nation.” Thus, the

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offering also a vision of its concept as a national revolution in the context of the history of East-Central Europe: Я. Грицак, *Українська революція 1914–1923: нові інтерпретації*, „Україна модерна”, 2-3/1999, pp. 254-269.

<sup>3</sup>R. Szporluk, *The making of Modern Ukraine: the western dimension*, [in:] A Laboratory of transnational history. Ukraine and recent Ukrainian historiography, (eds.) G. Kasianov and Ph. Ther, Budapest, New York 2009, pp. 249-286.

authors of the volume legitimized the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, showing the pattern of the general revolutionary struggle.

In 1978, the director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR appointed Professor Yuri Kondufor, a rather conservative scholar and an expert on the history of the October Revolution of 1917 and civil war in Ukraine in 1918–1920<sup>4</sup>. In the understanding of the historical process, Kondufor aligns his opinion on the basis of two revolutionary alternatives “... socialism or capitalism. Other ways of development [were] not simple, and cannot be.”<sup>5</sup>

In the early 1990’s Yuri Kondufor wrote an article about the “Great October in Ukraine” in the context of revolutionary alternatives.<sup>6</sup> His text contains an interesting interpretation, which claimed it as a reinterpretation of known positions, but without a major revision. The author considered the history of the Ukrainian Central Council (further—Central Rada) on the basis of Marxist methodology. He tried to imagine the development of a Ukrainian national movement dependent on the social situation in the former Russian Empire, which looked quite convincingly. Such a view displays a desire along with the recognition of the role of the Central Rada to show the absurdity of her follow-up to the national dimension<sup>7</sup>. Kondufor concludes that the Central Rada was essentially antisocialist and anti-Soviet<sup>8</sup>, however, what is important is not the “counter-revolutionary.”

An Austrian historian, Andreas Kappeler, in his reflections for eight years after a publication of his book *The Russian Empire: a multi-ethnic history*<sup>9</sup> suggested that the study of multi-ethnic empires can recover our memories

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<sup>4</sup> Historical views and scientific career professor Yuri Kondufor analyzed in his article Vladislav Verstiuk, his successor as head of the history department of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921 Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: В.Ф. Верстюк, *Історик і епоха (до 90-річчя від дня народження академіка Ю.Ю. Кондуфора)*, “Укр. іст. журн.,” no. 3, 2012, pp. 143-152.

<sup>5</sup> *Институт архивоведения Национальной библиотеки Украины им. В.Вернадского*, ф. 285, оп.1, д. 81, (Соціалістична революція на Україні. Розділ монографії. 1990-ті роки), л. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Ю.Ю. Кондуфор, *Революційні події 1917 р. на Україні: пошук альтернативи*, „Укр. іст. журн.” 1990, no. 11, pp. 10-20.

<sup>7</sup> *ИА НБУВ*, ф. 285, оп. 1, д. 84, л. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Ю. Ю. Кондуфор, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> А. Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*, Beck, München 1992, 416 pp.

alternative design principles of the state and society and to identify the inadequacy of nation-state principle.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, the scholar writes about the interesting observation that approaches borrowed from the experience gained through the rule of capitalist Western European countries, non-European regions, cannot be extrapolated to the Russian agrarian autocracy.<sup>11</sup> This view of the Austrian historian is important as an analytical diagnosis of imperial history without the use of the nation-state optics. Therefore, the new understanding of the Ukrainian revolution is possible through the combination of rejection and the Western and Russian methodological models.

In 2011 and 2012 two fundamental books of the history of Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921 edited by Valerii Smoliy and Vladislav Verstiuk<sup>12</sup> were published. The output of these books is a long overdue attempt to summarize more than twenty years of study of the revolution in terms of Ukrainian academic sciences. Analysis of this research shows that nation-centric optics was the main methodology for the authors. It should be emphasized that the authors were able to review the many conflicting and unambiguous interpretations of the 90s. The 20<sup>th</sup> century conception of Ukrainian revolution is formed under the influence of Diaspora historiography and dividing by the “Uenerovtsev” and “Hetmantsev.” This revision has led to the fact that most of the authors attempt to describe the revolution in the discourse of intentionality of historical action. The structure of essays shows the most important stories from the perspective of the national narrative.

Presenting an essay about the history of the Ukrainian revolution 1914–1921, I point out several important conceptual positions:

1. American scholar Edward Said in his classic book “Orientalism” wrote that knowledge is deeply ideologized, because its meaning is formed by a pre-determined system of political values that dominate the state and society.
- 2 The myth seems in the non-classic sense as fiction and I believe that it is successfully defined as a communicative form.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> А. Каппелер, «Россия—многонациональная империя»: некоторые размышления восемь лет спустя после публикации книги, [in:] Мифы и заблуждения в изучении империи и национализма, Москва, 2010, р. 267.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, р. 271.

<sup>12</sup> *Нариси історії Української революції 1917–1921 рр.: у двох книгах*, В. Верстюк та ін., кн. 1, Наукова думка, Київ: 2011, 340 рр.; кн. 2, Наукова думка, Київ 2012, 464 рр.

<sup>13</sup> Р. Барт, *Миф сегодня*, [in:] *idem*, Избранные работы: Семиотика, поэтика, Москва 1994, р. 72.

3. The Nation is not “a given reality” but “a work in progress.”<sup>14</sup> In addition, in our text, the nation is not supplied as a category of analysis, and the category of the practice through the study of the formation of values. In this aspect, it is important to understand how the concept of “nation” is work and not what a nation of Ernest Renan is?<sup>15</sup>
4. “Sobornost” is a modern idea, a purely Ukrainian and East-Slavic phenomenon arising from the nation-building processes of the XIX century on the basis of the colonial experience, as a response to the assimilation of the Habsburg and Romanov empires and the way of national unity. “Sobornost” has an Eastern Christian genealogy (in the sense of Michel Foucault) and forms a different perspective, an alternative national narrative. It presents Ukrainian history as a “cultural and civilizational frontier.”<sup>16</sup>

In this essay I shall explore several important questions that have not yet been considered by historians: what is “the frontier of civilization?” “Ukraine is Eastern Ireland,” “Reorientation of the Ukrainian revolution” and Eurasia as an Anti-Paradigm (Mark von Hagen).

