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Crimea—the Ukrainian Point of View. History and the Present Time

Crimea is undoubtedly the most distinct and specific region of present day Ukraine, enjoying a special administrative status—that of an autonomic republic (Autonomous Republic Crimea, ARK). It is an area rife with conflict, with waxing and waning separatist tendencies.

The first attempt to incorporate Crimea into the Ukrainian statehood took place in 1918—at the same time when the questions arose, of the independence of Ukraine, of Crimea remaining part of it, and of borders between states after the revolution and the break-up of the Russian Empire. The programme of the Central Council of Ukraine did not provide for the incorporation of Crimea into the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), whose borders were drafted based on the ethnographic and linguistic criterion. In December 1917, Crimean Tatars proclaimed the Crimean People's Republic, abolished by the Bolsheviks and replaced with the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic. In April 1918, UPR forces entered Crimea to seize Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet—the so-called Col. Petro Bolbochan's Crimean raid—under German pressure, however, the Ukrainian troops were withdrawn. A dilemma presented itself then, characteristic of the Ukrainians' present perspective on Crimean questions: How to treat Crimea and the Tatars? Most officers of the UPR army were socialists and narodniks who did not consider Crimea to be "Ukrainian ethnographic territory." Thus on one hand, they tried to explain the reasons of the Crimean raid to their soldiers by the necessity to claim the Black Sea Fleet ships for Ukraine and by referring to the raids of Zaporozhian Cossacks who liberated Ukrainian men and women from Tatar captivity. On the other hand, they took steps to organise some forms of cooperation with the Crimean Tatars against their common enemy—the Bolsheviks. The Crimean raid of 1918, though it failed to

accomplish its primary objective, entered the Ukrainian nationalist tradition as one of a few military victories in the whole dramatic period of “liberation struggle.”¹

In the summer of 1918, the German occupation forces handed over the internal authority in Crimea to the Crimean Regional Government led by Gen. Maciej (Suleyman) Sulkiewicz. This administration had no obvious ethnic identity, nor were its status and sovereignty clear.² Ukraine—by then the conservative and pro-German Ukrainian State of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskiy—lay formal claims to Crimea against Germany, offering economic ties and the vital interest of Ukraine as arguments:

The incorporation of Crimea into Ukraine would occasion so that Ukraine would have its daily necessities supplied, such as salt, tobacco, wine, and fruit. Control over Crimea would also bring Ukraine profits from creating new resorts and rebuilding old ones. By controlling the southern coast of Crimea, Ukraine would gain such natural ports as Sevastopol and Feodosiya. Without Crimea, Ukraine is being pushed away from the Black Sea, having but one port in Mykolayiv, as Odessa is overburdened. Ukraine without Crimea cannot become a strong state. ... Creation of a Tatar state in Crimea is unjustified from the ethnographic point of view, as the Tatars make up no more than 14% of the population of Crimea.³

In fact, an important motive of the Foreign Minister Dmytro Doroshenko's actions was a desire to prevent a possible “Piedmont of the Russian Empire”

¹ About the Crimean raid, see: N. Avramenko, *Spomyny zaporožcja*, Kyiv 2007, pp. 232-236; B. Halajčuk, *Čto uvilnyv v 1918 r. Krym vid bol'shevykiv*, „Litopys Červonoï Kalyny” 1938, N° 9, pp. 11-13; B. Monkevyc, *Slidamy novitnych zaporožciv*, L'viv 1928, pp. 75-159; V. Petriv, *Spomyny z časiv ukraïns'koï revoljucii*, T. III, L'viv 1930, pp. 55-133; R. Vynnyč'kyj, *Pochid na Krym*, „Istoričnyj Kaljendar-Al'manach Červonoï Kalyny,” 1929, pp. 21-29; P. Šandruk, *Syly doblesti. Memuary*, Kyiv 1999, pp. 37-39; Z. Stefaniv, *Vijskovi sylyč asiv Central'noi Rady*, [in:] *Istoriija ukraïns'koho vijs'ka*, Kyiv 1995, pp. 151-154; O.I. Lupandin, *Pytannja pro kryms'ku avtonomiju u 1918 r.*, „Ukraïns'kyj Istoryčnyj Žurnal,” 1996, N° 1, pp. 68-69; G. Skrukwa, *Formacje wojskowe ukraïnskiej „rewolucji narodowej” 1914–1921*, Toruń 2008, pp. 246-247.

² Under the National Government, Russian legislation from before 1917 was in force, with Russian as the official language, a flag combining Russian and Tatar symbols (light blue with the black two-headed eagle from the coat of arms of the former Taurida Governorate); the administrative personnel was composed of former Russian officials. Gen. Sulkiewicz was of Lithuanian Tatar origins (born in Lida). The Germans did not recognise the Regional Government as a sovereign nation but only as a regional government. For more, see: A.G. Zarubin, V.G. Zarubin, *Bez pobeditelej. Iz istorii Graždanskoj vojny v Krymu*, Simferopol' 2008, pp. 364-427.

³ Note from Hetman of Ukraine Pavlo Skoropadskiy to the envoy of the German Empire in Kyiv, Baron Alfons von Mumm, 10 March 1918; as cited in: D. Dorošenko, *Istoriija Ukraïny 1917–1923 rr.*, t. II, Kyiv 2002.

from arising.⁴ Those measures proved fruitless, however—the Germans did not resolve the problem of the final status of Crimea in their *Mitteleuropa* Plan in time before the collapse of the Kaiserreich. After the evacuation of the Germans, the control of Crimea was seized by the White Russians, and then by the Soviet Russia, who in 1921 established the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federative SR. In 1954 it was transformed into the Crimean Oblast of the Russian SFSR.

