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Several documents on German and Georgian cooperation during the interwar period and World War II are kept in the Polish archives in London — Part II¹

The first signs that social democrats wanted to remove their political opponents from the Polish Army could be observed as early as in the late 1920s. We see such signs, for example, in a note drawn up by a Polish agent, Lieutenant Stanisław Zaćwilichowski, who at the beginning of June 1929 arrived in Paris, where he talked to N. Ramishvili. Then he informed his superiors that A. Zakhariadze would probably demand to discharge an officer (an opponent of social democrats) from the Polish Army. At the same time S. Zaćwilichowski pointed out that the Polish party would most probably accept such a solution because “the other one is unthinkable.”² Thus, as early as the late 1920s, an opportunity arose to discharge Georgian officers from the Polish Army, and what is significant for further consideration, not because of the collaboration with foreign intelligence service but due to political reasons — the aim of Georgian social democrats was to limit the number of their opponents in the ranks of the Polish Army.

The key events took place after the assassination of N. Ramishvili in 1930. Then, in order to oppose social democrats, some Georgian officers from the Polish Army did not take part in a memorial service for the former Prime Minister. As a result, A. Zakhariadze appealed to the Second Department of the General Staff of the Polish Army³ to discharge those who were absent

¹ The first part of the paper was published in „Sensus Historiae” No. 1, Vol. 30, 2018, pp. 155-172.

² 1929, 6 czerwca, Paryż, *Relacja z rozmowy por. Stanisława Zaćwilichowskiego z Danem [Noe Ramiszwili], L. 418, [in:] II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego*, Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe im. mjr. Bolesława Waligóry, Tetragon, Warszawa 2013, p. 151.

³ The Second Department of Polish General Staff was the organizational unit of the General Staff, which dealt with, among others, intelligence, counterintelligence, diversion and

from the army or transfer them disciplinarily to the country.⁴ The disciplinary actions against the soldiers were not taken immediately, but only in 1931, and resulted in a negative response, including the former Polish military men who were the members of the Polish Military Organisation.⁵ In 1932 they submitted a Memorandum of the Former Members of the Polish Military Organisation Association's Board, Eastern Headquarters 3, which consisted of several dozen pages. The addressee was Józef Piłsudski,⁶ General Inspector of the Armed Force of that time, who in a decisive way influenced the overall Polish policy in that period. Familiarizing with the most important issues raised in this document is significant as it describes very well the situation among Georgian officers in the Polish Army, as well as the policy of Polish authorities toward Georgian parties in exile.

It was pointed out in the Memorandum that in the years 1923–1926⁷ the policy of the next Polish authorities toward Georgian emigrants was based mainly on the leaders of the social democratic party from so-called Noe Zhordania's Georgian government. At the same time it was stressed that this group claimed the right to monopoly in representing the Georgian nation and used the attitude of the Polish government to make a decision on Georgians officers in the Polish Army according to the interest of their own party, however, to the detriment of the Georgian independence movement.

foreign affairs of the Polish Army. It is this department dealt with Promethean movement, and also with the issue of the acceptance to the army of contract officers, representatives of non-Russian emigration from the USSR.

⁴ 1931, 26 stycznia. *Notatka rady Karola Dubicza Penthera o zmianach organizacyjnych w łonie rządu gruzińskiego po zabójstwie Prezydenta Gruzji na uchodźctwie, Noe Ramiszwili*, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 182.

⁵ Polish Military Organization was founded in Warsaw in 1914. It was a secret military organization created on the initiative of J. Piłsudski to fight against Russian invader. Then PMO division began to emerge in different parts of the Russian Empire, where was Polish diaspora. In the Caucasus PMO worked since 1917, while in 1919–1920 there was a constant district of PMO, which leadership was in Tiflis. For this reason in the organization were a lot of people who understand the political situation in Georgia before its occupation by the Red Army and then maintained contacts with the Georgian diaspora which stay in Poland. It is estimated that in PMO at various times was approx. 30 thousand people. After Poland regained its independence after World War I, the Polish armed forces largely composed of the persons who previously functioned in the organization.

⁶ 1932, 15 stycznia, Warszawa. *Memoriał Zarządu POW — Wschód Komendy Naczelnej 3 dla Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego, w sprawie współpracy polsko-gruzińskiej*, L. 5/32, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, pp. 194-249.

⁷ This period is associated with right-wing parties' governments in Poland and gradual disappearance of Józef Piłsudski from political life. It ended with a military coup d'état which resulted in that the authorities took over the camp centered around the person of Józef Piłsudski. He held it in an authoritarian way until the start of World War II.

A group of people around N. Zhordania and N. Ramishvili was to allow its office in Poland, i.e. the Georgian Committee, to decide about the Georgian community in Poland. As for the Georgian officers, the major role was played by Gen. A. Zakhariadze. According to the signatories of the Memorandum, the situation did not change after the Piłsudski camp took power in Poland. In their opinion the proof was, among other things, discharging eight Georgian officers from the Polish Army in 1931 and the way of commenting on this fact by the Polish authorities.

The authors of the Memorandum noticed an important thing, which reflected the opinions of the majority of Georgian contracted officers in the Polish Army as well as Georgian emigrants in general. Namely, the fact that while social democrats succeeded in underground activities in the period of Russian Empire, they failed to organise an independent country. In that document N. Ramishvili's speeches to the Georgian parliamentary committee were reminded, when he was a minister in the independent Georgia. He guaranteed then that there were 75,000 soldiers and guards in arms in the country, and that number could increase to 120,000 within two weeks. As far as armaments are concerned, in N. Ramishvili's opinion there had never been such a big number of arms and armaments in Georgia before. He promised that Georgian soldiers would not run out of equipment and ammunition even in case of a two-year war. The authors of the Memorandum pointed out that the data was highly inflated and it took six weeks for the Red Army to occupy Georgia in 1921. The guard turned out to be incapable of conducting any militant action, while the army was able to send only 9,000 soldiers who were poorly drilled, equipped and armed. The Memorandum says that the Georgian nation lost its independence almost not defending it since the desperate and heroic but individual efforts of the participants of the Officer Cadet School and School Battalion and only one of the regiments led by Col. Nikoloz Wachnadze could not be considered as fighting by the whole nation. It was also reminded that during the last session of the parliament in Batumi the vote of no confidence to N. Zhordania's government had been approved by all fractions, including social democrats. It was also decided that deputies would stay in Georgia and only the members of the government decided to leave it. The politicians who did not leave organised armed uprisings in the country. A union of different organisations was made, as for the bigger parties, only social democrats did not join it. The authors of the Memorandum highlighted that it was significant that soon after the uprising had broken out in Georgia in 1921, the Georgian government in Paris sent instructions to the leaders of social democrats staying in the country. They included an order that

... one needs to join the Inter-party Union only if you can determine the aim of joint efforts of all parties not only as the liberation of the country and the nation, but also as a complete restoration of the Menshevik authorities with the National Guard, led by Noe Zhordania's government.