### Importance of Chronology

Since the time of the 20-ies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a historiographical debate about the history of the Ukrainian revolution exists. Its active participants, on the basis of certain political motives and their own personal beliefs, justify a different framework. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Directorate of UPR Volodymyr Vynnychenko claimed that in January 1919 the revolutionary potential had been exhausted, a view that was obviously related to his subsequent resignation as head of the Directorate of UPR in early February 1919. General Secretary of foreign affairs (1917) and member of the UPR delegation at the Paris Peace Conference Alexander Shulgin thought that UPR troops crossing over the Zbruch River in November 1920 as a political defeat that ushered in a new stage of national

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<sup>14</sup> R. Szporluk, *The making of Modern Ukraine...*, p. 252.

<sup>15</sup> Р. Брубейкер, *Именем нации: размышления о национализме и патриотизме*, [in:] *Мифы и заблуждения...*, с. 110.

<sup>16</sup> A view at Ukrainian history as the “cultural and civilizational frontier” offered the American historian and professor at Harvard University Serhii Plokhy: *idem*, *Between History and Nation: Paul Robert Magocsi and the Rewriting of Ukrainian History*, “Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 117-124

struggle associated with emigration<sup>17</sup>. The ex-chairman of the Council of People's Ministers of UPR Isaac Mazepa in his book "Ukraine is on fire and tempest of Revolution, 1917–1921" believed the top date of the revolution was 1921.<sup>18</sup> These examples suggest that leaders and contemporaries of the revolution have emphasized the upper boundary line, which allowed them to thereby protect themselves from attacks by opponents. They are all perceived without rejection in 1917, as the start of the Ukrainian revolution, putting themselves and their works in dependence on Russian ideological dimension. Apologist's judgments of this approach are difficult—because they were the "sons of his era," in this way, pointing to participation in the "great" events.

The question of chronology in historiographical terms was always understood as an ideological tool to testify about belonging to a certain political historian or historiographical camp. But why is 1917 given such a sacred significance? It's not original, if I say that this approach is a direct consequence of the Soviet historiographical canon based on the Russian-centric view of history. Its essence lies in the recognition of the dominance of social demands and slogans of national liberation. However, it is known that Marxist theorists recognized the priority of the national question for the oppressed peoples of the social liberation. In this case, Friedrich Engels regarded the Slavic peoples as "nonhistoric," as those that can be assimilated and are subject to "historical" nations.<sup>19</sup> The liberation movement in Central and Eastern Europe is a process contrary to the laws of European history. Such a narrowing of the scope of political discourse is easily perceived by representatives, specifically the so-called "Nonhistoric" peoples who use Marxist tenets in designing their own national slogans. This happened because of the conviction that it is the progressive ideas of the Western civilization that are the most relevant with regard to the modernization of society, including the economy, education and culture.

Western Ukrainian revolutionaries in the matter of chronology hold different models and dates. A native Galician and an active participant in the revolution on the "Big Ukraine" Ivan Kedrin wrote that

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<sup>17</sup> О. Шульгин, *Без території. Ідеологія та чин уряду УНР на чужині*. Автентичне відтворення вид. 1934 р., Київ 1998, р. 20.

<sup>18</sup> І. Мазепа, *Україна в огні й бурі революції 1917–1921*, Київ 2003, 608 pp.

<sup>19</sup> Ф. Энгельс, *Письмо Э. Бернштейну, 22, 25 февраля 1882 г.*, [in:] К. Маркс, Ф. Энгельс, *Сочинения*. 2-е издание. В 50 тт., Т. 35., Москва 1963, pp. 228-236; Ф. Энгельс, *За Польшу*, [in:] К. Маркс, Ф. Энгельс, *Твори*. 2-ге видання, Київ 1964, т. 18, р. 532. This problem is quite convincingly studied Ukrainian scholar and Marxist Roman Rosdolsky. V.: R. Rosdolsky, *Engels and the "Nonhistoric" Peoples: the National Question in the Revolution of 1848*, Critique Books, Glasgow 1987, 220 pp.

... there is nothing to be silent, that there is here in Galicia, the tendency to devalue the entire Ukrainian revolution in “Big Ukraine” that emphasize its chaos and the collapse of self-will, in silence on the constructivism of the Ukrainian liberation shift like him, with all that happened.<sup>20</sup>

For Western Ukrainian contemporaries, there were other chronological frameworks directly related to the events in October 1918 in the Habsburg Empire.<sup>21</sup> As we know, on October 16 Cesar Karl I issued a manifesto for a federal reorganization of the monarchy, trying in this way to tame the national requirements within a multi-ethnic state. In an “Empire on which the sun never sets,” there began a long-term eclipse and a rapid sunset. Special activity manifested new partners in the dual monarchy—the Hungarians, Poles and the Balkan Slavs. Western Ukrainians also unanimously recognize the end date of the revolution as 1923, which is associated with the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of the Entente on the transfer of Eastern Galicia in the reborn to Poland.

My choice about 1914–1921 is an attempt to synthesize two Ukrainian dimension of the revolution, which were influenced by European and Russian factors. 1914 marked a powerful burst of activity in the Ukrainian movement. On March 9 proceedings began against the Galician Russophiles (Simeon Bendasyuka, Maxim Sandovich, Ignatyi Hudyma and Vasil Koldry) in Lvov, which advocated for the separation of Eastern Galicia from Austria-Hungary. The court was inspired by the Polish administration of the territory. Contemporaries remembered that such trials showed “sins of public policy” against the people of the Habsburg Empire and most powers.<sup>22</sup> Heating up anti-Russian sentiment in Eastern Galicia was a deliberate policy in consolidating the Galician population.

Since the beginning of the war the Austro-Hungarian authorities and the Polish administration initiated the creation of dependent political structures that worked hard to discredit the Romanov Empire and pan-Slavic ideas (in the Orthodox dimension) of unity. On August 1, 1914 “The Main Ukrainian Council” (May 5, 1915 in Vienna, was reorganized into the “Ukrainian General Council”) was founded in Lvov, which stated the importance of solving the “Ukrainian question,” accusing Russia of

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<sup>20</sup> І. Кедрин, *Роковини української революції*, Діло, Львів, 27 березня 1937, Центральный государственный архив высших органов власти и управления Украины, ф. 3695, оп. 1, д. 44, л. 54.

<sup>21</sup> М. Лозинський, *Галичина в рр. 1918–1920*, Прага 1922, 228 pp.; V. Kuchabsky, *Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923*, Edmonton, Toronto 2009, 361 pp.