Crimea did not lay within the borders of Ukraine until 1954—it is thus the area which is a part of Ukraine for the shortest time. As part of the 300th anniversary celebrations of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Crimean Oblast was transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Officially, this decision was made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the request of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of both Union Republics. It was justified by “the commonality of the economy, the proximity, and close economic and cultural relations between the Crimean Oblast and the Ukrainian SSR.”⁵

Although these decisions had nothing in common with the actual will of the people of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Russia, and Crimea itself, it may be worth noting that—as emphasised by a contemporary historian, writing from a national Ukrainian point of view—the cession of Crimea was the first cession within the Soviet Union done at least in accordance with the legislation of the USSR. Previous cessions, including those in which the Ukrainian SSR was the granter (such as the transfer of the Eastern part of the Donets Basin with Shakhty and Taganrog from the Ukrainian SSR to the Russian SFSR in 1925, or the transfer of Transnistria from the Ukrainian to the Moldavian SSR in 1940), were carried out exclusively on the basis of decisions made by the central authorities of the Union.⁶

The official justification for the cession was indeed not far from its actual reason. In the post-war decade (1944–1954), Crimea was a depopulated, desolate, underinvested, and impoverished region. In 1944, Crimean Tatars,

⁴ A.G. Zarubin, V.G. Zarubin, *op. cit.*, s. 368.

⁵ *Nacijonalni vidnosyny v Ukraïni u XX st. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materijaliv*, red. M.I. Pančuk *et al.*, Kyïv 1994, N° 147.

⁶ V. Serhijčuk, *Ukraïns'kyj Krym*, „Ukraïns'ke Žyttja v Sevastopoli,” <http://ukrlife.org/main/prosvita/uakrim0.htm> (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011); It should be added, according to Ukrainian historians, that although the cession of Crimea is commonly associated with the name of Nikita Khrushchev (it is a common perception in Russia that “Khrushchev took Crimea from Russia and made a gift of it to the Ukraine”), the First Secretary of the CPSU of that time could not make such a decision personally as his position then was still too weak—the cession needed to be agreed upon by the whole “collective leadership,” i.e. together with Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Lazar Kaganovich.

Bulgars, Greeks, and Armenians were deported, which diminished the population count by several hundred thousand. During the post-war Stalin's rule, when heavy industry and strategic military were priority for the USSR, no effort was made towards rebuilding the infrastructure (including resorts) of Crimea, nor its housing destroyed by war. Vineyards and orchards lay fallow, the cities of the seaside were full of devastated and empty buildings. In the same period, settlers were being brought to Crimea from Central Russia who were unprepared for work in the specialised branches of Crimean agriculture, such as orcharding, wine-making, and growing tobacco. All they could farm were potatoes and rye. In this situation, the only chance of development Crimea had was to integrate its economy with the economies of regions with similar economic profiles—i.e. Kherson and Mykolajiv Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, even more so since Crimea was reliant on the water and electricity they supplied. Also, raw materials, machines, and equipment for the reconstruction of cities, industry, and infrastructure were being brought in from the industrial districts of Ukraine—from Dnipropetrovsk, Kiev, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Donbas. The cession of Crimea slightly preceded the introduction of Khrushchev's Regional Economic Council (Sovnarkhoz) plan, or the division of the USSR into 105 economic regions. Crimea was then placed under the management of Kherson Sovnarkhoz. Any economic integration of Crimea with the regions of the Russian SFSR was impossible due to strictly geographic reasons—Crimea has two direct railroad connections with “continental” Ukraine (Krasnoperekopsk–Kherson and Dzhankoy–Melitopol), while it is divided from Russia by a strait and only a shuttle connection has always been possible.⁷

The non-economic consequences of 1954 were initially not clearly noticeable. Crimea was included into the makeup of the Ukrainian SSR after the deportation of Crimean Tatars as a “Slavic land”⁸. Both the Ukrainian SSR and the regional authorities took action for the Ukrainisation of the region, i.e. encouraging the Ukrainians to settle in Crimea and organising Ukrainian cultural institutions there.⁹ Inasmuch as several hundred thousand inhabitants of “continental” Ukraine were resettled to Crimea,

⁷ For the causes of the cession from the Ukrainian point of view, see: P. Vol'vač, *Ukraïns'ka provesin' Krymu*, Simferopol' 2008, pp. 236-258.; V. Serhijčuk, *op. cit.*; P. Harčev, *Krym na perechrestih mižnarodnyh šljachiv, cyvilizacij, deržav*, „Ukraïns'ke Žyttja v Sevastopoli” <http://ukrlife.org/main/tribuna/garchev.htm> (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011)

⁸ P.R. Magočij, *Istorija Ukraïny*, Kyiv 2007, p. 560.

⁹ V.K. Baran, V.M. Danylenko, *Ukraïna v umovach systemnoi kryzy (1946–1980-i rr.)*, Kyiv 1999, p. 82; O. Bažan, *Sproby „ukraïnizacij” Krymu v druhih polovyni 1950-ch rokov*, „Ukraïns'ke Žyttja v Sevastopoli” http://ukrlife.org/main/uacrim/conf_50x.htm (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011)

however, which migration lasted until 1980s, the development of Ukrainian schools, publishing houses, theatres, and cultural centres on the peninsula was reduced in 1959–1960 and afterwards its results were suppressed, i.e. teaching in Ukrainian was being restricted, Ukrainian press was being replaced with Russian-speaking press, etc.¹⁰ Since the beginning of 1960s the formal affiliation of Crimea with the Ukrainian SSR was of little practical significance.

This affiliation had no reflection in the realm of consciousness for a long time. The Ukrainian Soviet historiography concerning Crimea simply repeated the main ideas of the Russian Soviet historiography, such as accentuating the Tatar–East Slavic conflict as the main thread in the history of Crimea, the negative image of Crimean Khanate, and the presentation of the expansion of the Russian Empire, including the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, as “objectively progressive” processes. The independent research of the Ukrainian Soviet science into the history and culture of Crimea did not develop, as since the beginning of 1930 virtually neither any independent Ukrainian academic Oriental studies nor Turkology existed.