It was also pointed out in the Memorandum that at first the agents of social democrats were to call the Georgian nation for not taking part in the uprising against the Bolsheviks. Only when the authorities of the party noticed that they were losing their influences in the society and the uprisings of 1921 and 1922 in Svanetia and Khevsureti had reached a significant range, they decided to join the inter-party union. According to the authors of this document, social democrats played a destructive role in it. As a proof, they provided information that it was an agent of social democrats who betrayed the underground Military Centre in 1923 and as a result most of its members were arrested by communists and shot. At the same time the Memorandum says that N. Ramishvili assured Georgians politicians in 1924, both those in exile and those working underground in the country, that the insurgents in Georgia would be given help by European countries. As a result of such guarantees, an uprising broke out at the end of August and the beginning of September. The help promised by N. Ramishvili turned out to be fictitious, which, to a great extent, resulted in a failed uprising. According to the authors of the Memorandum, the assurances of social democratic politician had in fact no grounds, and their aim was to rebuild the decreasing significance of their party.

As for the direct divisions among Georgians officers in the Polish Army, according to the Memorandum, it appears that as early as at the beginning of the 1920s two fractions were formed. The Georgians, after arriving in Poland, were deployed in two training centres, one group in Rembertowo, led by Gen. A. Zakhariadze, and the other group deployed in Bydgoszcz was unofficially led by Gen. A. Koniashvili. Next, the emissary of social democrats came to the centre in Bydgoszcz, Capt. Georgi Uchadze, who agitated for this party. However, he did not succeed because he managed to recruit only three officers and one cadet. As a result, Capt. G. Uchadze was to provoke the people who were indifferent or hostile to social democrats shortly before the end of the training. He wrote a report for the Polish military authorities in which he accused three officers from that group of spying to the detriment of Poland. According to the authors of the Memorandum, an indisputable objective of those provocations was the unfavourable attitude of the Polish government to the Georgian officers who opposed social democracy as well as discharging them from the army. The commander of the training centre in Bydgoszcz realised in fact that this whole issue was a political scheme and it was Capt. G. Uchadze who was discharged from the Polish Army, and then he arrived in France.

The Memorandum also describes destructive actions taken by Gen. A. Zakhariadze. According to the authors of the document, he was the main opponent of the leaving of the Georgian officers who were trained at Polish military schools for Georgia to support the uprising which had broken out in 1924. That was his opinion despite the fact that many of them declared willingness to support their compatriots in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Gen. A. Zakhariadze's main argument was that the Georgians contracted in the Polish Army were to come back to their homeland only when it would gain its independence.

The Memorandum included the information that in 1925, in order to show their reluctance to Gen. A. Zakhariadze, Georgians officers elected Gen. Alexandre Chkheidze, Col. Nikoloz Kandelaki and Capt. Vasili Injia⁸ to the Georgian Committee⁹ in Poland (in the document there is a note that those officers had been recently discharged from the Polish Army at the request of Gen. A. Zakhariadze; it should be also noted that two officers — M. Kandelaki and V. Injia — were mentioned by E. Charaszkiwicz in the discussed note related to the collaboration of Georgians with German intelligence). It was pointed out then that electing the opponents of social democrats did not go the way of Gen. A. Zakhariadze, who led to discharging the three persons mentioned above from the Polish Army at the earliest opportunity.

Certainly, this opposition from most Georgians contracted in the Polish forces against social democrats caused that they were soon denied to designate their representative to the Georgian Committee. It happened in 1927 after N. Ramishvili visited Poland. Then Gen. A. Zakhariadze informed officers that the Polish Headquarters had forbidden them to participate actively in the work of the Committee. The Memorandum raises an issue that Georgian soldiers expressed doubts whether Poles were really the authors of that prohibition or it was an initiative of social democrats.

The arresting of a courier sent from Paris by N. Zhordania and N. Ramishvili in Georgia in 1927 reverberated among the Georgian diaspora in Poland. The courier had instructions for the local leaders of social democrats, which next were published in the Soviet press. The Memorandum says that in his letters, N. Zhordania called for sabotaging the national movement dominated by right-wing parties and fighting it with any means. He called their leaders fascists. The politician pointed out then that nobody should take actions in Georgia besides social democrats. On the other hand, N. Ramishvili was to write in the

⁸ During World War II V. Injia was an officer of the 822th Georgian Infantry Battalion in the Wehrmacht. See: R. Żelichowski, *Operacja "Dzień narodzin." Powstanie gruzińskie w 1945 r. na holenderskiej wyspie Texel*, „Pro Georgia” Issue 11, 2004, p. 102.

⁹ Georgian Committee represented Georgian emigrants living in Poland and in some cases government-in-exile of N. Zhordania to the Polish authorities.

intercepted letters that Gen. A. Chkheidze and Col. M. Kandelaki, who were contracted in the Polish Army, contacted Cheka's (Cheka — *Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия по борьбе с контрреволюцией и саботажем при СНК РСФСР*) agents and used Soviet funds. As a consequence of publishing these accusations, Col. M. Kandelaki managed to meet Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel,¹⁰ chief of the Second Department of the General Staff of that time. The Polish officer informed the Georgian that he treated N. Ramishvili's opinions as political, not substantial, and the Polish command did not believe in the allegations that Georgian officers in the Polish Army had collaborated with Soviet intelligence. It was highlighted in the Memorandum that at the same time the Georgian government-in-exile had been asked to explain the situation. The government sent a laconic statement that "it does not have any evidence proving the rightness of these allegations made by, among others, Ramishvili against Gen. Chkheidze and Col. Kandelaki." In view of the false accusations M. Kandelaki wanted to fight a duel with N. Ramishvili, who was then in Poland, however, as it was pointed out in the document, for reasons beyond the officer's control, the duel did not take place.

The authors of the Memorandum stressed that in November 1928 Col. M. Kandelaki had given Gen. A. Zakhariadze a letter in which he described the situation of Georgian officers in Poland and at the same time he criticised actions taken by the general himself. A. Zakhariadze submitted the document to the Georgian government in Paris together with an application for discharging Col. M. Kandelaki from the Polish Army (it should be reminded that it was the Georgian government that recommended the candidates for the Polish Army to the Polish authorities and could file for discharging them). Then the government dismissed the application. A. Zakhariadze, together with a representative of the Georgian government in Poland, Ioseb Salakaia, repeated his initiative with a declaration that they both would resign from their positions if it was not accepted. The Georgian government dismissed it again, however, M. Kandelaki was reprimanded. Both initiators kept their positions.

The Memorandum says that in August 1929 the information was spread that the Polish General Headquarters decided to discharge twenty-two Georgian officers. Soon, it turned out that this decision was made at the request of A. Zakhariadze and I. Salakaia, who were supposed to act on behalf of the Georgian government in Paris. They both motivated their positions by allegedly harmful — to the Georgian issue — activities carried

¹⁰ Tadeusz Schaetzel lived from 1891 to 1971. He was a military intelligence soldier, diplomat, politician and activist of Promethean movement. In the years 1926–1929 T. Schaetzel was the head of Second Department of the General Staff, in the years 1931–1934 he led the Eastern Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the years 1934–1935 he was the deputy director of the political department of MFA. After the war he settled in the UK.

out by the Georgian officers intended to be discharged. As a result, the officers submitted an official inquiry to the Georgian government. They received a reply that the discharge was an initiative of A. Zakhariadze and I. Salakaia. It was highlighted in the Memorandum that this issue caused such outrage among Georgian officers in the Polish Army that almost all of them opposed A. Zakhariadze, even those who had supported him so far. The Georgian government was asked to discharge the general from his position in Poland. This request was signed by almost all generals and staff officers, i.e. fifteen persons. Because of that, among others, Evgeni Gegechkori¹¹ came from Paris to Warsaw to conduct an investigation. As a result, all Georgians officers in the Polish Army remained their positions, while A. Zakhariadze was deprived the possibility to influence officially the contracted Georgians in the Polish forces on behalf of the government.