<sup>22</sup> К. Левицький, *Історія політичної думки галицьких українців 1848–1914. На підставі споминів*, Львів 1926, pp. 699-700.



suppressing the Ukrainian people.<sup>23</sup> However, the most important event was the creation of a revolutionary shift by calling the General Council of Ukrainian troops the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, which became a national military formation. They can be fully correlated with the Polish Legion units of the Austro-Hungarian army and the Czechoslovak Legions, which fought on the side of the Entente.

August 4, 1914 the “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine” (Alexander Skoropys-Yoltuhnovsky, Markiyan Melenevsky, Vladimir Doroshenko, Andrey Zhuk) formed as an organization that declared the fight for the independence of Ukraine. This union received funding from the Austrian government and worked under the tutelage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Habsburg Empire. The real purpose of the Union was to launch an anti-Russian campaign among the Ukrainian population and the imposition of the “Ukrainian question” at the international level. These events can be fully attributed to the beginning of the national revolution.

Determination end date of the revolution has many interpretations; however, it seems to us, that 1921 can be considered the completion of the national revolution in the Ukraine. “The second Winter Campaign” of the UPR Army under the command of General Yuri Tyutyunyk was the last attempt to raise a general Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik uprising. The appeals of 1922 or 1923 were more virtual. Adherents of this view equate the development of the revolution to the level of individual stocks and unofficial Ukrainian emigration concerning settlement of the “Ukrainian question” at the Paris Peace Conference.

On this basis, the question of chronology is important to illustrate the ideological contradictions, at the level of the revolution, as well as to researchers. Recognition of the ambivalence view of the revolution is even broader and show how the representatives of the national narrative easily use arguments regarding the characters of Russian history. And at the same time, the apologists of Russian vision of the revolution refer to the arguments of the Western version in the same way.

### **About Russia as a “prison of nations” and “Austria is good mother”**

Initially, it should be recognized that the figures regarding the contemporary Ukrainian revolution period are equal in measure, both the Russian and Habsburg’s Ukraine in their ways were colonial (subaltern) intellectuals.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 721.



They believed that the Ukrainian nation created oppression and assimilatory policy of the empires which was the subject of history is the empire, but the nation is just a passive object. It is clear that in his writings and rhetoric they represent the nation as a sense of the historical process to a particular society, thinking that their view is the most appropriate relative to the “laws” of world history. This thesis is a fairly easy thing to prove by presenting the ideology of the Ukrainian liberation movement, where the vocabulary of prominent figures is based on several myths about Russia, about the Habsburg Empire, and Ukrainians.

Even the Habsburgs authority with their anti-Ukrainian shares had a smoother and less aggressive perception among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the peasantry. Starting with the “Spring of Nations” in 1848, the empire in Central and Eastern Europe stood alone before the test of modern ideologies—socialism, liberalism, federalism, cosmopolitanism, nationalism *etc.* The beginning of the First World War only exacerbated many national movements throughout Europe that proclaimed the importance of both social and national liberation.

French traveler and writer, Marquis de Custine, in his book “Russia in 1839” first formulated the idea of Russia as a “prison of nations.” Under this definition the empire’s domination over other peoples and nationalities as well as a “bloody” and inhuman domination are understood. This western myth of Russia, which arose during the series of revolutions in France and the beginning of the British-Russian conflict over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, included several aspects. Call discusses the preeminent components. First is the belief that Russian “borrowed” the culture of the Western civilization. Second, for Russian people “despotism” is inherent. Third, the “Russian corruption” hit all sectors of society. All of this underscores that Russia is a backward country, “Another World,” and is inherently different from Europe.

This metaphor immediately became very popular among the Russian revolutionary movement and other national empires. Almost all the leaders of the Ukrainian liberation movement used this myth in their writings and pamphlets.<sup>24</sup> They even developed this oxymoron as “devouring the Tatar-German Moscovia.”<sup>25</sup>

Another example is the myth of the Habsburg Empire referring to “Austria is a good mother,” which emerged as the counter to “Russia is a

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<sup>24</sup> V.: М. Грушевский, *Освобождение России и украинский вопрос. Статьи и заметки*, Санкт-Петербург 1907, p. 301.

<sup>25</sup> This is an oxymoron for the first time used a famous Russian and Ukrainian historian Nikolai Kostomarov in a letter to Russian revolutionary thinker Alexander Herzen in January 1860 about the intentions of the Emperor Alexander II abolishes serfdom.

prison of nations.” The authors of these representations were Ukrainian immigrants and political ideologists (M. Drahomanov, M. Hrushevsky), who were strong political and anti-Russian activists in Easter Galicia. It seemed to them that life is ruled by the Habsburgs more freely and democratically (*sic!*). An active collaborator with Galician periodicals, the famous Ukrainian scholar Agatangel Krymsky in general considered the fact that “Galicia was ceded to Austria” is a historical happiness of Ukraine.<sup>26</sup>

It must be stressed that a comparison of the Habsburg and Romanov Empires in the Ukrainian context, based on the “European subject” differs between Ukrainians and Russian/Great Russians. Associative in contemporary political mythology of the Habsburgs was presented exactly as in the West/Europe, and Russia—as archaic and oppressive in the East.

Activation of the national movement in the Russian Empire took place under the direct influence of political transformation in the West, which starts after the “Spring of Nations” in 1848. The French historian Fernand Braudel believed that “the turn toward Europe” has always defined the history of Russia.<sup>27</sup> The same can be said of the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman sultanate only in the context of the West and “Western” history. The introduction of constitutions in the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires, the guarantee of civil rights and the institution of parliament showed modernization of political, legal and social structures, as a kind of response to the demands of national and liberal movements.<sup>28</sup> However, in Russia, these reforms only intensified the contradiction between autocracy and modern nation designated conflict between the All-Russia project and the idea of “Great Russia.” In the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire this led to a natural tension between the imperial power and the development of the national movement, thereby enhancing the economic backwardness of these countries.

The Ruthenian population of Austria-Hungary resided in other civil and economic conditions. The Habsburgs were able to create the appearance of linguistic pluralism and preserve the privileged position that in the context of urbanization and the popularity of literacy were crucial to the preservation of the monarchy. Very convincing in this aspect is Dominic Lieven, who in referring to Michael Mann, argues that Austria-Hungary was

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<sup>26</sup> *Агатангел Крымский, Что такое современное украинство? Научное исследование. Нач. XX ст.*, Институт рукописи Национальной библиотеки Украины им. В. Вернадского, Ф. 36. Д. 660. Л. 64 об.

<sup>27</sup> Ф. Бродель, *Грамматика цивилизаций*, Москва 2008, p. 513.