The attachment of Crimea to Ukraine became the source of crucial issues and began drawing attention only during the decline of the USSR, and even more so after 1991. First, secessionist tendencies were revealed among the Russian and Russian-speaking population of the peninsula—an aspiration to establish an independent state entity loosely attached to Ukraine or not at all. Second, the question of the sovereignty of Ukraine over Crimea became part of a complex of contentious issues in the Ukrainian–Russian relations, intertwining with the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet and it being based in Sevastopol. Third, Ukraine inherited the problem of the repatriation of Crimean Tatars with a whole accompanying lot of social, economic, and political problems it entails. As a result, a triangle of reciprocal relations was formed, whose three corners are: Ukraine (the state) and the Ukrainians—the Crimean Russians and other Russian-speaking population (with possibly the Russian Federation in the background)—the Crimean Tatars. According to a later assessment by the Foreign Minister of Ukraine of the time Hennadiy Udovenko, an armed conflict scenario, similar to that of Transnistria, was quite realistic in Crimea at the beginning of the decade.¹¹ By the second half of 1990s, however, the central authorities of Ukraine managed to settle the

¹⁰ For more on this subject, see P. Vol'vač, *Ukrains'ka provesin' Krymu*, Simferopol' 2008, pp. 104–116.

¹¹ *AR Krym s'ohodni i zavtra: terytorija ryzyku čy zona konfliktu?* „Nacional'na Bezpeka i Oborona,” [further as: „NBiO”] 2008, N° 10 (104), p. 74. Henadij Udowenko—b. 1931, diplomat, 1985–1991 Ambassador of the Ukrainian SSR to the UN, 1992–1994 Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland, 1994–1998 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, since 1999

challenge of Crimean separatism. The final status of the peninsula as the Autonomous Republic Crimea (ARK) without sovereignty, without its own president, but with its own government and parliament, and Russian as the second (*de facto* first) official language was established in 1998 and has not changed since. As T.A. Olszański writes, reducing the Crimean autonomy to a form acceptable in the world practice and averting a potentially dangerous conflict without the use of force was a great success of the Ukrainian state.¹²

The events of 1998 are often referred to as the “neutralisation” (of conflict-provoking factors), which aptly summarises the state of affairs—from the Ukrainian point of view, Crimea is still a potential source of problems. The analysis of situation in ARK prepared by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Oleksander Razumkov in 2001 listed numerous internal and external conflict-provoking factors which threatened the stability around the region. The list included: contradictions between the constitution of ARK and the constitution of Ukraine, still unsettled budget relations between ARK and the centre, political conflicts among the Crimean elites, negligible presence of Ukrainian culture in Crimea, and the totality of problems referred to as “failure to satisfy the political and legal demands of the Crimean Tatars and to solve their social, economic, and cultural problems,” namely not being awarded the status of “indigenous population of Ukraine,” the lack of Crimean Tatar representation in the parliament of ARK (due to the unfavourable voting system), not having granted land to the Tatars, the problem of water and electricity supply for Tatar settlements, *etc.*¹³

While speaking of present-day Ukrainian attitude to the Crimean question, one has to tell apart several planes: the view on the Crimean autonomy and Crimean Russians, the view on Crimean Tatars, and finally the imaginations about the place of Crimea in the history and present day of Ukraine. The points of view of Ukrainians from very different factions on the question of Crimea, and especially on the issue of autonomy and Russians, are generally quite alike—similar attitudes are presented by the national-democratic-liberal circles, the radical nationalists, and (albeit less pronouncedly) the bureaucratic apparatus.¹⁴

Chairman of the People’s Movement of Ukraine (NRU), Member of Verkhovna Rada from 1998 to 2006, first as a member of NRU, then of “Our Ukraine.”

¹² T.A. Olszański, *Trud niepodległości. Ukraina na przełomie tysiącleci*, Kraków 2003, pp. 164-165. For more on the subject of the formation of the present status of ARK, see: *ibidem*, pp. 163-170 and: *Krym na politycznej karcie Ukrainy*, „NBiO,” 2001, N° 4 (16), pp. 3-10.

¹³ *Krym na politycznej karcie*, pp. 14-24.

¹⁴ Unfortunately, there are only very few publications presenting the point of view of the Ukrainian scientific or journalistic writing on the Crimean issues. A publicistic-

The relative political stabilisation of the Crimean situation does not mean that, from the Ukrainian point of view, the present status of ARK is a good thing. The compromise between Kiev and Simferopol, consisting of the recognition of the territorial autonomy of Crimea and the *de facto* leading role of the Russian language, as well as the abandonment of the use of force by both sides, is often perceived as a failure of Ukraine. In a paper written in Russian and taking a point of view convergent with the Russian policy in many points (e.g. the issue of Transnistria), a group of authors connected with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense wrote the following:

A presence of an autonomic territorial formation within a unitary national state is a paradox in itself. ... Actually, in the form of ARK, there is a Russian-speaking, post-soviet quasi-state, created as a result of a compromise, unequal for Ukraine, between the political agendas of Kiev and Moscow elites. The existence of ARK cannot be justified by the large number of Russians living here—considerably more of them live in other oblasts of Ukraine, and yet nobody puts forward any serious motion to create new autonomies in Donetsk or Luhansk.

The only legitimation for the Crimean autonomy might be the Crimean Tatar factor. However, ARK was created not as a national and territorial autonomy and not in the best interest of Crimean Tatars. It may be said that it was rather formed in order to counteract their migration movement in a situation where both Moscow and Kiev, occupied with other issues, were unwilling to take care of Crimean Tatars.¹⁵

From the angle of radical nationalists, ARK is judged even more harshly: “pro-Muscovite–revanchist reservation,” “anti-constitutional, anti-Ukrainian and provocative creation.”¹⁶

The autonomy of Crimea is thus perceived as a constant part of the political reality of Ukraine, yet at the same time as a necessary evil of some sort and as a result of the weakness of the Ukrainian state in the beginning of its independence. In 2001, according to the survey by the Razumkov Centre, 37.7% of the inhabitants of Ukraine thought that Crimea should be transformed into a regular oblast. An almost identical number (38.8%) supported the preservation of the current status of ARK, 3.8% opted for

popular scientific book by Petro Volvach, Professor of Agronomy and an active proponent of Ukrainian culture and education in Crimea, may be deemed representative. It exemplifies well the national or national-democratic point of view: P. Vol'vač, *Ukraïns'ka provesin' Krymu, Simferopol'* 2008. For references to other Ukrainian sources, see: *ibidem*, p. 238.