An interesting fact is that the Memorandum mentions Doctor Grigol Alshibaia, who was also listed by E. Charaszkiwicz in his letter as the main leader of German spy network in Poland. The Georgian was mentioned in the Memorandum when describing Shalva Amirejibi's stay in Poland, one of the main representatives of the national-democratic Georgian party, who participated actively in national uprisings in the years 1921–1924, after the Red Army entered Georgia. In October 1930 when received a six-month visa, Sh. Amirejibi arrived in Poland and stayed among others in Grodno, at Doctor G. Alshibaia's — a distinguished Georgian activist and the pioneer of the Polish-Georgian conciliation movement, as he was called in the Memorandum. Sh. Amirejibi had to leave Poland earlier. When staying in Warsaw, he was arrested by the police as a „troublesome foreigner” and deported at the Polish-German border. It was pointed out in the Memorandum that his signatories had not had compelling evidence but circumstantial evidence indicating that the representatives of social democrats, who considered Sh. Amirejibi¹² to be a dangerous independence activist, had influenced the Polish government to discharge the politician from the country.

The overall political situation related to divisions among Georgian emigrants and reluctance to social democrats caused that some Georgian contracted officers from the Polish Army did not attend the memorial service after N. Ramishvili's death. Therefore, Gen. A. Zakhariadze, the members of the Georgian Committee in Warsaw, as well as N. Zhordania's government accused the absent people of the lack of patriotism. As a consequence, eight

¹¹ Evgeni Gegechkori was a social democratic politician. During the existence of independent Georgia he became a member of the first government of N. Zhordania as foreign minister. After the invasion of the Red Army, he emigrated to France. He died in 1954 in Paris.

¹² It should be noted that at the end of 1938 Sh. Amirejibi settled in Berlin and started cooperation with the German secret services.

Georgians were discharged from the Polish Army in 1931 (including those who E. Charaszkiwicz listed in the document from 1945 in the context of the Georgian officers collaborating with German intelligence). It was pointed out in the Memorandum that the direct reason was an appeal of the Georgian government-in-exile, which accused the soldiers of opposition's activities and Russophilia, to the Polish authorities. However, the Georgian government denied that it had anything to do with discharging the officers from the Polish Army. Due to that outcome, Col. M. Kandelaki requested the Polish Minister for Military Affairs to specify charges brought against him. It was written in the Memorandum that the Georgian received the reply from E. Charaszkiwicz. From the information obtained by M. Kandelaki, it seemed that the Polish government continued the durability of its foreign policy, which intended to be loyal to N. Zhordania's government. It was also pointed out that the government was considered to be the general Georgian government and Poles accepted fully its political approach. E. Charaszkiwicz stressed that he believed N. Ramishvili to be the most remarkable Georgian patriot. When explaining to M. Kandelaki the reasons of discharging, the Pole said that the Polish government perceived the group of Georgian contract officers in the Polish Army as a basis on which the policy of independent Georgia would be made in future, and therefore it cannot tolerate officers who express the opposite attitude to N. Zhordania's government and his representatives in Poland (most probably, he meant here A. Zakhariadze and I. Salakaia). E. Charaszkiwicz continued that due to the fact that some officers had shown disloyalty to N. Zhordania's government more than once, the Polish government had decided to discharge them from the Polish Army.

The Pole did not present any specific evidence of that disloyalty, but in the Memorandum it was highlighted that it concerned three main issues: the collective list written by the officers to the Georgian government with a complain about Gen. A. Zakhariadze; the fact that he was absent at the memorial service after the death of N. Ramashvili; as well as the fact that the officers did not protest against paying for a memorial service for the soul of deceased Grand Duke Nikolay¹³ by the organisation of Georgian combatants in Paris. Finally, E. Charaszkiwicz explained to M. Kandelaki, that the Polish government is determined also in future not to allow the Georgian officers in Poland to take positions which would harm the actions of N.

¹³ In this case, it was about Grand Duke Nicholas Romanov, a grandson of Tsar Nicholas I. Nicholas Romanov after the outbreak of World War I was appointed as chief commander of the troops of the Russian Empire. During the Civil War in Russia, he emigrated to Europe and settled in France. In the years 1924–1929 he was chairman of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), an immigration organization of the tsarist army officers. Nicholas Romanov died in 1929.

Zhordania's government — even willing, if needed, to discharge all Georgian officers from the Polish Army. Apart from that, E. Charaszkiwicz admitted that the discharged officers struggled with a dramatic financial situation but the Polish government should not be guided by sentiment, when political issues matter. Therefore those discharged could not count on granting Polish citizenship, which would facilitate them to find any paid job.

It was stated in the Memorandum that due to the Polish policy N. Zhordania's government had an opportunity to settle a score with their political opponents in Poland through the Polish authorities. The authors of this document thought that because of an awful coincidence A. Zakhariadze had become the main trusted person for the Polish decisive authorities. He was compromised during the war with Soviet Russia, and made a career only because he personally knew N. Ramishvili. It was stressed in the Memorandum that A. Zakhariadze as a representative of N. Zhordania's government had an opportunity to revenge on the Georgian officers who did not hide their reluctance to him through E. Charaszkiwicz. That officer had, thanks to his position, practically unlimited possibilities to „render” the opposing Georgians “harmless.” The authors of the Memorandum criticised the Polish party for basing its policy unilaterally on N. Zhordania's government, which, in their opinion, led to a division among Georgian emigrants. In this regard, a representative of the government in Poland, A. Zakhariadze, was to discriminate the officers who had different views than social democratic ones. The authors of the document stated that minister T. Schaetzel was disinformed by his incompetent co-workers who lacked sufficient knowledge on the situation among Georgian emigrants.

In view of known archival materials, a thesis that the Polish party discharged Georgian officers in 1931 because they were suspected of collaborating with German intelligence cannot be proven. In the document from 1945 that is kept in the Józef Piłsudski Institute in London, E. Charaszkiwicz pointed out that at the beginning of the 1930s he had known about the collaboration of Georgian officers contracted in the Polish Army with Gestapo. The letter by the Polish officer was written in such a way that one can conclude from it that due to the collaboration E. Charaszkiwicz led to discharging a number of Georgian contracted officers from the Polish forces. However, it is important to bear in mind that Georgians from the Polish Army were discharged in 1931, and Gestapo was established two years later, in 1933. Based on the available archive materials, the only reason suggesting the discharge of the Georgian officers was not their possible collaboration with foreign intelligence, but only the fact that the Polish government based the contacts with Georgian emigrants on social democrats and discharged officers who were inconvenient for them. A thesis cannot be excluded that the contracted

soldiers coming from the nations which were part of the USSR were used by foreign intelligence agencies to obtain information. Nevertheless, there are no documents proving that the Polish government had any information on that. If we hypothetically assumed that Georgian officers contracted in the Polish Army collaborated with German intelligence, then, most probably, it would have started only after Adolf Hitler took power in Germany.