<sup>28</sup> А. Каппелер, *Центры и элиты периферий в Габсбургской, Российской и Османской империях (1700–1918 гг.)*, „Ab Imperio”, 2, 2007, p. 35.

the Rechtsstaat (“constitutional state”), but not a democracy.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, the Russian Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire became an imaginary example of an “ideal” society, specifically democratic. Freedom of the press and the use of local languages created the illusion of having real rights and freedoms.

To understand the essence of the Ukrainian revolution, it is necessary to carefully consider the events in Eastern Galicia and Russian Ukraine, which resulted from the collapse of the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Methodologically, we rely on the thesis of the presence of imperial outskirts, which included Ukrainian lands, as well as situational and hybrid identities, characterized by multiple loyalties.<sup>30</sup>

### **Eastern Galicia: Ukrainian sobornost against “the Croatian way”**

To understand how the Galician Greek Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Ukrainians become one nation, it is necessary to look at the policies from the secular positions.<sup>31</sup> Western Ukrainian elites and the Ruthenian population fluctuated between different national identities and political affiliations, favoring a strong partner, whether the Habsburgs, Germans, Russians or Poles. However, the final Ruthenians opted for a Ukrainian project at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries.

How did this happen? Ruthenians took the main slogan of the national struggle from the Russian Ukraine about the union of Ukrainian lands, which is called “sobornost.” This notion of Byzantine patristic in the political lexicon of Ukrainians received secular and geographical sense. Subsequently, the idea of sobornost was reflected in political parties’ programs and Ukrainian revolutionary organizations. During the Great War, there was a shift from the idea of Russia that has captivated the minds of Ruthenian activists since the liquidation of the “province of Rus,” the idea of united Ukraine. Inclusion of the Ruthenians to the Russian space protected the identity and thwarted assimilation by the Poles. The factor of Russia played a crucial role in the Ruthenians choice of the Ukrainian perspective. But at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century there still remained the danger that lay in the peculiarities of Galician identity in the Croatian model of nation-building,

<sup>29</sup> Д. Ливен, *Империя, история и современный мировой порядок*, „Ab Imperio”, 1, 2005, p. 307.

<sup>30</sup> Хаген фон М., *Империи, окраины и диаспоры: Евразия как антипарадигма для постсоветского периода*, [w:] Новая имперская история постсоветского пространства, Казань 2004, p. 131.

<sup>31</sup> R. Szporluk, *The making of Modern Ukraine...*, p. 258.

which excludes single South Slavic nations. It is known that faith played a very important role in the case of the Croats - Catholic identity and the transition to Gaj's Latin alphabet. These factors allowed the Croats to construct their own identity. So they declared their differences before the Serbs declared their main "Alien."

Caught in the revolution, most Western Ukrainian national leaders began to believe in the individual's historical path of Eastern Galicia and in particular the trajectory of its occurrence in the "New Europe." Books and memories of the main participants in the revolution in western Ukraine are reproducing this ideological and political position, especially in the context of the idea of "Ukrainian Piemont." This thesis about the role of Eastern Galicia in Ukrainian history has contributed to the formation to represent their exclusive mission between the Western Ukrainian political leaders<sup>32</sup>. It has formed a characteristic pattern of behavior on the twin with the "Big Ukraine," which seemed less legible in the nuances of the political struggle.

Western Ukrainian revolutionaries justified the position Western Ukrainian accessories to Central Europe as a region with pro-Western historical traditions that have been in a certain way, deformed powerful influence of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. On this basis, it is understandable why the Ukrainian historiography used the comparison of WUPR (Western Ukrainian People's Republic) as the "Eastern Switzerland"<sup>33</sup>.

An active participant of the revolution, the centurion Ukrainian Sich Riflemen Vasil Kuchabsky argued that Eastern Ukrainians are "able to arms, but not to restore order - in their own ranks and in their own country."<sup>34</sup>, This perception of Kuchabsky was typical for practically most of the Western Ukrainian leaders. This "abyss" and the deep divisions between Western Ukrainians and Eastern Ukrainians manifested itself in 1919 when it started the unification process. Historians were able to outline the "fault lines" between Galicia and Russian Ukraine. They consist essentially of the ideological opposition of conservative-nationalist and national-socialist ideology, different models of social development vision united Ukraine, the presence of other images of the external enemy for those Galicians were Poles, and Ukrainians to Russian - Russia.

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<sup>32</sup> V. Kuchabsky, *op. cit.*; С. Ярославин (Сохоцький Ісидор), *Визвольна боротьба на Західно-Українських землях 1918–1923 роках*, Філадельфія 1956, 183 pp.

<sup>33</sup> V.: Н. Литвин, *Президент «Швейцарии Востока»*. *Политический портрет Евгения Петрушевича*, „День”, 31 октября 2008.

<sup>34</sup> V. Kuchabsky, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

This perspective allows us to understand the steps of the Galician political revolutionaries in the period of 1918–1921. The process of signing the Union of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West Ukrainian People's Republic of January 22, 1919, following the ZUNR government's disintegration. As a result, the union formed between the Ukrainian Galician Army and Volunteer Army of White-Russian General Anton Denikin and the right of Eastern Galician was transferred from the Directory of UPR to Poland over the conditions of the Warsaw Pact of April 22, 1920. The civilization view of the then leaders of UPR and WUPR played a major role in these events, which in turn formed a variety of geopolitical preferences.

### **Russian Ukraine: “the Czechoslovak way” of sobornost**

Why has the “Ukrainian Piemont” (Eastern Galicia) not given such an iconic name for the national movement as a Russian Ukraine? Can the activity of the famous writers Ivan Franko and Mykchailo Pavlik be compared in importance to the development of Ukrainian identity of such persons as Taras Shevchenko, Mikolai Kostomarov, Mykchailo Dragomanov, Volodymyr Antonovich, Mykchailo Hrushevsky, Agatangel Krimsky, Olexander Konysky, Mykchailo Mikhnovsky, Dmytro Dontsov?

Eastern Galicia was set for a legal and “free” design of the national project, where Russian Ukrainians came to conduct political work or actively collaborated with the Galician publications. On the “Big Ukraine” Ukrainian political figures received adequate experience and clandestine revolutionary struggle that is not characteristic of the Habsburg Empire. During the Ukrainian revolution, it played an important role in the proclamation of autonomy for “Little Russian” provinces under the name “Ukraine,” and then the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the adoption of the 4<sup>th</sup> Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada (22 [9], 1918) on its independence. In the First World War, the co-operation between the Ukrainians was closer.