¹⁵ V. Ju. Bogdanovič, A. Ja. Manačinskij, S. G. Butenko, *Konflikty i vojny poslje raspada SSSR*, Žitomir 2006, p. 114.

¹⁶ V. Ivanyšyn, *Kryms'kyj vuzol*, „Ukraïns'ke Žyttja v Sevastopoli,” http://ukrlife.org/main/uacrim/vuzol_cr.html (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011).

the transformation of Crimea into a national Tatar autonomy, 3.0% for the independence of Crimea, and 4.1% for the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.¹⁷

In the eyes of national and national-liberal oriented Ukrainians, the image of Crimean Russians, the dominant ethnic group in Crimea, is also negative. They are perceived as the ethnic group who question the integrality of the Ukrainian state and who allow themselves to be used as instruments in attempts to destabilise Ukraine from the outside. As a group, they may prove very detrimental to the Ukrainian foreign policy and to the image of Ukraine, a case of which were the anti-NATO demonstrations in June 2006. The identity of this group is visibly determined by the Russian imperial-militaristic ideas, as the most important events which compose the collective memory of Crimean Russians are: the conquest of Crimea by Catherine II in the end of 18th century¹⁸, the Crimean War 1854–1855, Gen. Wrangel's "White Crimea" in 1920 (the last bastion of anti-Bolshevik Russia), the defence of Sevastopol in 1941, and its liberation in 1944. It is readily emphasised that this group is dominated by nondemocratic and corrupt, if not outright criminal, political elites. Finally, it is believed that the group's political and cultural domination in Crimea is "wrongful," that they usurp Crimea for their own national history, and that they build a peculiar "Ukraine without the Ukrainians" there. By pushing the local Ukrainians into their cultural niches, they want to engage in "Ekaterinisation, Potemkinisation, and Suvorovisation."¹⁹

A characteristic example of the critical view of Crimean Russians is a satirical text called the "Crimean-Russian phrasebook," incidentally written in Russian and published in a Russian blog. The author half-jokingly warns the Ukrainians going to Crimea not to raise in conversation such subjects as the Ukrainian language, Tatars, land ownership, cinema showtimes, holiday season, OUN-UPA, and Russian settlement in Crimea—as the Russians are oversensitive to these subjects and prone to react with aggression or propaganda clichés. She advises to talk only about weather, "and yet this too may be dangerous, as even here Kiev may prove responsible."²⁰

¹⁷ *Krym na polityčnij karti*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁸ The Russian-speaking inhabitants of Crimea themselves call this event "liberation"—for once, such does the the inscription on the monument in the centre of Symferopol.

¹⁹ P. Vol'vač, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²⁰ *Krymsko-ukrainiskij razgovornik*, Ledi Di, 9.04.2008, <http://diana-ledi.livejournal.com/126471.html> (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011) also in: Sevastopol's'kyj Forum, <http://ukrlife.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=2&sid=d462daf788e4b31de0bfbfb09fd28e41> (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011)

The image of Crimean Tatars is more complex and ambiguous. Among the Ukrainians there are three general ways this ethnic group is perceived. Grossly simplifying, one might call these views “traditional-national,” “romantic-antiimperialist,” and “Huntingtonian,” respectively.

By the “traditional-national” view, the Ukrainian state and the present day Ukrainian nation are the continuators of the Cossacks and Kievan Rus’. One of the main themes in the history of the Cossacks is the conflict with the Turkish-Tatar world, including the Crimean Khanate, a bandit state which relied on slave trade and which used to be a constant threat to the Ukrainian population.²¹ For centuries, a large part of the population of Crimea consisted of the Ukrainians²² and they have the strongest moral right to Crimea as the hard-working and peaceful tillers and farmers.²³ Their right is better than the right of the Russians—military men, officials, and militia-KGB pensioners. Concerning the Crimean Tatars, it is believed that they were victims of Russian-Soviet imperialism, the deportation of the Tatars was undoubtedly a Stalin’s crime, the return of the Tatars is morally and politically justified but should not give them any special privileges. The history of Crimea is shown as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, with a large, but not predominant, share and contribution by the Tatars.²⁴ Much attention is given, obviously, to explaining the circumstances of the cession of Crimea in 1954 and combating the myth of “Khrushchev’s Gift.”

In the *protochronistic* (or *hypertrophic*) interpretations of history²⁵, popular in certain circles of the Ukrainian society, the Ukrainians are shown

²¹ A large part of the Ukrainian folk epic, whose canonical, academic-school version still plays an important role in the formation of the Ukrainian identity, belongs to a cycle depicting abductions to Crimea and the Cossacks’ escapes from Tatar captivity.

²² P. Vol’vač, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-45.

²³ One can find examples of this way of thinking in relation to 20th century as well, e.g. in the cited above work by Volodymyr Serhiychuk and in other publications at the “Ukrainian Life in Sevastopol” website (<http://ukrlife.org>). It is emphasised there that it were actually the Ukrainians who rebuilt Crimea after 1945 and 1954, who were better landholders and farmers than the Russians, *etc.*

²⁴ O. Halenko, *Bytva rosijjs’koho flotu z Kryms’kym chanatom*, „Krytyka,” 2008, N° 9 (131), pp. 4-7.

²⁵ It is a set of extreme nationalist philosophical conceptions of history, present on the fringes of the Ukrainian scientific discourse and beyond, and yet is quite popular. Its main features are: 1) the perception of all peoples who in the past inhabited the territory of present day Ukraine as the genetic ancestors of the Ukrainians, or even as the Ancient Ukrainians—thus Sarmatians, Scythians, Cimmerians, “Tripillians” (the population of the archaeological Trypillian culture) *etc.* are Ukrainians. 2) the claim that Ukraine is the cradle of world civilisation, for there the proto-civilisation arose, destroyed by inundation when the waters of the Mediterranean Sea poured into the Lake Pontus, raising its water level and

as the indigenous population in Crimea from the dawn of history, as the descendants of peoples inhabiting Crimea for thousands of years, long before the Tatars: Scythians, Cimmerians, and Tauri.²⁶