The fact that Polish politicians based unilaterally on Georgian social democracy caused that the members of right-wing parties started to look for other collaborates. Germany rose as their natural partner, in particular when A. Hitler became chancellor. In the Polish archive materials there is a document that compares the attitudes of Poland and Germany to the nations living in the USSR. It says that when Tsarist Russia collapsed, a concept was developed based on the support and patronage of huge countries for all such nations fighting for independence, which used to be part of the former Russian Empire, and next a part of the Soviet Union. The author of this document stressed that the first concept of that kind, called „Prometheism,” was created by Poland. Since 1920, it had been advocating the idea of the common front of nations which had gained freedom and the nations which had just started to fight for that freedom. The Polish government was to support democratic ideology. The document said that Germany arose as Poland’s opponent. Its policy related to that issue started to be formed at the beginning of 1933. The main credit for this went to Alfred Rosenberg, who in a decisive way influenced Germany and its attitude to the nations of the USSR. The author of this document notices that shortly after A. Hitler took power in Germany, A. Rosenberg gave a known statement about the division of the Soviet Union and Germany’s support for national and social anti-soviet independence movements.¹⁴

The comparison of Poland’s and Germany’s policy in the document mentioned above is quite unilateral. The author presented a simplified scheme that Poland supported democratic movements and Germany supported national-social movement. It omits the fact that Poland focused mainly on social democrats. This helped them to eliminate their political opponents, as well those with democratic views. To a great extent, it was affected by the fact that J. Piłsudski was a socialist himself and his camp after the coup and taking power in Poland focused on contacts with Georgian socialists. When Germans got interested in the minorities in the USSR, they became a natural partner for various right-wing politicians in exile. They

¹⁴ 1934, 12 marca, Warszawa. Pismo kpt. Edmunda Charaszkiwicza do mjr. Włodzimierza Dąbrowskiego w Paryżu, w sprawie polecenia Tadeusza Schaetzela odnośnie zbierania informacji dotyczących postrzegania przez członków emigracji prometejskiej kwestii narodowościowo-niepodległościowych i stosunku różnych państw do tego zagadnienia, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 296.

did not find any support in Poland, which focused on social democrats and took unfriendly steps toward their opponents, discrediting itself in their eyes. Thereby, by not collaborating with Georgian parties and right-wing organisations that gathered mainly young people with a negative attitude to social democrats, Poland lost their support in favour of Germany. The Polish decision makers paid attention to this issue as late as in the mid-1930s but it was too late to gain their sympathies. Germany was a more attractive partner. According to a French researcher, George Mamulia, T. Schaetzel supported compromises with a moderate circle of right-wing Georgian politicians.¹⁵ This is a questionable thesis, in particular if we study the activities of Polish intelligence in the years 1926–1929, when T. Schaetzel was the head of the Second Department of the General Staff. In that period, exactly in the mid-1926, under Poland's pressure, an Independence Committee of the Caucasus was established. Originally, it was supposed to coordinate the independence activities of Caucasian politicians in exile. However, it was formed in a way that it was fully dominated by Georgian social democrats and Azerbaijani musavat followers, which actually was noticed by G. Mamulia himself.¹⁶ Nonetheless, a thesis saying that T. Schaetzel accepted the collaboration with Georgian right-wing parties but only if they were subordinated to social democrats led by N. Zhordania and N. Ramishvili is probable. It is difficult to speak of collaboration in that case, rather of willingness to control Georgian emigrants by the main partners of the Polish authorities, i.e. Georgian social democrats. However, it is true that the position of decision makers in Warsaw changed when they noticed that Germany is an interesting alternative for right-wing politicians, as they used to refuse to cooperate with Germans.

In regard to this discussed issue, a memorandum by Haidar Bammat¹⁷ seems to be interesting. It was submitted in 1935 to T. Schaetzel, who was then a deputy director of the political department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. H. Bammat wrote in that letter that the actions taken by the Georgian social democratic government supported by the Polish authorities could not be in any way considered as an honest patriotic policy, ensuring faithfulness to the independence of the Caucasus. According to the Caucasian

¹⁵ Г. Мамулия, *Борьба за свободу и независимость Кавказа (1921–1945)*, Тбилиси — Париж 2012, p. 226.

¹⁶ Г. Мамулия, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

¹⁷ Haidar Bammat was born in Dagestan. He was an activist for independence and held, among others, the post of Foreign Minister of the Union of the Peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Dagestan. After the occupation of Caucasus by the Red Army H. Bammat went into exile to France. There he established contacts with Polish intelligence and has been an activist of Promethean movement. His relationships with Poland weakened when the country clearly relied on the social democratic parties, while he was a person of right-wing views.

politician, Poles made a mistake supporting N. Zhordania's government and treating it as a Georgian national government. In regard to this, he reminded that Georgian social democrats are incessantly the members of the Second International and strictly cooperate with Russian social circles. According to H. Bammata, Georgian social democrats were in contradiction to the Georgian national movement because they propagated centralistic Russian ideas and fought against Georgian political parties with decentralised and federal tendencies. In this regard, he reminded that after his arrival in Paris, N. Zhordania sent a letter to a representative of the social democratic party, in which he ensured that the independence of Georgia in the years 1918–1921 was only a temporary period and a temporary requirement, and he could not imagine the future of Georgia without close cooperation with Russian social democracy.¹⁸

The cooperation of right-wing Georgian emigrants with Germany, which developed in the 1930s, had its roots in the First World War, when German troops landed in Georgia, protecting it against Turkey's aggressive policy.¹⁹ As early as in the spring of 1925 Spiridon Kedia, one of the leaders of Georgian national democrats, submitted a memorandum on cooperation to the representatives of right-wing German parties.²⁰ In the 1920s, the German government was not interested in the issue concerning the nations of the USSR. The situation changed at the beginning of the 1930s when A. Hitler came to power. In 1934 Polish intelligence received a note from collaborating Mustafa Chokayev²¹ that described his arrival in Berlin. He wrote in it that the Georgians in the capital of Germany who joined N. Zhordania's camp were discontented with his policy. They complained that nobody had come to them from Paris and the centre had not called anybody from Berlin, even

¹⁸ 1935, 1 lipca. *Memoriał Hajdara Bammata dla ministra Tadeusza Schaetzla*, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 335.

¹⁹ Shalva Maglakelidze may be a good example. During the existence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia he was the general-governor of Abkhazia and general-governor of Tiflis. At that time he also worked closely with representatives of the German expeditionary corps, including Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg, with whom he agreed the content of the Georgian-German agreement signed on 26 May 1918 in Batumi. Using these contacts, Sh. Maglakelidze established contacts with German military circles during the 1930s. As a result, he had already become an Abwehr officer by the outbreak of World War II. During the war Sh. Maglakelidze was one of the leading organisers of Georgian troops in the Wehrmacht. See: A. Gryźlak, *Generał Szałwa Maglakelidze i współpraca gruzińsko-niemiecka w trakcie II wojny światowej w oczach gruzińskich dysydentów*, „Nowy Prometeusz” Issue 7, 2015, pp. 183-199.