When political and cultural contacts between Ukrainians and Ruthenians in the Great War intensified, none of them tried to talk about patriotism and love for the Motherland. The question of the legitimacy of empires as a homeland for the then Ukrainians was developed due to the popularity of international perceptions of the future reorganization of the whole of Europe, as well as the possibility of revolutionary change of the old world. In such circumstances, the Galician's reached out to Ukrainians, thus repeating the “Czechoslovak way” of constructing the nation. However, we should point out a feature of the “Czechoslovak nation,” which equates to

the new Belgian, Australian and Swiss<sup>35</sup>. In addition, its formation took place in a “state of law” of the Habsburgs, which made it possible to open exchange of ideas between the Czechs and Slovaks. The “Czechoslovak question” is widely used by Entente states as an option arrangement of Central Europe. Even before the Versailles Peace Conference, the draft “Czechoslovakia” was recognized *ante factum*<sup>36</sup>. Questioning the validity of the historical foundation of Czechoslovakia interested nobody and “faded into oblivion.”

The history of the movement for the creation of the Czechoslovak state shares many similarities with the Ukrainian case. I present here the most typical, metaphorical examples:

THE PHENOMENON OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT	“Czechoslovak project”	Ukrainian national project
„Federation of the Empire”	In 1916, the Czech national figures supported the federalization of Austria-Hungary. Czechs expect to receive autonomy in all ethnic lands, like the Hungarians in 1867 (which got a real union)	In 1917, the Ukrainian revolutionaries put forward the idea of a national-territorial autonomy within the Russian federation
The military potential	Czechoslovak legions	Ukrainian “Sich” Riflemen, First Ukrainian Corps, Sinezhupanna division, serozhupanna division, etc.
Autonomy of the “little sister”	Czechs fought for the autonomy of Slovakia, which was considered Upper Hungary.	Ukrainian Central Rada, Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky, Directory of UPR pursued a policy of annexation of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathia (after 1923 Eastern Galicia was part of Poland, became officially known as the “Eastern Małopolska”).

<sup>35</sup> This assumption is expressed by the Czech philosopher Emanuel Rádl, which then became a national project. V.: R. Szporluk, *War by Other Means*, “Slavic Review”, Vol. 44, no. 1, 1985, p. 25.

<sup>36</sup> V.: А. Бобраков-Тимошкин, *Проект «Чехословакия»: конфликт идеологий в Первой Чехословацкой республике (1918—1939)*, Москва 2008, 224 pp.

<p>Association of “nations”</p>	<p>In 1918 a treaty of federation between Czechs and Slovaks was signed between the National Union of Czechoslovak and Slovak League in the United States in Cleveland. In Pittsburgh (USA) an agreement was signed on the constitutional foundations of the future of Czechoslovakia, which prescribes the broad autonomy of Slovakia with the Slovak parliament and a second state language.</p>	<p>In January 1919 in Kiev an Act of Union was proclaimed between the UPR and WUPR unified state, which in reality was a co-federal union. WUPR received extensive rights that asserted that it was sufficiently independent subject with international relations.</p>
<p>Leaders of the movement</p>	<p>The Czech national movement was led by the famous philosopher, Professor Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, who became the promoter of the “Czechoslovak project.”</p>	<p>The Ukrainian national movement headed by a famous historian, Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky. In Eastern Galicia it was led by the President of the Ukrainian National Council (Central Rada) Dr. Eugene Petrushevich</p>

In the summer of 1918 after the failure of separate negotiations with the Habsburg Empire, Czechoslovak National Union began to gain international recognition: July 29–30, through the recognition of France. Paradoxically, that Czechoslovakia as a state has not been created, and its “government” recognized Western countries, in particular the Entente and its allies. If the Central Powers emerged victorious in the Great War, the idea of “Czechoslovakia” would never be realized.

Events around the “Czechoslovak project” in many respects resemble the recognition of quarter Union UPR after signing the Peace of Brest February 9, 1918, and then by the German military command coup of April 29 and the establishment of the Ukrainian State (the official name instead of “people’s republic”) under Pavlo Skoropadsky. British historian Dominic Lieven writes that a German victory in the war would lead to the preservation of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and approval statist, not democratic and individual ways of modernization<sup>37</sup>.

The Ukrainian national project had its own characteristics, which reflected the conflict of different political traditions and perceptions of civilized experience. After all, only the international recognition of Czechoslovakia after the war, buried the idea of formation of a unified nation. Dual legitimizing “nation-states,” the West thus designed a new

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<sup>37</sup> Д. Ливен, *op. cit.*, p. 308.



project in Central Europe, independent of the various imperial projects like «Mitteleuropa» by Friedrich Naumann. So, the idea of T. Masaryk—“New Europe”—was implemented. It is possible that if the countries of the Entente recognized in 1919 the Association of Ukrainian People’s Republic, we would have had a very different map of Central and Eastern Europe.

The scenario of combining “both of Ukraine” became a reality in late 1918, when the defeat of the Central Powers was apparent, the eruption of revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the continued struggle for the Ukrainian lands between Poland, the Entente, the White movement and Bolshevik Russia. All these forces considered the territory of Ukraine as theirs, forcing the Ukrainians to depend on outside forces. These forces are, in fact, the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were “historical” nations claim to hegemony, particularly in Eastern Europe.

### **Ukraine is not Ireland. “Eastern Ireland?”**

In April 1916, during the height of the Great War, an anti-British uprising erupted in Ireland, known as the “Red Easter.” (“The Easter Rising”). The leader of the Russian Bolsheviks Vladimir Lenin in a special article described the events of those days in Dublin as a national uprising of the “small peoples,” a prologue European “social revolution.”<sup>38</sup> The main demand of the rebels was an extension of “home rule” and the independence of Ireland from Great Britain. The British press in his defense came up with plans for the collapse of the Habsburg Empire by national and ethnic lines. In this case, the British did not pay attention to Russia, which also did not solve the national question, either Finnish or Polish. As a result, Great Britain grudgingly succumbed to the uprising, which had considerable resonance among the national movements in Europe.

The question arises of how the representatives of the other “non-historical” nations were ready with “Irish” determination to fight for their independence and the creation of the nation state? The answer lies in the peculiarities of national development projects in Central and Eastern Europe, where the politicization of the liberation movement coincided exactly with the beginning of the Great War.<sup>39</sup> The war was a watershed in

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<sup>38</sup> В. Ленин, *Ирландское восстание 1916 года*, [in:] В. Ленин, Полн. собр. соч., vol. 30, pp. 83-87.