There is also a “romantic-antiimperialist” view, an attempt to create an intellectual background for a political alliance of Ukrainians and Tatars against the predominant group of Russians and Russian speakers. In this view, the Crimean Khanate was a highly-developed state with significant civilisation and cultural achievements. The history of Cossack–Tatar relations is also a history of military and political alliances and mutual enrichment of both cultures—passing over the problem of Tatar captivity and slave trade. The Crimean Tatars are the indigenous inhabitants of Crimea and they should become allies of the Ukrainian state in the fight against the Russian imperialism.²⁷

A unique attempt to combine both traditions of the Ukrainian perception of Tatars can be found in the 2003 film “Mamaj” by Oles Sanin, otherwise

turning it into the Black Sea—as supposedly evidenced by both the Biblical description of the Deluge and the myth of Atlantis (the hypothesis that the Black Sea originated in this way some 7–6 millennia b.c. is given serious credit by some oceanographers, see C. King, *Dzieje Morza Czarnego*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 26–29 [Charles King, *The Black Sea: a History*, Oxford University Press 2004, no pages—AP]); after the fall of this proto-civilisation, its inhabitants were to scatter in different directions, founding the Egyptian, Summerian, Hellenic, Etruscan, and other civilisations; 3) the claim that Aratta–Oriana–Ukraine is the proto-cradle of the Oryans (Arians, the tillers), i.e. all Indo-European peoples. This whole *hypertrophic* discourse incorporates, often contradicting itself, the Aryan theory (created in 19th century Europe on the foundation of comparative linguistics, then taken over by the ideologists of the German racism and national socialism), the search for the Old Testament origin of present day nations (the Ukrainians are ancestors of all the “Japhetic peoples”), as well as various popular quasiscientific conceptions of 19th and 20th centuries, such as Atlantology. The most likely explanation of the rise and popularity of such views is that they arose as a kind of response to the scientific and political concepts, in which Ukraine was peripheral, unoriginal, and transitory, such as the Norman theory of the origins of Kievan Rus’ or the views in which Ukraine was just a periphery of Poland and Russia. For the best exemplification of the *hypertrophic* conceptions of the Ukrainian ethnogenesis, see: Ju. Kanyhin, *Šljach Ariiv*, Kyiv 2002. These conceptions were analysed by Andrew Wilson (see *idem*, *Ukraińcy*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 21–39).

²⁶ See e.g. P. Vol’vač, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁷ O. Halenko, *op. cit.*, p. 8. In fact, the “traditional-national” and “romantic-antiimperialist” views are not wholly mutually exclusive and can practically function as a synthesis. For one thing, Petro Volvach presents the history of Ukraine in accordance the the Ukrainian national paradigm, while at the same time he regrets that there has never been any lasting agreement between the elites of the Cossack Ukraine and the Crimean Khanate against the common threat of Russia and shows the Tatars as victims of genocide committed by Russia—not only in the light of the 1944 deportations, but he also calls the forced migrations to Turkey in 19th century (Muhajir) a genocide. See P. Vol’vač, *op. cit.*, pp. 213–234.

one of the first examples in Ukraine of a cinema very modern in its forms, visually and artistically impressive, but addressed to a very narrow group of connoisseurs. The film refers to several Cossack and Tatar legends in telling a story of a Cossack's escape from Tatar captivity and his love affair with a beautiful Tatar girl. The Tatars are shown as a hostile, but close and fascinating society.

The “Huntingtonian” view is not contradictory to the traditional one in any case, it can supplement it puts the history aside and focuses on the present day. In this conception, Crimea lies on the frontier between the “European civilisation” represented by the Ukrainian state (and, which is logical but remains unsaid, by the Crimean Russians) and the “Islamic civilisation” represented by the Tatars. It is stated that the Tatar national movement and its structures (Mejlis) are being financed and inspired by Turkey and are irredentist in nature. Crimea may become a second Kosovo or a new Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a region where separatism develops, though not Russian, but a Tatar one.²⁸ Moreover, fears of “Crimean Tatars falling into the arms of Islamic fundamentalism” may lead to a demand that Crimea should be transformed into a national Tatar autonomy, since this option would consolidate the Crimean Tatar nation as an ally of the Ukrainian state against Russia.²⁹

A diagnosis formulated in the liberal-national opinion-making magazine “Criticism” negatively evaluates the policy of the Ukrainian authorities towards Crimea, or rather the lack of it, and warns of possible tensions:

One can regretfully ascertain the lack of any active national policy of the Ukrainian state in Crimea. ... The peaceful neutralisation of Crimean secession attempts in the previous decade and the lack of any large scale nationality conflicts should not create an illusion of the state's wise policy. ... The success of the political compromise, embedded in the 1998 constitution of the Autonomy, is offset by the exacerbation of tensions between ethnic groups, above all the Russian group and the Crimean-Tatar group, threatening the escalation of violence and the strengthening of the Russian separatist movement of the peninsula.³⁰

²⁸ V. Ju. Bogdanovič, A. Ja. Manačinskij, S.G. Butenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-120.

²⁹ V. Ivanyšyn, *op. cit.* The author postulates the creation of a Crimean Tatar-Ukrainian Autonomy, with two official languages: Ukrainian and Tatar. His paper contains also some utterly unrealistic demands of de-Russification of Crimea. First published in the portal of the “Tryzub” Society named after S. Bandera — <http://banderivets.org.ua/index.php?page=pages/zmist9/tvory/zmist906> (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011). The paper was also published at the “Ukrainian Life in Sevastopol” website http://ukrlife.org/main/uacrim/vuzol_cr.html (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011)

³⁰ O. Halenko, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Suggestions of a beneficial to Ukraine solution for the Crimea-related problems have appeared for a long time, they were made during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma and then of Viktor Yushchenko. In 2001, the experts from the Razumkov Centre advised to leave the contemporary political status of ARK unchanged, and simultaneously take various political actions to “harmonise” the relations between ARK and Kiev, including increasing the role of the Representative of the President of Ukraine in ARK, passing an ARK Council of Ministers Act by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, integration of the Crimean bureaucratic class with the Ukrainian bureaucracy (through internships and studies), development of the teaching of the Ukrainian language in Crimea, recruiting the Crimean youth for studies at schools of “proper” Ukraine, and, at last, fulfilling the majority of the Crimean Tatar demands (although the assignment of quotas in ARK parliament to the Tatars was declared to violate the constitution of Ukraine).³¹