²⁰ Г. Мамулиа, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

²¹ Mustafa Chokayev (Shokayev) was a Kazakh politician and activist of Turkestan National Unity. In the interwar period he cooperated with Polish intelligence, and during the Second World War he started cooperation with the Germans. He died in 1941 in Berlin.

though the situation required close cooperation. The note also included information that the supporters of social democrats in Berlin could not have made up their mind.²²

In view of the deliberations in this article, it is also worth discussing a document sent from a Polish intelligence facility in Paris to E. Charaszkiwicz. It concerns the consequences of taking power by the Nazis in Germany for the movement. It was reported there that even before taking power the circles of A. Hitler's collaborators tried to make contact with a group of emigrants from the Caucasus which collaborated with Poles. The author of the document states that he knows about two such events, one concerns Azerbaijanis and the other — Georgians. The addressee of this letter, E. Charaszkiwicz, also knows about it. In this regard, he pointed out that you could not rule out if other attempts of that kind had been made. Then, as the author said, "our friends" had a negative attitude to those proposals because cooperation with Poland gave them disproportionately bigger benefits than the German party could give them. When A. Hitler came to power, the situation significantly changed. As it was pointed out, Germany had huge financial resources and big influences on the international arena in the policy related to the minorities in the USSR. Poland could offer them little. The author of the letter expressed hope that reducing the resources by Poland to fund the Promethean movement would not push their current collaborators to the policy that would be hostile for Poland, concerning also the fact that some emigrant groupings had been cooperating with Germany for a long time. At the end of the note there was information that concluding from the objectives of A. Hitler's political supporters revealed so far, it should be expected that they would resubmit their proposal in a situation more beneficial for them.²³

E. Charaszkiwicz's reply to this letter is interesting. He wrote that you

... mention about the events I allegedly know, about the Wolf [Wolf was a cryptonym of A. Hitler in polish Intelligence assessment — P.A.] contacting Azy [Azy was a cryptonym of Azerbaijanis in polish Intelligence assessment — P.A.] and Grzmoty [Grzmoty was a cryptonym of Georgians in polish Intelligence assessment — P.A.]. *I ask you for details because I do not know to which events this should be referred to.*²⁴

²² 1934, 3 czerwca. Notatka Mustafy Czokajewa z wyjazdu do Berlina, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 305.

²³ 1933, 11 lutego. Pismo placówki „Martin” w Paryżu do kpt. Edmunda Charaszkiwicza w sprawie konsekwencji wynikających dla ruchu prometejskiego z dojścia Hitlera do władzy, L.dz. 49/33/14, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, pp. 270-271.

²⁴ 1933, 21 lutego, Warszawa. Pismo kpt. Edmunda Charaszkiwicza do placówki „Martin” w Paryżu w sprawie wyjaśnienia cięć budżetu przeznaczzonego na działalność prometejską, L.dz. 198/33/24, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 272.

It seems that E. Charaszkiwicz did not have any detailed knowledge on the German and Georgian issues.

Germans started to implement an active policy toward non-Russian emigrants from the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s.²⁵ However, at the beginning it was not specified. In 1935 M. Chokoyev reported to the Polish intelligence that there is a divergence in the policy toward the USSR and its possible division among the German authorities. He listed, among others, Gen. Hermann Göring, Prussian PM and commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, as well as Joseph Goebbels, propaganda minister, as the main opponents of dividing the USSR. On the other hand, A. Hitler himself was to support publicly the division. According to M. Chokayev

German's weak point is their contact with emigrants supporting independence. If I said that Germany does not have serious contacts, even more, it does not have contacts with the representatives of separatists at all, I would be very far from exaggeration. The fault lies with the supporters of independence themselves, who poorly present themselves in Berlin. Their most numerous group, Georgians, are divided and at variance.²⁶

In the same year, another collaborator of Polish intelligence, Magomed Sunsh-Girey,²⁷ when reporting on his stay in Berlin, he wrote that there was no doubt that the German government was interested not only in the general issues of the USSR, but also in the Caucasian issues. After visiting the Propaganda Ministry and the department of the national-social party, whose foreign policy was led by A. Rosenberg, M. Sunsh-Girey thought that Germans realized well the situation in the Caucasus.²⁸

Mainly Georgian emigrants with right-wing views as well as social democrats decided to cooperate with Germans in the 1930s. Shalva Maghlakelidze is a well-known example in this case. He was a famous social democratic politician and at the same time one of the most important Georgians during the Second World War in Wehrmacht, where he had the rank of Major General. He was a governor of Tiflis when Georgia was independent. After the Red Army took the Caucasus, he was discharged from the USSR to Germany. Next, he lived in Latvia and the Czech Republic,

²⁵ Г. Мамулия, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

²⁶ 1935, 4 marca. *Sprawozdanie Mustafy Czokajewa z podróży do Berlina*, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 318.

²⁷ Magomed Sunsh-Girey was the Balkar by birth. After the occupation of the Caucasus by the Red Army he went into exile in Europe, where he was an active participant of Promethean movement.

²⁸ 1935, 28 czerwiec, *Paryż. Sprawozdanie Mahometa Sunsz Gireja z wyjazdu do Berlina*, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, pp. 328-329.

where, according to G. Mamuli, he dealt with intelligence activities for social democratic N. Zhordania's government. When A. Hitler came to power, he started collaborating with German military circles.²⁹ In 1939 Sh. Maghlakelidze arrived in Warsaw twice after commissioning the top commanders from the German army, persuading his Polish speakers to join the coalition of Axis powers by Poland. Gen. A. Zakhariadze³⁰ was his channel for contacts with Poles.

When discussing the involvement of Poland in the Promethean movement, consideration should be given to the sense of this undertaking, which is often omitted in the works of Polish researchers. It involved great organisational efforts and financial resources, which were a substantial burden for the reviving country. Poland did not gain any real benefits from the existence of the Promethean movement. The non-Russian nations of the USSR for whom this movement was aimed to did not gain them either. It seems that its only beneficiary was a narrow group of emigrants for which it was a fixed source of funds. Such a view was popular in the inter-war period. It is reflected well in the report by Capt. Stefan Nowaczek on conducting a sabotage course for a group of Georgian soldiers in 1930 who were to be taken in secret to Georgia. A part of this document presents the opinions of trained persons on Georgian emigration organisations. The officer wrote that:

... they complained that they have too many organisations in exile, inside which there are various frictions. They complained a lot about Gen. Zakhariadze and in general about all those who are safe in Poland and „get through money.” They do not contribute to the “holy issue” at all [i.e. to lead to the independence of Georgia — P.A.]. The General and others are accused of passivity, indifference and slovenliness.³¹

The appropriateness of Polish policy was also questioned; despite the willingness of the Georgian officers trained in Poland to go to Georgia to support the uprising of 1924, such an action was not taken. Certainly, Gen. A. Zakhariadze's position was key to this issue — in his opinion, soldiers would be able to come back to their homeland only when it gained its independence and they would not participate in the national independence fighting for their nation. This position undermined the point of training Georgians in the Polish Army.

²⁹ Г. Мамулиа, *Грузинский легион вермахта*, Москва 2011, p. 12.

³⁰ Г. Мамулиа, *Борьба за свободу...*, pp. 254-259.