<sup>39</sup> After analyzing the development of ethnic identity in the Romanov Empire, the American historian Mark von Hagen concluded that “even in 1917, not all national communities of the Russian Empire has formulated the nationalist goals they set for themselves over the next few years.”: Хаген фон М. *Великая война и искусственное*

relations between the Russian and non-Russian population, as well as in the relations of various representatives of non-Russian population between them.<sup>40</sup> Obviously, only the Poles, whom the German philosopher Georg W. Hegel regarded as the single Slav peoples of the “non-historical” nations, have been able to rise up against an empire.

With the “lighthand” of the 19th century Ukrainian thinker Drahomanov subtracting the writings of British philosopher John Mill, the ideology of the Ukrainian movement was the most popular example of Ireland’s struggle for liberation from the British Empire. During the revolution, arguments for the Irish movement widely cited Ukrainian revolutionaries in their articles, pamphlets and demonstrations.

A map of the “European issues” portrayed a real political struggle to get one of his incarnations in the Ukrainian national movement compared to that in Ireland. In 1917, the publishing house “Hammer and Sickle” of the Ukrainian Central Rada began publishing a series of books about the liberation movement of the “captive nations.” It is significant that the first of these was the brochure of an unknown author under the pseudonym “D.G.” entitled “Iryandska Respublika.” After analyzing the features of the psychology and mentality of the Irish economic life of the island, the author saw “historical” reasons and traditions for the construction of the state. During the Middle Ages, Ireland was an “advanced civilization” and the Irish monasteries were not only centers of education and culture but the custodians of the European spirit after the fall of the Roman Empire.<sup>41</sup> After all, the Irish continued to develop the building, music, mathematics, theology, medicine and law, and to disseminate knowledge throughout Europe<sup>42</sup>. England enslaved Irish freedom, who has the right to national self-determination.

You can easily guess the calculation of Ukrainian revolutionaries who uttering these texts in this way legitimized his rule and justified in the perception of the common people’s right to form a national government. Bright analogues with “Russia—Ukraine” and “England—Ireland” became a kind of “road map” of the Ukrainian Central Rada, aimed towards the enemy image of Russia and the “Alien.” Again in this aspect, the Central Rada leaders were imitators of Western thought, without showing sufficient originality in the political lexicon.

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усиление этнического самосознания в Российской империи, в кн.: Россия и Первая мировая война, (Санкт-Петербург, 1999), pp. 385-405.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 389.

<sup>41</sup> Д.Г., *Ірляндська республіка*, Київ 1917, p. 5.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*.

Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Central Rada and a one of the leaders in Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalist Sergey Efremov believed in 1917 that the idea of autonomy of Ukraine is the general political demand for “foreigners” of the former empire of the Romanovs (the Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Georgians). The main reason to do so, he felt was the presence of their territory for a single ethnic group. In fact, the political discourse of Efremov is characterized by the “ethnographic determinism.” The publicist tried to politicize the idea of autonomy in the plane of the national status of the example of the historical experience of Ireland and it’s the struggle for “home rule,” resembling the Ukrainian war for autonomy.<sup>43</sup>

A member of the Ukrainian Parliament and the Labor Congress of UPR (1919) Panas Fedenko in the article “From centralism to federation” wrote that the British rule over Ireland was manifested in primitive arrogance. The British that settled among the Irish banned marriages with the local population. This in turn led to the division of the island between “clean” (English), and “bad” (Irish) parts.<sup>44</sup> Perhaps this is what helped to keep the Irish cultural and ethnic identity alive. In the case of Scotland, the opposite is true: the Scots lost it in the face of the onslaught of British colonialists.

Irish discourse was also the focus of Western Ukrainian revolutionaries. In the early 1920’s in the midst of the debate about the causes of emigration defeat of representative of the Ukrainian Conservative historiography Vasil Kuchabsky expressed the opinion that the Irish liberation struggle serves as “headless our Gaydamachchina<sup>45</sup> as a example.”<sup>46</sup> He believed that the repetition of the “spirit of our history” will “revolt” the Ukrainian nation, strengthening his claim to the historical analogy by England to the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>47</sup>

Actually the dichotomy between “Ukraine is not Russia” and “Ireland is not England” appeared as a consequence of the dominance of Western ideas in the environment of the liberation movement, as well as an attempt

<sup>43</sup> С. Єфремов, *Ірландська справа*, “Нова Рада,” 8 червня, 1917.

<sup>44</sup> Стаття П. Феденка, *Од централізму до федерації*, [in:] Український національно-визвольний рух, березень–листопад 1917 року, Київ 2003, р. 90.

<sup>45</sup> “Gaydamachchina”—V. Kuchabsky calls “Koliivschina”—Orthodox uprising of peasants and Cossacks in the Ukraine in 1768 against the feudal and religious oppression in Rzeczypospolita. Some historians believe that this rebellion was the beginning of the collapse of Rzeczypospolita.

<sup>46</sup> В. Лист, *Кучабського до Івана Крип’якевича*, Берлін, 26 лютого 1929, „Записки Наукового товариства ім. Шевченка”, Т. 233 (СХХХІІІ). Праці Історично-філософської секції, Львів 1997, р. 495.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem*, р. 496.

to include the struggle of the Ukrainian people in the wider context of the development of Europe in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. It should be recognized that almost all Ukrainian revolutionaries were imitators in the context of ideology. It is the memory of the traditions of the Byzantine political culture and the right to influence the outlook of the majority of the leaders regarding initiation of the idea of autonomy and independence of Ukraine in the Russian federation (after 1918 the Ukrainian community discussed the federal scheme with the restructuring of Europe and the inclusion of the Black Sea). The paradox lies in the fact that the Ukrainian revolutionaries were convinced in the possibility of creating a democratic union of states based on ethnicity. In this aspect is the main sense of the Irish example—it does not consider Ukraine as European Ireland but Ukraine as Ireland with an “eastern face.”

### **ReORIENT of the Ukrainian Revolution: “Russia at the Turning Point” or civilizational frontier?**

Research on the events of the Ukrainian revolution strongly supports the concept of the American sociologist of German origin Andre Gunder Frank. This indicates the possibility of rejection to a Eurocentric version of history<sup>48</sup>. In his book *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* Frank argued that “traditional” is not retarded, but it does apply to political myths. The Ukrainian case is important, thought Frank, because underdevelopment produced the influence of the West through various forms of economic expansion, colonization and political enslavement. The conclusion of the scientist comes from his thesis which states that the myths of the “European roots” of the global system are undergoing criticism in other parts of the world.

