The Epistemic Justification of Testimony - Based Beliefs: between Knowledge and Faith

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the epistemological status of testimony; whether true beliefs based on the word of others deserve the name of knowledge and whether our reliance on testimony can be a justified epistemic strategy. If we assume that it is so and testimony-based beliefs can be epistemically justified, then the question arises of what it is that confers justification on such beliefs. On the basis of what other people say we may form true or false beliefs, so dependence on testimony in general is not an infallible strategy to form beliefs. Hence, according to many philosophers representing traditional Cartesian-style epistemological individualism, testimony-based beliefs are not epistemically justified, and, therefore, they do not make knowledge. According to other philosophers, especially in more recent Anglo-American epistemology, that inherent lack of certainty in testimony can be overcome, and testimony-based beliefs can be regarded as justified, and, if true, they will constitute knowledge, which can be furthered transferred, via testimony, to other people.