In 2001, statements of four important Ukrainian politicians were published—they took part in the “Round Table in Absentia” talks on Crimean issues. The four were: Representative of the President of Ukraine in ARK Anatoliy Korniychuk,³² Deputy Head of Administration of the President of Ukraine Yuriy Bohutsky³³, Vice Prime Minister Mykola Zhulynsky³⁴ and the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and National Minorities Hennadiy Udovenko.³⁵ All were asked for assessment of the contemporary relations between Kiev and ARK, a proposition to solve the Tatar issues, and a prognosis on political processes in Crimea in a strategic perspective. Vice Prime Minister Zhulynsky answered only the question on Tatar issues, declaring the government’s intention to solve the question of land and promising to fulfil other expectations of the Tatars in social matters.³⁶ Bohutsky’s answers were quite general but he noticed the need for the actual Ukrainisation of Crimea: the practical introduction of

³¹ *Krym na polityčnij karti*, pp. 35-39.

³² Born in 1957, agronomist, Deputy Prime Minister of ARK in 1998–1999 and 2002–2005, 1999–2002 Representative of the President of Ukraine in ARK, People’s Party (Lytvyn Bloc) politician.

³³ Born 1952, member of CPSU until 1991, then state official, Minister of Culture 1999, 2001–2005, and 2006–2007, Deputy Head of Administration of the President (Leonid Kuchma) 1999–2001.

³⁴ Born 1940, literature specialist, member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine 1992–1994 and 1999–2001; 2002–2006 deputy of the Verkhovna Rada as a member of “Our Ukraine” bloc.

³⁵ See n. 11.

³⁶ *Polityčna sytuacija v ARK: aktual’ni problemy ta šljachy ich vyrišennja*, „NBiO,” 2001, № 4 (16), p. 49.

Ukrainian as the first official language and the inclusion of Crimea into the Ukrainian informational space. He saw the solution to Tatar problems above all in the economic development of Crimea and the whole Ukraine, which would make possible finding the means to fulfil the repatriates' needs. He did not rule out the possibility of transforming ARK into a national-cultural autonomy, provided that its "inhabitants of all nationalities will feel like fully-fledged citizens of Ukraine."³⁷ Korniychuk (himself connected with ARK authorities) saw the harmonisation of Kiev–Symferopol relations before all in the realisation of the slogan "Less attention from Kiev, more responsibility from Crimea."³⁸ He deemed a quick fulfilment of Tatar demands unrealistic for the lack of sufficient funds. Udovenko's answer was the least restrained: he blamed for the problems the Communist Party of Ukraine and its Crimean leader Leonid Grach. He said that Ukraine had been taking concrete actions to solve the problems of the Crimean Tatar nation, but it also expected help from the international community, especially those CIS countries from which the Tatars were returning.³⁹

The following years did not bring any significant progress in solving the Tatar issues, however, and the question of the deeper integration of Crimea with Ukraine remains controversial. Although there were not any more increased tensions between the authorities of ARK and central authorities, the relations between the Russian-speaking ARK population and the Tatars did not improve, also the degree of identification of ARK inhabitants with Ukraine, already low, decreased. The political changes in Ukraine in 2005 (the so-called "Orange Revolution") massively contributed to it. The new authorities were negatively perceived by the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Crimea. Moreover, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko a new policy to increase the significance and range of use of the Ukrainian language was introduced, also in the popular culture sphere, among others through the requirement, established in 2008, that films displayed in cinemas were to be translated to Ukrainian (before, films from both Russia and the western countries were shown in Ukraine with Russian dubbing or voice-over). In Crimea, this "Ukrainisation" is very negatively received.

As a contemporary commentator writes, Kiev can pursue two active strategies towards the population of Crimea in order to integrate it with the Ukrainian state.⁴⁰ The first is the competition against the Russians in the field of historical discourse, i.e. the promulgation of the view that the history

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 44-45.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 50-51.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 52-53.

⁴⁰ O. Halenko, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

of Crimea is primarily Ukrainian, and at any rate more Ukrainian than Russian.⁴¹ The main theses of this current of thought are: the Ukrainians have always made up a significant part of Crimean population, the Ukrainian Cossacks defended the whole Rus' (the whole Orthodox world) from Tatar invasions, the seizure of Crimea in 18th century was made mainly by the Ukrainians in the service of the Russian Empire, the Ukrainians have always formed the majority of the Black Sea Fleet and both the Russian and the Soviet army in Crimea, the Ukrainians fought for Crimea in 1918 (the Bolbochan Raid mentioned above), prominent names in Ukrainian culture dwelled and worked in Crimea, such as the poetess Lesya Ukrainka, poet Mykhaylo Kotsyubinsky, painter Mykola Samokysh, and others. An example, albeit abortive, of actions in this spirit, may be the attempt in April 2008 to put up a plaque in the port in Sevastopol, commemorating the hoisting of Ukrainian flags over the ships of the Black Sea Fleet the 29 April 1918. The plaque was soon torn down by the local populace. Such actions may thus seem fairly short term, a peculiar nationalist race of symbols against the Russian nationalists.⁴² On the other hand, they are quite understandable, as this is what "historical politics" is like in the entire area of the former USSR. It also fulfils the needs of the Ukrainians who think in national terms all around the country.

There emerge some proposals of an alternative strategy from the liberal circles. It would consist of promoting the image of the Ukrainian state as a supra-ethnic democratic community which identifies itself with the European values. According to them, the military history of Crimea, instead of serving as a reservoir for the nationalist hegemonist discourse (Russian, Ukrainian, or Tatar), should become an inspiration for a discourse promoting humanism, the dialogue of cultures, and efforts towards peace—one efficient theme could be the Crimean War 1854–1855, when the present day ideas of humanitarian conduct in armed conflicts were formed: the work of Florence Nightingale as the pioneer of modern nursing, the achievements and humanitarianism of the Russian military medicine, the heroism of both sides of the conflict, which does not antagonise any nations any more.⁴³ The chance, however, that such a discourse should take place in the broad consciousness of the inhabitants of Crimea, is very slight.