In the Ukrainian context of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Frank’s opinion explains the features of the collision on the Ukrainian lands, begun by two civilizations: the Western and the Russian (Russian-Byzantine). It should be emphasized that both descended from a common European civilization, united by Christianity.

After all, the “European theme” of the Ukrainian national project was an immanent part of the all-Russian “nation-state” project. The Great War witnessed Ukrainian-Russian differences and vital political ties with the West. The “European theme” was the main tool that allowed the Ukrainians

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<sup>48</sup> A.G. Frank, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, University of California, 1998, p. 2.

to prove their otherness from Russians, to isolate themselves from the empire. Within the borders of Eastern Galicia, Ruthenians formed a sense of belonging to the Ukrainian nation, using the Greek-Catholic (Uniate), Cyrillic and declaring Russian (ancient Russian) roots. In fact, the “oriental theme” (it can also be called “Russian-Byzantine”) differentiated the Galician Ukrainians from the Poles. Generally, the “European” and “Eastern” theme created a national project that united discourse of Occident and the Orient.

The colonial experience of Ukrainian lands within the empire suggests an extensive development of the economy, which led to the peasant character of the Ukrainian nation. Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina and Carpathian Rus’ were a raw materials appendage of the Habsburg monarchy, the periphery being extensively agricultural. Uneven economic development of Russia in Ukraine led to a rapid Russification and social degradation of cities, as well as feudalization of agriculture. In comparison with other parts of the Russian Empire “Little Russian” provinces were sufficiently developed. Such economic contrast created conditions for the development of national movements.

The history of revolution proved that the “Westernization” and the modernization of Russia led to the abandonment of the “All-Russian Nation” and the formation of a new Ukrainian nation, for which the “European theme” became the basis of the modern identity. The above mentioned Dominic Lieven believes that the attempt to turn the tsarist empire into something resembling a nation has played a fatal role.<sup>49</sup> The strategy of this policy involves the formation of Ukrainian and Belarusian “modern,” literate citizens who have recognized the legitimacy of the empire and political loyalty. However, the monarchy was not able to keep these Orthodox Slavic peoples within the framework of Russia, to the detriment of, having isolating themselves from the “all-Russian” space.

Relatively recently, the American historian Mark von Hagen has proposed Anti-Paradigm “Eurasia,” which allows you to understand the characteristics of the formation of self-description languages in Eastern Europe and Russia. The concept of “Eurasia” is an imaginary space between the West and the East, the constructed discourse on issues of territorial localization and suburbs/borderlands. Understanding the geographical localization of Ukraine proceeds from the perception of geopolitical preferences of its western and eastern parts.

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<sup>49</sup> Д. Ливен, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

Hagen outlined two exemplary paradigms—the Russia/Soviet Union and the Orient/Modernization.<sup>50</sup> Ukrainian historiography describes both, “Ukraine is not Russia” and “Ukraine between East and West.” It builds on these concepts all the arguments of historians aimed at the formation of evidence of the “European theme.” Other researches stumble upon rejection and accusations of incompetence.

I look at the Ukrainian revolution as a purely European process that led Ukraine to Europe, and Russia to fracture. The second discourse is a “civilizational frontier.” Further Hagen argues that the localization of Russia between Europe and the “another world” stemmed from the recognition of the fact that Russia (USSR) is not a European country; it is because they do not fall under the model of the nation-state.<sup>51</sup> Such a view is controversial because of the many contradictions in terms of “nation-state.” What then is the nation-state? After all, the absence of such a model in the UK is forcing historians to talk about some kind of Euro-Atlantic Empire. Yet all recognize the United Kingdom is a European state.

Civilization localization of Ukraine between Europe and Russia was based on the idea of Europe as a “different world” and of Russia as the “East.” Such a construct of the project affected the nation-state, which was understood as an ethnic and collective creation. However, its European dimension is displayed in the quest to create a “constitutional state” which was the source of Western values and the Byzantine (Roman) law.

In 1927, in Berlin, the famous Russian liberal thinker and revolutionary activist Pavel Milukov published a two-volume book “Russia at the Turning Point.” Milukov believed that in March 1917 Russia was not a “normal” European country. Milukov builds the concept of anti-Western revolution, basing it on the conviction of a unique historical path for Russia.

In contrast to the West, he believed that:

... the state in the East came too late to keep their origin from within, from the natural process of organic internal development. It was brought to the East from the outside ... The political development and the expansion of the Russian state is constantly ahead of the economic development of Russia. Therefore, the state has always been compelled to extort from their poor subjects more than they could give.<sup>52</sup>

This Slavophile opinion, when the Russian state received power from the outside, is a way to explain the social and psychological gap between autocracy and society, between bureaucracy and “nationalities.” Milukov

<sup>50</sup> Хаген фон М., *Империи, окраины и диаспоры...*, p. 132.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 129.

<sup>52</sup> П. Милуков, *Россия на переломе*, т. 1, Берлин 1927, pp. 30-31.

actually suggested looking at the revolution of 1917 from the Eurasian perspective.<sup>53</sup> However, the historian did not notice the obvious problem of combining western modernity with the new Russian traditionalism; he revived the myth of Russian messianism. Therefore, his interpretation of the revolution did not recognize the crucial role of the West in its development, as well as repeating known facts about the crisis of Russian society. Trying to work out their own self-description language based on Western categories and concepts, Milukov designed his Eurasian discourse at the level of Russia—not the West, but not the East.

The revolution of 1917 destroyed the autocratic Russia, transformed the “orientalism” of the Russian intelligentsia and the elite in the colonial complex.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, emigration began to look for a new, more relevant explanation of the nature of the Russian Empire and the state. At the same time, the conservative ideas were very popular in Europe, as a purely Russian recipe in exile was Eurasianism. Western Ukrainian historian Kuchabsky also noted that Eurasian elements also “profoundly influenced ... the Ukrainian national movement.”<sup>55</sup>

In this context, the Ukrainian Revolution illustrates a completely different vector of development. Creation of the Ukrainian Central Rada, its policy of democratization of public life and decision of European laws marked the beginning to degradation of the “European theme” in representations of Ukrainian revolutionaries. This process is evident in the bureaucratic apparatus, the use of the former imperial laws as sources of new legislation to combat classical European values—human rights and private property. Leaders of the Central Rada, in practice, were speakers of the radical socialist ideology that brow-beat on “old” Europe.