³¹ 1930. *Sprawozdanie kpt. Stefana Nowaczka z wyszkolenia dywersyjnego grupy gruzińskiej*. *L.dz. 177.II/XIV, 1185/1930*, [in:] *II Rzeczpospolita wobec...*, p. 151.

It should be also pointed out that the main creators of the Promethean movement from the Polish party were people connected with J. Piłsudski's camp, so close to social democratic views. However, there were critics of the Polish policy toward the non-Russian nations of the USSR even around him. One of them was Maj. Aleksander Hauke-Nowak.³² His opinion on this issue is presented in a document drawn up after the Second World War and kept in the archive of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in London, in unit No. 100 entitled *Stefan Mayer's Archive*, No. 136. A. Hauke-Nowak blamed Piłsudski's followers for not being prepared for the war with Germany, in particular he blamed Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski,³³ who was to reject a British proposal to establish an agreement of four countries: Poland, Germany, the UK and Russia. K. Sosnkowski was not to allow that because he was the main supporter of Prometheism, a popular movement among the adherents of Piłsudski in the Second Department whose epigone was

Charaszkiwicz, a major of our AMGOT.³⁴ So he hoped that with the help of such unemployed half-wits from the Second Department, he would manage to divide Russia into small countries, and then he would go to the East with Germans. This agreement with Russia was avoided. No military plans related to the western front had been developed in the Headquarters since 1926 until Piłsudski's death

Apart from the criticism of Poland's involvement in the Promethean movement, the document also says about the reason of such actions. It was the fact that the Polish government treated the USSR as the main threat of safety and took all actions which could lead to the weakening of their eastern neighbour. At the same time the German threat had been underestimated for a long time.

As for the possible collaboration of Georgian officers contracted in the Polish Army with German intelligence, it must be said that until now no

³² Aleksander Hauke-Nowak lived from 1896 to 1956. Since gaining independence by Poland in 1918-1931 he was a professional soldier. In the years 1933-1938 A. Hauke-Nowak was the provincial governor of Lodz, then the provincial governor of Volyn. During the Second World War he was in Britain, and afterwards he went to South America.

³³ Gen. K. Sosnkowski was one of the most powerful military in Poland in the interwar period. During World War II, after the death of Gen. Sikorski in a plane crash in Gibraltar in 1943, K. Sosnkowski was the commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces. Often it is accused him a short-sighted policies and the underestimation of the German threat to Poland. In 1934 already K. Sosnkowski presented the report, where asserted, that over the next twenty years Germany will not be able to rebuild military power. See: P. Kołakowski, „Laboratorium” — *komórka analityczna marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego*, „Słupskie Studia Historyczne” No. 16, 2000, p. 122.

³⁴ The author refers here to AMGOT — the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories, ie. the allied military administration.

documents were found in the archives in Poland which would prove that the Polish government had any information on that issue. Sergiusz Mikulicz wrote about it more than forty years ago. He was the first Polish researcher who studied comprehensively the Promethean movement.³⁵ The discussed document from the Józef Piłsudski Institute in London should be treated only as possible circumstantial evidence of a thesis saying that individual Georgian military men could have been agents of German intelligence service, which also used Georgian emigrants with right-wing views living in Poland for its own purpose. However, it must be proved by other research materials, which should be found particularly in German archives.

The second document, a report by S. Kobiashvili, is descriptive and presents the reasons why Georgians decided to cooperate with Germans during World War Two. Its author, S. Kobiashvili, who was a Georgian contract officer in the Polish Army, is noteworthy. In September 1939 he was the chief of the Pomeranian Cavalry Brigade as cavalry captain and he participated actively in the Polish defensive struggle. Later, he joined the command of 798th Georgian Infantry Battalion in Wehrmacht as captain and proved himself as one of the best Georgian officers in exile.³⁶

One must agree with the main theses of S. Kobiashvili's report. However, one-sidedness of the report gives grounds for concern. The report is clearly addressee-oriented, to people from command positions in the Polish Army from the Second Polish Republic, who were in exile after 1945. S. Kobiashvili strongly emphasises that the Georgian emigrants made their decisions about joining Wehrmacht because of the sense of duty to their homeland. Wehrmacht was supposed to cause the collapse of the Soviet Union and establish national countries instead, including Georgia.

The author of the report focuses on the fact that the nations of the Caucasus would not have fought in the Red Army, which resulted in frequent desertions and going over to the German side. He omits the desertion of Georgians from the Georgian battalions from the Georgian Legion of Wehrmacht. It was so common that German commanders did not consider those units to be competent military units. When the 795th Georgian Infantry Battalion (GIB) was transported by Germans in the middle of August 1942 from the occupied Poland to the Caucasian front, so many Georgians deserted from it that it had to be moved to the back. That did not prevent from another desertions and as a result Germans disarmed the unit in October. The same situation occurred in the 796th GIB to which, when many soldiers deserted,

³⁵ S. Mikulicz, *Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1971, p. 187.

³⁶ Г. Мамулиа, *Грузинский легион...*, p. 134.

soldiers from the Central Army had to be transferred and as a result it was transformed into the 795th Turkestan Supply Battalion. Many Georgians and other soldiers from the Caucasus serving in the Eastern Legions went over in large numbers to the Red Army during the battle of Kursk.

The Georgians from Wehrmacht did not desert only on the eastern front. The situation in the Western Europe was the same. A big number of soldiers from the 797th and 799th GIBs fled and fought for the French resistance. Such events as the rebellion of the 822nd GIB on the Texel island³⁷ cannot be ignored. It took place in April 1945. Georgians killed approx. 250 German soldiers in sleep and then took control over the island.³⁸ Germans managed to crush the rebellion within several weeks. More than 200 Georgians survived the fight. They were given to the Soviet Union by the Allies when the war finished. They were quickly rehabilitated by the Soviet authorities, which was a precedent, as far as the soldiers serving in the Eastern Legions of Wehrmacht are concerned. Therefore, we may discuss about the battle value of the Georgian units in the German army and the real involvement of Georgian soldiers on the German side and the fight against the Soviet Union.

The author of the report, S. Kobiashvili, must have known a lot about the fact that most Georgian battalions in Wehrmacht struggled with numerous desertions, including going over to the Red Army. He was one of the highest in rank Georgian officers who held a command position in the Georgian units in Wehrmacht. There is no doubt that a group of Georgian soldiers fought with dedication for Germany, such as the 798th GIB, which participated in battles against the Allies in the north-western France. The soldiers from the 824th GIB are an example of those who served in the Georgian Legion because of ideological reasons. In the spring of 1944 the unit was fighting the Red Army near Lviv. When the unit was destroyed, some Georgians who managed to survive fought for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Українська Повстанська Армія*). As a matter of fact, Georgians had fought for the UIA before. There had been groups of Georgians, Uzbeks or Russians in the UIA troops at least since 1943.³⁹

Therefore, the report by S. Kobiashvili should be considered a piece of evidence about the past time, however, taking into account all the circumstances of its creation. The following things must be taken into

³⁷ Texel Island belongs to the Netherlands and is the outermost island in West Frisian Islands.

³⁸ In total, about 400 Germans and about 500 Georgians were killed in fighting on the island. See: R. Żelichowski, *Operacja „Dzień narodzin.” Powstanie gruzińskie w 1945 r. na holenderskiej wyspie Texel*, „Pro Georgia” Issue 11, 2004, pp. 108-109.