In 2008, the Razumkov Centre organised a discussion between Ukrainian politicians, sociologists, and political scientists about the socio-political situation in Crimea, the Crimean issues and the perspectives for

⁴¹ See P. Vol'vač, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-103.

⁴² O. Halenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

⁴³ *Ibidem.*

development under a topic “Crimea today and tomorrow: territory of risk or conflict zone.” The alternative in the topic offering a choice between risk and conflict (!) was significant, noticed one of the participants.⁴⁴

Regarding that discussion, one should list among others the line of People’s Deputy Yuriy Hnatkevych.⁴⁵ He said that the Russification of the Crimean Ukrainians progressed and, unless it was stopped by conscious and thoughtful action by the state, Ukrainian nationalists might become involved in the issue. Although the Ukrainian society is generally passive about the ethnic questions, an open conflict may arise unexpectedly.⁴⁶

Deputy Minister of Regional Development and Construction (in Yulia Tymoshenko Government) Anatoliy Tkachuk⁴⁷ said that a *de facto* Russian nation arose in Crimea. According to Tkachuk, the example of Crimean autonomy is not encouraging for further decentralisation of the whole Ukraine—administrative costs in ARK are higher than in the oblasts, yet the economic and social development is slower. The Ukrainian state builds gas and water pipelines and schools—but it is Russia who finances higher educational and cultural grants as well as mass media. In order to retain sovereignty over Crimea, Ukraine has to become engaged in raising consciousness: “not Crimea should come to Ukraine, but Ukraine should come to Crimea.”⁴⁸

Ihor Zhdanov from the “Vidkryta Polityka” (“Open Policy”) Analytical Centre accused the political elites of Ukraine of having “no integral systemic policy towards” Crimea, he also commented on the weakness of Ukraine in the Crimean information sphere: the people in Crimea watch mainly the Russian television.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ AR Krym s’ohodni i zavtra: terytorija ryzyku čy zona konfliktu? „NBiO,” 2008, № 10 (104), pp. 73-88. One of the participants, Yuliya Tyshchenko (Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research), said that such a discussion topic indicates the mitologisation of Crimean issues in Kiev: “Today, we are traditionally trying to associate Crimea with crisis, conflict, risk. By and large, we ourselves reproduce negative senses and substances” (*ibidem*, p. 84) [taken from the English online edition, page numbers match: http://www.uceps.org/eng/files/category_journal/NSD104_eng_7.pdf (date of access: 11 Dec. 2012)—AP].

⁴⁵ Born 1940, philologist (German studies), dissident and political prisoner in the times of USSR, Prosvita society activist, People’s Deputy to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 1990–1994 and 2006–present (as a member of Yulia Tymochenko Bloc), Chairman of Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and National Minorities.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁷ Born in 1958, radio and electronic engineer and lawyer, People’s Deputy to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 1990–1994, Presidential Advisor 2005–2008, since 2008 Deputy Minister of Regional Development and Construction, no party affiliation.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 79-80.

Vitaliy Kulyk from the Centre for Civil Society Studies expressed a concern that social tensions in Crimea may transform into ethnic ones. Social issues, such as unemployment, social marginalisation, or unequal share in the profits from tourism, are common to all ethnic groups, but the lack of channels to articulate these issues threatens with pushing them towards inter-ethnic conflicts with acts of violence.⁵⁰

Yevhen Bystrytsky, the Executive Director of the “Vidrodzhennya” Foundation,⁵¹ stated that the position of Ukraine and Ukrainian language was greatly harmed by naively patriotic actions of some Ukrainian nationalist activists in the beginning of the independence. According to him, the stability and growth of Crimea requires an actual (not declarative) development of civil society—support for the establishment of uncorrupted local authorities and for social participation in power is more important than organising further conferences and “round-tables.”⁵²

Then Viktor Kotyhorenko from the Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies put forth a thesis that the instability of Crimea is consciously generated—the corrupt political class of the whole Ukraine and Crimea are interested in inciting inter-ethnic conflicts in order to maintain a system based on clientelism and corruption in the peninsula. Moreover, there are “destructive external influences,” from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, at work in Crimea, and “special services know [who] finances Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Tyahnybok and many others.”⁵³

Serhiy Danylov, the Deputy Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies in Kiev (AMES), presented a view that religion, symbols, and collective identities based on them play a greater role in Crimea than anywhere else in Ukraine. This phenomenon does not cause conflicts by itself, mainly because people in Crimea can do business across ethnic and religious differences, the problem is the lack of social dialogue about elementary matters even at the lowest (village, settlement) level, the ordinary inhabitants of Crimea feel left alone with their problems.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 80-81.

⁵¹ International Renaissance Foundation, financed by George Soros, is part of the Open Society Foundations network; its Polish counterpart is the Stefan Batory Foundation.

⁵² *Ibidem*, pp. 81-82.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 83. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Party of Liberation, an international Islamic party founded in 1953, strives to build the world caliphate with peaceful means. In many countries of the former USSR suppressed by police forces, works half-openly in Ukraine without much opposition from the state. Oleh Tyahnybok—leader of the nationalist All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda.”

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 86-87.

Apparently, in spite of the diversity of the attitudes presented, the Ukrainian national interest towards Crimea can be expressed so: more democracy, more dialogue, conscious information policy. As Yuliya Tyshchenko noticed, however, the greatest fault of the Ukrainian policy towards Crimea is not the lack of a program, but of its implementation.⁵⁵