Actually, the Anti-Paradigm “Eurasia” explains the rather complex and contradictory phenomenon of Ukrainian Revolution, in particular the Hetmanate period in 1918. This period of revolution and state formation, which was inspired by German military commanders, differed from the European aspirations of the Ukrainian Central Rada. In fact, the Hetman’s state in 1918 showed features of Ukrainian history as a “civilizational frontier.” The activities of the Directory of UPR were the epitome of radical Ukrainian national socialist ideology, which tried to “glue” together Ukrainian land. The same ideas are found in the environment of rejection of the leaders of WUPR who positioned themselves as liberal conservatives. The idea of the Ukrainian nation and an attempt to create a “nation-state” in

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>54</sup> С. Глебов, *Евразийство между империей и модерном*, Москва 2010, p. 76.

<sup>55</sup> V. Kuchabsky, *op. cit.*, p. 98.



1919 all came from imperial resources in Eastern Europe, which in the view of Western elites considered a classic East. Unwillingness of the Entente to consider Ukraine as an independent state was stimulated by their policy of “Europeanization” and “Westernization” of Russia.

The Ukrainian revolution is not a clash of civilizations, but an attempt to associate them. It was the time of formation of a single great European civilization, following the example of what it was before the division of the Roman Empire. However, in practice the events of the revolution were the first occurrence of Eurasian history, perhaps the beginning of a new Hellenism. It should be emphasized that all of this took place under the auspices of Western ideas with the Russian and Ukrainian revolutionaries tried to adapt to the realities of social and political life of the former empire of the Romanovs.

The Ukrainian revolution, in its national identity, was a classic national revolution, typical of similar processes in Central and Eastern Europe. This is a revolution, not a rebellion or “liberation competition,” it combines the logical processes in Eastern Galicia and the Russian Ukraine. In its social essence of the revolution was a profound social conflict that arose as a result of a clash of civilizations.

### **The Legacy of “1917:” Russia or Europe? Some conclusions**

We have already recalled that in modern history, Ukrainian historiography falls within the paradigms of “Ukraine is not Russia” and “Ukraine between East and West.” In historiographical practice, she finds reflection in the European and Russian dimension.

Ukrainian revolution is not just a clash of civilizations but a way of their union, which was implemented in the Ukrainian national project. The revolution has united the various versions of the national identity, pointing to the dominance of ideas and practices of Russian Ukrainians. She showed the death of Galician (Ruthenian) identity and the myth of the “Ukrainian Piemont,” to realize the idea of union of Ukrainian lands, born in the historical conditions of a “Big Ukraine.”

The first issue of “Russia and Europe” was a milestone for Ukraine even after the approval of the Bolshevik regime and the establishment of the Soviet Union. Its modern interpretation is the product 1918, when the Ukrainian nation passed the point of no return in its complex history. That’s when it became clear in the first place for the Ukrainians that they are a separate nation. Furthermore, this belief was strengthened in the 1920s through the Bolshevik policy of “Ukrainianization” and subsequent modernization.

Second, the ReORIENT proved that Ukraine as a state and a subject of world politics took place in a non-European world in the Eurasian civilization. Indeed, in such a choice of Ukrainians, Europe was to depend on the choice of Russian, Ukrainian emphasizing something “unhistorical.” In fact, Ukrainians expectation of legitimization from Europe led to the destruction of the Ukrainian statehood. Although it is the awareness of themselves as Europeans, Ukrainians made the de facto nation. Being Ukrainian, the national project implemented during the revolution becomes a synthesis of the “European” and “eastern” themes.

Third, if we consider the Ukrainian revolution as a national and social revolution in the context of the history of Central and Eastern Europe, it is more reasonable to examine the chronological framework—the years 1914–1921.

Fourth, union between Western and Eastern Ukraine in 1919 can be considered as the European process of nation-building, implemented in a “civilized frontier.”

Fifth, the Ukrainian Revolution was the only liberation movement “non-historical” nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The revolution not only assumed a radical transformation of society but the process of building a national statehood occurred.

Sixth, Ukraine during the revolution managed to gain territorial integrity. Paradoxically, it is the period of the Soviet regime which created the conditions for the development of the Ukrainian modern nation.

Seventh, the Ukrainian revolution has shown the possibility of considering the Soviet Union as part of the political traditions and values of Europe, contrary to the very essence of Russia.

Interest in the Ukrainian revolution after the collapse of the Soviet Union was stimulated by new attempts to rethink the events of that time. At present, among Ukrainian politicians and intellectuals, it is considered that the construction of a Ukrainian discourse of memory can resolve many of the problems of nation building. The “ideologisation” of historical knowledge and methodology left their marks on the perception by researchers of the historical process and especially upon those social cataclysms as the Revolution. After all, the history of communication with the policy defined as “nationalization” of historical thinking during the 90s of the 20th century was based on the many myths and ideological clichés.<sup>56</sup> The history of the Ukrainian revolution presents “a series of change of several forms of national power,” which are associated with the stages of the

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<sup>56</sup> V.: Г. Касьянов, *Национализация» истории в Украине. Краткий экскурс*, [in:] Г. Касьянов, А.Миллер, *Россия—Украина. Как пишется история*, Москва 2011, pp. 38-73.

construction of an independent Ukrainian state. This led to the fact that in modern historiography there was a significant instrumentalization of many representations of the Ukrainian revolution, which does not allow for its consideration in a broader historical context.

### **Ukrainian Revolution of 1914–1921: The European and Russian Dimension**

*by Gennadii Korolov*

#### *Abstract*

The article describes the contemporary conception of the Ukrainian revolution of 1914–1921, discussed in both the European and Russian dimension. The formation of political myths and ideologies of the Ukrainian national movement is also analyzed. The nation-building in Eastern Galicia was similar to the “Croatian project”, while that in Russian Ukraine resembled more the “Czechoslovakian project” of the creation of a nation. These two ways are considered as two models of development of the Ukrainian national project.

The Ukrainian revolution is a period of the clash of civilizations, as well as their union, which was implemented in the Ukrainian national project. The analysis of the European and Russian dimension demonstrates that the Ukrainian state came into existence in a non-European world. The Ukrainian Revolution was a war for independence and also one of the liberation movement among non-historical nations in the East Central Europe. As a result, the Soviet period created conditions for the development of the modern Ukrainian nation.

*Keywords:* Ukrainian revolution, Europe, Russia, conception.