³⁹ О. Стасюк, *Видавничо-пропагандивна діяльність ОУН*, Львів 2006, p. 116.

account — the surroundings where it was written down and who was the addressee, because that determines its contents to a great extent and affects its individual aspects.

Postscript

In the spring of 2019, I carried out a query in the Polish Underground Movement (1939–1945) Study Trust under the project funded by the Lanckoronski Foundation. During the research I was looking for documents concerning Polish-Cossack cooperation. Accidentally I came across new materials related to Georgian-German collaboration. Among them is a report (actually they're two versions of the same report differing in minor details) found in the file with signature BI 0947, titled *Reut Tomasz kpt. Ps. „Mizerski,” „Kos,” „Tarnawa” — relacja* that concerns the underground work of Reut in the period from November 30, 1939 to August 1, 1944. In the report, among the activities described, there is a paragraph: „Mission accomplished by the intelligence officer of the group „Hanka” „Stragan”: 3 Penetration of Minority Committees.” One of the committees penetrated by Polish Intelligence was the Georgian Committee. A substantial part of the report was devoted to the characteristics of Grzegorz (Giorgi) Alshibaia. The document indicated that in 1939 he was the president of the Georgian Committee, which was located on Smolna 40 Street, and at the same time the head of the Ujazdowski Hospital. As described by Tomasz Reut, he was also a German spy. According to his account, Alshibaia was born in Tiflis.⁴⁰ When during the years 1917-1918 in Georgia the regiments of Polish soldiers from the Caucasian front started to form, Alshibaia began cooperation with the Poles. Reut wrote that these troops were formed by the adjutant of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the colonel of the General Staff, Yanushkevich,⁴¹ who made friends with Alshibaia. In 1918 Alshibaia was to leave for Germany with his family. In turn, Yanushkevich, according to Reut, ended up in Poland along with Polish troops, where in 1924 he was a general on the position of the Commander of the Corps District in Grodno.⁴² As the report states, Yanushkevich brought

⁴⁰ Current Tbilisi.

⁴¹ It's hard to say who that could be. Perhaps the author of the report meant Nikolai Yanushkevich, who was the commander of the supply of the Caucasian Army from 1916 to 1917.

⁴² If Reut meant Nikolai Yanushkevich, the information provided here is not true. Nikolai Yanushkevich never served in the Polish armed forces. After the Bolshevik revolution, at the beginning of 1918 he was arrested in Mogilev and shot by guards during his escort to Petrograd. In 1924, the Commander of the Corps District in Grodno was General Leon

Alshibaia to Poland in the same year and helped him to become a doctor at the regional hospital in Grodno, and then, thanks to military protection, Georgian moved to Warsaw as the head of the Ujazdowski Hospital. He worked there until 1939. Alshibaia, living in the capital of Poland, brought here his whole family from Germany, where his two sons had completed education at university level at the Polytechnic. After he arrived in Warsaw, his son Nikolai was awarded the position of an engineer in the ammunition factories „Pocisk,” located in Praga.

The author of the report stressed that Alshibaia and his sons were recruited by German Intelligence and that they completed a special intelligence training. Coming into Poland, Alshibaia was to be entrusted with the task of organizing a spy ring. Reut reported that during the interwar period Alshibaia and his sons often travelled to Berlin, where they stayed at the briefings of German Intelligence.

According to the document, when in 1939 the Germans entered Warsaw, Alshibaia with his sons showed up at the Gestapo office in German uniforms. Alshibaia was supposed to be a general in the secret police, and his son Nikolai, a lieutenant. According to the author, in 1941 Alshibaia was appointed by the Germans the President of all Caucasian organizations, while Nikolai remained director of the ammunition factories, which worked at full capacity during the occupation period. In accordance the information provided by Reut, Alshibaia had a law office at Szucha Avenue.

Reut remarked that during the occupation, Germans designated a former Polish Army colonel, Nikolai Kandelaki, as the president of the Georgian Committee. In the author's opinion, Kandelaki was a „big bastard” and completely devoted himself to work for the Germans. He was to work officially at the Gestapo intelligence department. According to the note, Georgian took part in interrogations of former Polish soldiers, during which he was mistreating prisoners sadistically. General Kobiashvili,⁴³ who was the Polish Armed Forces specialist, was to work in the Gestapo as well. Reut explained that even before the war, Georgian had been already retired and had been receiving the salary of a retired general paid by Poland. In his opinion, in the interwar period Kobiashvili had wide connections among the upper military spheres in Poland and he was fully trusted. For this reason, he was urgently needed by the Gestapo, which with the help of Georgian,

Berbecki, who served in the Polish Legions during World War I, and most likely had never been in the Caucasus. From the document, which I quoted in the first part of the work (appeared in the issue of „Sensus Historiae” No. 1, Vol. 30, 2018), it is known that Grzegorz Alshibaia was friends with General Aleksander Litwinowicz, who took command of the Corps District in Grodno in 1927.

⁴³It refers to Alexander Kobiashvili.

was detecting officers working in the underground. Reut emphasized that it is safe to say that Kobiashvili is responsible for the death of many Polish higher rank commanders who, thanks to him, were arrested by the Gestapo. The Germans were to regard him as a very brave and devoted man. The report shows that throughout the occupation he worked at the headquarters of the Gestapo on Szucha Avenue, where he had his office. The author of the document stated that he was also a cruel sadist and often beat Polish officers at the hearings in order to extort confessions.

The report said that when the possibility of joining the Georgians to the German army came up, the following men volunteered: Captain Alexander Kobiashvili,⁴⁴ Rittmeister Szymon Kobiashvili,⁴⁵ Major Dimitr Shalikashvili,⁴⁶ Captain Dawid Lagidze,⁴⁷ Rittmeister Jan Bakradze,⁴⁸ Captain Jerzy Mrelashvili,⁴⁹ Rittmeister Sozyrko Masag.⁵⁰ Reut explained that he mentioned those who were not sent to the front by the Germans, but cooperated with the Gestapo and fought against the Poles. According to him, the troops they organized were characterized by cruelty towards the Poles and Jews. One of these units was stationed in Czarny Las near Garbatka, outside Dęblin, and was at the disposal of the Gestapo, who resided in the assets of Garbatka. The property was owned by Antoni Jełowiecki, the mother's brother of Reut. The author of the report wrote that the task of the troop was to clear the forests in the vicinity of Lublin from Polish partisans.

⁴⁴ Aleksander Kobiashvili was a captain in the Polish Army.

⁴⁵ Simon (in Poland he used the name Szymon) Kobiashvili in 1935 graduated from the Military Academy in Warsaw and in 1939 he was the chief of Pomeranian Cavalry Brigade of the Polish Army. During World War II he was one of the Georgian officers who collaborated with the Germans. Kobiashvili died in the US in 1976.

⁴⁶ It refers to Major Dmitry Shalikashvili, who served in the 1st Regiment of Cavalry named after J. Piłsudski. He was the father of John Shalikashvili, who was born in Poland in 1936 and in the 90s of XX century occupied the highest position in the structure of the US Army — he was the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army.

⁴⁷ David Lagidze was a cavalry lieutenant in the Polish Army. He left Poland in 1927.