The attitude of Crimean Ukrainians towards the political and identity problems of the peninsula is a separate question. It differs considerably from the views of Ukrainians from “continental” Ukraine.⁵⁶ In 2008, 25% inhabitants of Crimea declared Ukrainian nationality. In majority, however, they are “nominal” Ukrainians, whose attitude in all important questions is similar to that of Crimean Russians. 76.7% Crimean Ukrainians, according to the 2008 Razumkov Centre survey, say Russian is their native language, and even more, 86.4%, speak it most often at home (although as much as 43.9% declare that they can flexibly use the Ukrainian language). Moreover, as many as 55.2% of ARK Ukrainians would support the incorporation of Crimea into Russia (!), almost as many (54.7%) would support an increase of ARK autonomy within Ukraine, while only 13.9% would positively gauge a transformation of ARK into a regular oblast of Ukraine.⁵⁷ Most Crimean Ukrainians do not notice any discrimination against the Ukrainian language in ARK, they believe instead that the authorities in Kiev pursue a policy of “forced Ukrainisation” and blame Kiev for ethnic tensions in Crimea. Asked about a possible ethnic conflict in Crimea, Crimean Ukrainians answer that a conflict between the Tatars on one side and both East-Slavic groups on the other is the most likely. Crimean Ukrainians are disposed negatively to the aspirations of the Crimean-Tatar movement, but less so than Crimean Russians. Among Crimean Ukrainians, 60.9% are against awarding Tatars the status of “indigenous population of Ukraine,” among Crimean Russians—as much as 70.3%. The demand to grant land, housing, and jobs to Tatar repatriates is supported by 10.4% Crimean Ukrainians and 6.4% Crimean Russians.⁵⁸

Obviously, there are groups among the Ukrainian society of Crimea who represent a typically nationalist option, which is also pronounced by

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

⁵⁶ For more about the views of the inhabitants of Crimea, including the Ukrainians, on political and social issues, see research results in: *AR Krym: ljudi, problemy, perspektyvy. Suspilno-polityčni, mičnacional'ni ta mižkonfesijni vidnosyny v Avtonomnij Respublici Krym*, „NBiO,” № 10 (104), 2008, pp. 3-28.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 19-21. It needs to be noted, however, that the results of the cited surveys show much disorientation and ambivalence among the representatives of all ethnic groups of Crimea, e.g. it was characteristic to simultaneously give mutually exclusive answers.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 27.

the Ukrainian-speaking Crimean media (especially the “Krymska Switlycyia” newspaper), while the pro-Russian faction of Crimean Ukrainians does not have any independent voice in the debates, as its views are expressed by the Russian-speaking media. Even some sympathisers of the OUN-UPA tradition can be found in Crimea. At a scale of Crimea, however, people who declare themselves as Ukrainians are practically a Russian-speaking population, whose Ukrainian self-definition accounts only for their origins, e.g. the fact that the respondents, or their parents, came to the peninsula from the territory of Ukraine “proper.”

Such a high level of nominal Crimean Ukrainians’ identification with the Russian culture and with the patriotic views of Crimean Russians, caused that in the 2009 Razumkov Centre analysis a new identity categorisation was proposed. Instead of three nominal ethnic groups, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars,⁵⁹ three (or four) functional groups were introduced: a Slavic community (58.7%), a community of Crimean Tatars (9.1%), and a heterogeneous group of others (32.2%), among whom a subgroup of “Ukrainians of Crimea” (6.5% of all inhabitants) can be distinguished. The “Slavic community” are people who declaratively (nominally) belong to the Russian nationality, who speak Russian at home and state it as their native language, who identify themselves with the Russian cultural tradition, with the geopolitical community of the “Russian world,” and Orthodoxy as the basis of this world, and who believe in the idea of East-Slavic community under the leadership of Russia. The group of “others” is predominantly Russian-speaking as well, they identify themselves with the Russian culture and the East-Slavic community, but do not fulfil all the criteria of the “Slavic community.” The “Ukrainians of Crimea” who consciously reject the Russian-Ukrainian community (although in part Russian-speaking) are only 6.5% of the nominal representatives of Ukrainian nationality in the Republic.⁶⁰

In the end of the 1st decade of 21st century, the issue of prestige and presence of the Ukrainian state in Crimea is not optimistic. Frequent political crises in Kiev, cabinet changes, inexplicable disputes between the leading figures of the former “Orange Camp,” and the financial crisis to boot, do not improve the image of the state. On the other hand, in spite of various tensions over Crimea, a vast majority of Ukrainians (in the whole Ukraine) do not believe that an acute conflict with Russia over Crimea

⁵⁹ According to the 2008 Razumkov Centre survey, 60.1% inhabitants of crimea declare Russian nationality, 24.9% Ukrainian, 9.1% Crimean-Tatar, see: *AR Krym: ljudy, problemy, perspektywy*, p. 3.

⁶⁰ For more, see *Kryms’kyj soejum: linii podilu ta perspektyvy konsolidacii*, „NBiO,” N° 5 (109), 2009, pp. 2-28.

could erupt in the near future.⁶¹ This is illustrated by surveys carried out in November 2008, after the South Osetia War. This separatist region of Georgia is sometimes compared to Crimea, and after the war in 2008, a lot of speculations appeared in journalism around the world, that “Crimea was to be next.” For both the Ukrainian political elites and the Ukrainian public, Crimea is an inseparable and integral part of the territory of Ukraine. It is also the “Ukrainian Riviera”—virtually the only seaside-beach tourism region in Ukraine. Just as for the Russians from the Russian Federation, so for the Ukrainians, the Southern Crimean Shore embodies the imaginations of happy holidays by the warm sea and is tied to many personal biographies of ordinary people. For them, it is not a foreign region. It is worth noting that the current shape of Ukraine, within the borders set in 1954, is very strongly engraved in the awareness of present day Ukrainians—the contour of Ukraine with the peculiar peninsula at the bottom has been reproduced in atlases, school handbooks, on the maps hanging in almost all classrooms, in the weather forecasts in the television, in political party and business emblems, on souvenirs (T-shirts, mugs, *etc.*). The Ukrainian state has certain means to exert pressure on the authorities of ARK—Crimea is reliant on the supplies of water and electricity from the “continent.”

One may predict that, barring some extraordinary supra-regional crisis in international relations, Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea will not be threatened. One should not expect, however, that the attitudes of the majority of Crimean population should significantly turn to pro-Ukrainian.

⁶¹ V. Čalyj, *Vidkrytyj ukraïno-rosijs'kyj konflikt v Krymu maloïmovirnyj*, Centr Razumkova, 10 Nov. 2008, http://www.uceps.org/expert.php?news_id=882 (date of access: 22 Jan. 2011)