⁴⁸ Jan Bakradze was the commander of the squadron in 17th Cavalry Regiment in September 1939.

⁴⁹ Jerzy (Giorgi) Mrelashvili was the commander of the company in 45th Infantry Regiment. It is probably about Ingush, Sozyrko Malsag, who was the commander of the squadron of 8th Regiment of Horse Riflemen in September 1939. However, for most of the war he was in captivity and did not cooperate with the Germans. In 1944 he escaped from the camp in Bavaria, managed to get to France and was active in the local resistance.

⁵⁰ It is probably about Ingush, Sozyrko Malsag, who was the commander of the squadron of 8th Regiment of Horse Riflemen in September 1939. However, for most of the war he was in captivity and did not cooperate with the Germans. In 1944 he escaped from the camp in Bavaria, managed to get to France and was active in the local resistance.

In addition to the Georgian unit, there stayed still Ukrainian, Latvian and Lithuanian military troops. They caught and arrested Poles, after which the courts were held in Czarny Las.

In turn, among Georgians staying in the pre-war period in Poland, who in the author's opinion deserved praise and maintained loyal towards the country and did not start to collaborate with the Germans, were: Colonel T. Tuvradze,⁵¹ Major Artem Aromidze,⁵² Captain Geno Khundadze,⁵³ Rittmeister Vitaly Ugrekhelidze-Ugorski.⁵⁴ Reut briefly described their underground activities in the report. Ugrekhelidze, after being released from German captivity in 1941, immediately began to cooperate with the Home Army and was its agent on the Georgian Committee. According to the author's account, when Ugrekhelidze was offered to join the Wehrmacht, he flatly refused. As a consequence, Alshibaia demanded the death penalty for him, but it eventually ended up taking away the German ration stamps from Ugrekhelidze.

Reut stated that the Gestapo civilian agent M. Varelidze was active in the Georgian Committee. His job was to report behavior of the Georgians, and he was used to follow the Georgians, Poles and Jews. He was a trusted man of Alshibaia, from whom he received various tasks. In the opinion of the author of the report, he was very dangerous — he cited the example of Varelidze being shot in Lublin in 1941.

The report shows that the Georgian Committee was well infiltrated by the Polish underground. Reut noted that one of the good agents was Stanisława Mazarek-Żółkiewska, who spoke Georgian and was well acquainted with the Georgian environment. She was born in the Caucasus, and her sister was a wife of Georgian who lived in Łódź.

Reut in the document mentioned the whereabouts of Georgians who cooperated with the Germans: Grzegorz Alshibaia — dead, Captain Jerzy Mrelashvili — stays in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Jan Bakradze — stays in France, Sozerko Malsag — stays in Manchester, Captain Aleksander

⁵¹ It possibly refers to Lieutenant Colonel Valerian Tevzadze, who in September 1939 fought in defense of Warsaw, and was honored with the Order of Virtuti Militari, and then started to serve in the Home Army.

⁵² It's about Major Artem Aronishidze. In September 1939, he commanded one of the troops defending Warsaw, for which he received the Order of Virtuti Militari, later he served in the Home Army.

⁵³ Gedeon Khundadze in September 1939 was the company commander in 44th Infantry Regiment.

⁵⁴ Vitaly Ugrekhelidze-Ugorski served in the 19th Volyn Uhlans Regiment stationed in Ostrog in the eastern Poland. During the war he worked in the Home Army and then served in the 2nd Polish Corps who participated in the fighting in Italy.

Kobiashvili — stays in United States and works in the Polish department of Radio Free Europe. He noted that he was supposed to be welcomed there by Kwiatkowski from the 14th Uhlans Regiment, and now the director of the Polish section of the „Free Europe” radio in the United States⁵⁵. Reut wrote that one should inform Director Kwiatkowski about the past of Kobiashvili. While the civilian Gestapo agent, Validze, was to be in Baghdad.

The author of the report concluded that the Georgian Committee was run by the Gestapo agents and everything that was done there was made on the orders of German Intelligence.

The interview with Mikhail Alshibaia (1908–1967) may serve as a complement of the information from Tomasz Reut’s report. It was carried out under the so-called Harvard Project, implemented in the years 1950–1951 and aimed to collect materials about the Soviet Union. The project was financed by the armed forces of the United States. The participants were, among others, employees of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR in Munich, cooperating with the CIA. It was Bavaria that became the main place of the research. This was due to the fact that the region was inhabited by a sizeable diaspora of former USSR residents. The group was hostile toward the communist authorities, and constituted the main source of information. Within the Harvard Project, 329 large interviews, 435 specialist interviews and 12,5 thousand surveys were conducted.⁵⁶

An interview with Mikhail Alshibaia, son of Giorgi, was carried out on March 27, 1951 in Munich.⁵⁷ And by his words, he left Georgia in 1921 and started education in Germany. In 1925 he came to Poland, but went to Germany again to study at the University of Munich. Then he returned to Poland, where he stayed until 1941 when he was the director of a factory in Warsaw. Alshibaia said that in 1941 he voluntarily joined the German army and served as *Sonderführer*⁵⁸ in the 18th Armored Division. In 1943 he joined the Georgian Liaison Team,⁵⁹ where he worked together with Kedia,⁶⁰

⁵⁵ It most likely refers to Jan Nowak-Jeziorański who used the pseudonym „Jan Kwiatkowski” during World War II. He was the director of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe in 1952–1976.

⁵⁶ И. Петров, *Гарвардский проект: список интервью*, <https://labas.livejournal.com/1010371.html> [17.04.2019].

⁵⁷ Респондент #543, <https://labas.livejournal.com/1133109.html> [19.04.2019].

⁵⁸ It was a specialist role introduced in the Wehrmacht in the Third Reich. It was received by people who did not have military training but were distinguished by their competences.

⁵⁹ It was a Georgian collaborative military organ.

⁶⁰ This is Michael Kedia, who was among others he was a German agent in the Vatican and participated in the organization of Georgian military units cooperating with the Germans. After the Second World War he became a co-worker of the American special services.

Giorgi Magalov,⁶¹ and Givi Gabliani. Their duty was to provide social security for captives, ostarbaiters⁶² and cultural work in the Georgian Legion.

Przemysław Adamczewski

Several Documents on German and Georgian Cooperation During the Interwar Period and World War II are Kept in the Polish Archives in London — Part II

Abstract

The paper presents documents on the German and Georgian cooperation during the interwar period and World War II kept in the Polish archives in London. One of the documents, written by Edmund Charaszkiwicz, can be treated as a potential clue in the thesis that individual Georgian military men might have been agents of the German intelligence service, which also used Georgian emigrants with right-wing views who lived in Poland for its purposes. Another document, written by Simon Kobiaszwili, is dedicated to the explanation of what caused that some of the Georgian emigrants who stayed in Europe developed collaboration with the Germans during World War II. To a great extent, the paper also discusses the conflict in the community of Georgian emigrants in the interwar period and the policy of the Polish authorities toward the Georgian government in exile established by socialists.

Keywords: German and Georgian cooperation during World War II, Polish archives in London.

⁶¹Giorgi Magalashvili spearheaded the Georgian Liaison Team.

⁶²Ostarbeite — forced laborers in the Third Reich recruited in the areas conquered in the USSR.